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Abstract 
This study examines the transmission of shocks during the financial crisis, and 
particularly the transmission of shocks from one market to another, which we define as 
financial contagion. While the current contagion literature focusses solely on the effects 
of macroeconomic fundamentals on contagion, we argue that the element of shock, 
which cannot be directly explained by fundamentals, also plays a role. We first examine 
the contagion concept in this context and split overall shock into two segments: 
interdependence or common shock, which represents the elements that fundamentals 
can directly explain, and the pure contagion or idiosyncratic shock, which fundamentals 
cannot directly explain. The results support our hypothesis, and reveal that pure 
contagion is just as volatile as interdependence. Furthermore, we introduce two 
additional features into the analysis: the long and short memory feature, and 
heteroscedasticity. Past studies have considered heteroscedasticity in their research by 
adjusting it directly in the calculation. However, we instead examine this issue from 
another point of view, by using breakpoint tests. It emerges that adjusting for 
heteroscedasticity through breakpoint tests reduces the number of structural breaks 
detected. The long and short memory feature measures the persistence of the 
autocorrelation of the data. Our results show that the identification of contagion is 
highly sensitive to this feature while short memory processes are very sensitive to the 
models used. We then widen our analysis by taking trade and region into consideration. 
Our result is inconsistent with a number of past studies, thus suggesting that trade and 
region neither diminish our ability to identify contagion, nor affect the transmission of 
shocks. Finally, we look at financial contagion in a more comprehensive way by 
analysing the overall effect, the split effect and the duration of these effects together. By 
combining the investigations of overall effect and the split effect, we are able to gauge 
the role played by common and idiosyncratic shock, as well as how they contribute to 
the overall effect. Indeed, because of the impulse response analysis, we are able to 
assess how long the contagion effects last once they are identified. Finally, we reach a 
similar conclusion to those of previous studies, that is, the shocks last only a short 
period of time. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
There have been at least 11 financial crises since the Great Depression in 1929 (see 
appendix 1), roughly equating to 1.3 crises every 10 years. When it comes to financial 
crises, an interesting fact is that the shocks are usually not contained within the country 
of origin. Indeed, they spread through the whole continent, and sometimes even the 
whole world, especially when the US is involved. Research studies have offered 
theories relating to how financial crises developed and are transferred, as well as how 
they can be prevented or even predicted. At present there is no unanimous opinion, and 
as such we would like to focus on how shocks are transferred from country to country. It 
is hoped that our study can help countries to develop a better understanding of the 
transmission mechanism of shocks, hence informing them of what to expect or do when 
financial crises occur. 
 
The word ‘Contagion’ has been introduced into the financial field to refer to the idea 
that financial crises may spread from one market to another. Moreover, financial 
contagion is usually used in the literature to describe the spillover effects from one or 
more markets or enterprises to others; it is also used to describe the susceptibility of 
markets or enterprises to shocks. However, there is no consensus regarding exactly how 
contagion should be defined. In fact, an examination of the relevant literature reveals 5 
different definitions of ‘Financial Contagion’: 
1. Significant increase in the probability of a crisis. 
2. Volatility spillover of asset prices. 
3. Jumping between multiply equilibriums. 
4. Significant increase in co-movements. 
5. Change in transmission channels. 
After reviewing the definitional context of previous studies in Chapter 2, we noticed 
that research studies under definition 1 to 5 tend to include an increasing number of 
features and definitions. For instance, studies under definition 5 usually consider 
definition 3 and 4 too. This fact leads us to the conclusion that contagion studies should 
not focus solely on one single aspect but rather take a more comprehensive approach 
and attempt to encapsulate more new features as well. As a result, for the purposes of 
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this study we define contagion as the transmission of shocks from one market to another. 
The results can be interpreted under each of the last 4 definitions (definition 2 to 5), 
although the increased probability of a crisis is not discussed in detail in our study. 
Indeed, one of the new features which we would like to examine is what we call the 
‘pure contagion’. While all previous literature has focussed only on the effect of 
macroeconomic fundamentals, we feel that the shock component which cannot be 
explained by fundamentals should also be considered. In other words, we argue that 
shock consists of two elements. The first element can be directly explained by 
fundamentals and is referred to as interdependence or common shock in this study. The 
second element cannot be directly explained by fundamentals, and is referred to as the 
pure contagion or idiosyncratic shock.  
 
Chapter 3 reviews several representative methods from previous studies. We review the 
methodologies for 2 purposes. Firstly, although there are 5 different definitions of 
contagion, we must admit that they share certain similarities, with definitions 3 to 5 
serving as fitting examples. Different kinds of co-movement can be interpreted as 
different equilibrium, while different equilibrium may suggest different channels of 
transmission. Research studies have occasionally defined similar contagions using 
different words due to the fact that they used different methods. Indeed, these results 
can be interpreted better under their own definitional context. As a result, a difference in 
terms of methods occasionally gives rise to a difference in the definition. The second 
purpose of this study is to compare the advantages and disadvantage of different 
methods in order to display our methodology interests. For instance, as revealed earlier, 
our interests lie in splitting shock into two segments, and as such we seek a method 
which can help us to achieve this. Following the comparison, we concluded that Herd 
Behaviour methods cannot be used to detect the reasons for contagion, nor the channels 
through which it is transferred. While Multivariate Regression methods are helpful 
when identifying the possible transmission channels of contagion, they cannot help us to 
examine pure contagion. Correlation methods are straight forward when analysing the 
overall effect, but again, the same methods are feeble if we wish to examine the effects 
of interdependence and pure contagion separately. ‘Identification through 
Heteroscedasticity’ seems to be the perfect match for our intention, although we would 
also like to bring in new features which, in our opinion, make this method more 
appropriate. The two new features we would like to examine include the long and short 
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memory feature, and heteroscedasticity. No contagion study has ever assessed the long 
and short memory feature, yet we feel that the persistence of the autocorrelations will 
affect the transmission of shocks. Although some studies have already tried to adjust 
heteroscedasticity through direct calculation (Loretan and English, 2000; Forbes and 
Rigobon, 2002), it is our intention to try another, previously unused, approach by 
employing breakpoint tests. 
 
Chapter 4 sets out the methodology used. Following the literature review in the last two 
chapters, we identified 3 new features to examine in order to fill the existing gaps: the 
pure contagion, the long and short memory feature, and heteroscedasticity. In order to 
address the first feature, it is necessary to split the shock into two segments as we 
planned. Indeed, the Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006) method seems to be an ideal 
choice, as these scholars successfully split shock into two segments: the common shock 
and the idiosyncratic shock. However, in terms of empirical study, they only examined 
the way in which common shock reacted and completely ignored idiosyncratic shock. 
Although the element which fundamentals cannot directly explain is slightly mystical, 
as a part of the overall effect, it should not be left out. We would like to further the study 
by taking idiosyncratic shock, the pure contagion, into consideration. Moreover, the 
result did support our hypothesis, with pure contagion proving just as volatile as 
interdependence. With regards the second feature, the long and short memory, we would 
like to achieve that through ARMA and ARFIMA models. The ARFIMA model 
distinguishes between long term memory and short term memory, while ARMA model 
confounds them. The ‘Identification through Heteroscedasticity’ method employed by 
Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006) is based on forecast errors (the residuals that 
represent the shock). However, they failed to explain how they came about this 
important element of the methodology framework. On the contrary, it is our contention 
that quantifying the shock is just as important as identifying the feature of the data. In 
order to achieve both at the same time, we use the ARFIMA model to make the forecast 
and obtain the forecast error while identifying the long and short term memory features 
of the data. With this said however, we would like to see the results when we do not 
consider all of these details, and thus we will also examine the results of the ARMA 
model. Indeed, it emerges that the results are highly sensitive to this feature, particularly 
when the data relates to the short term memory feature. As for heteroscedasticity, we 
would like to address this through the use of a different, and previously unused 
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approach, the breakpoint tests. Our idea with this feature is quite similar to that of the 
last feature. We will compare the results of one model which fits heteroscedasticity (the 
Bai-Perron test) with another model which does not fit heteroscedasticity (the 
Andrews-Ploberger test). The Bai-Perron test and Andrews-Ploberger test are two 
commonly used breakpoint tests. Theoretically speaking, the Bai-Perron test fits 
heteroscedasticity better than the Andrews-Ploberger test as the Andrews-Ploberger test 
requires homoscedasticity while the Bai-Perron test allows heteroscedasticity. Our 
further accuracy test also confirms that the Bai-Perron test has a higher accuracy and 
deals more effectively with changes in variance. Hence, the Bai-Perron test is a better 
choice for the purposes of this study, although we would also like to see the results 
when we ignore this feature. With this last goal in mind, the results of the 
Andrews-Ploberger test are also considered. Moreover, by estimating the structural 
breaks exogenously, we can improve the power of the contagion test. In order to 
accomplish all of these targets, we use the new non-linear Iterative methods, as opposed 
to the Markov-Switching model used by Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006) did. 
 
In Chapter 5, we put the above theories into test. Indeed, we also attempt to bring one 
more new idea into data selection. We only included countries with extremely low 
dependence on foreign trade with each other as our targets. Based on the equation of the 
balance of payments, we reduced the effect of interdependence and made pure 
contagion easier to identify. In terms of results, we reached almost the same conclusion 
to that reached by most previous studies focusing on interdependence. While many 
contagion effects were detected, the changes of the coefficients were more volatile. 
Furthermore, we found that pure contagion is just as volatile as interdependence. When 
a contagion effect in interdependence is identified, we would normally expect a pure 
contagion effect in the same direction. As for the other two features we examined, we 
concluded that the identification of contagion is highly sensitive to the long and short 
memory and heteroscedasticity feature, particularly when the data relates to the short 
memory feature. The results from the identification of contagion of short memory 
processes varies considerably for ARMA and ARFIMA models, while the results of the 
long memory process are much less volatile. This suggests that being aware of the 
data’s autocorrelation feature before the identification process is very important and we 
should be extra careful when dealing with short memory processes. In addition because 
of the superiority of the ARFIMA model to distinguish long memory process from short 
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memory process, we prefer the results from the ARFIMA model. As for the 
heteroscedasticity feature, we found that adjusting it through a breakpoint test reduced 
the number of structural changes in all cases, and hence it has a significant effect on the 
identification process. Indeed, because of the higher accuracy and the capability to 
allow heteroscedasticity, we prefer the results of the Bai-Perron over the 
Andrews-Ploberger test. 
 
In Chapter 6, we widen our study by considering trade linkages and region. As the last 
chapter used specifically selected targets with extremely low dependence on foreign 
trade with each other, we would like to test trade linkages in order to gauge whether or 
not our ability to identify contagion, especially pure contagion, is impaired when the 
trade link is high. As such, in this chapter, we select our targets among countries with a 
high degree of dependence on each other while also attempting to keep all of the other 
elements including the testing procedures exactly the same. This will aid in highlighting 
the change in trade linkages. In the last chapter, we chose 6 European countries with the 
lowest trade links. As such, here, on the contrary, we choose 6 countries with the highest 
trade linkages in Europe while trying to keep all other variables identical. As for the 
results, the higher trade links did not diminish our ability to identify contagion. We were 
still able to detect many contagion effects in all testing procedures and reached the same 
conclusion regarding the 3 features as that reached in the last chapter. This result differs 
from that of previous studies which argued the importance of trade linkages. Indeed, 
since trade link is the only altered element and we observe no differences in the 
breakpoint tests or the contagion identification procedures, we conclude that, regardless 
of the kinds of trade linkages countries have, shock transfers all the same. Hence, we 
can confirm our finding that trade does not play an important role in the identification of 
contagion. 
 
After having fully examined the new features and establishing a more appropriate 
‘Identification through Heteroscedasticity’ procedure, we move on to look at contagion 
from a more comprehensive point of view in Chapter 7. Now that we have examined 
interdependence and pure contagion separately, we are interested to know the possible 
contagion effects on overall shock and how interdependence and pure contagion 
contribute to this. Furthermore, we would also like to establish how long the contagion 
effects last once they are identified. We do this by combining our procedure with Forbes 
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and Rigobon’ s (2002) correlation method and Khalid and Kawai’s (2003) impulse 
response analysis. In this chapter, we ask 3 questions. Firstly, what kind of contagion 
effect can we identify in the overall shock? Secondly, what role do interdependence and 
pure contagion play in the overall effect? Thirdly, if contagion is detected, how long 
will it last? In conclusion, first of all, we detect more contagion than Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) did, and of course we reach a different conclusion. Second, by 
combining the overall effect and split effect together, we are able to identify the roles 
played by interdependence and pure contagion in the overall effect. It emerges that they 
vary in different groups of targets. Sadly, we cannot identify the reason for the variation. 
Last but not least, we find that when contagion effects are detected, they normally last 
less than 5 days, and occasionally longer than 10 days, which is a similar conclusion to 
that reached by Khalid and Kawai (2003). 
 
Overall, this study examines 3 new features based on existing literature: the pure 
contagion, the long and short memory feature and heteroscedasticity. We split shock 
into two segments and employ ARMA, ARFIMA, the Bai-Perron test and the 
Andrews-Ploberger test to account for them. Indeed, our results strongly support our 
hypotheses. We then widen our study by bring trade links into our analysis and reach a 
different conclusion to that of certain previous studies. After having fully examined the 
split effects, we combine them with the overall effect to see how interdependence and 
pure contagion contribute to the overall shock. We also employ impulse response 
analysis to estimate the duration of the identified contagion effects, which is short and 
consistent with previous studies. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review on the Definitions 
This chapter reviews the definitional context of contagion studies, and particularly 
different definitions of contagion as well as the corresponding research frameworks. We 
will summarise the similarities and differences while also proposing possible ways in 
which these studies could be improved and suggesting approaches with which to expand 
the topic. 
2.1 What is Financial Contagion 
“Contagion” is usually used to describe an incident in which an infectious disease is 
transmitted from one person or organism to another in daily life. However, this word 
has now been introduced into the financial field, and vividly describes the spread of 
financial crisis, or more widely, the spillover effects from one, or more than one, market 
to the others. In other words, it describes the process or possibility of shocks 
transferring from one market/country to another. It is also used to describe the 
susceptibility of markets to shocks. A market/country that is sensitive to financial 
contagion is vulnerable to shocks. When it comes to shocks, most contagion studies 
focus on negative shocks, turmoil and crisis periods (De Gregorio and Valdes, 2001; 
Fratzscher, 2003). A few others argue that positive shocks should also be considered 
(Billio and Caporin, 2010) because their transmission nature could be identical to that of 
the negative ones, but in the opposite direction. Thus, a framework which takes into 
account both shocks would be more appropriate for the contagion study. Moreover, the 
spillover effects and the susceptibility of markets to shocks are comprehensive topics 
with many subfields. Consequently, the research frameworks of contagion studies vary 
as many of them head in different directions. Hence, the discussion of various 
definitions of contagion is as important as the research methods.  
 
The definitions of contagion in previous literature can be summarised into 5 groups. 
Definition 1: Contagion is a substantial increase in the probability of crises in one 
country, if any another country is having one. Moreover, the countries involved do not 
have to be neighbours. Definition 2: Contagion refers to the process whereby the asset 
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price volatility spills over from one country to the others. Studies usually take a crisis 
country as the origin of the contagion transmission. Definition 3: Contagion happens 
when the co-movement or the change of the co-movement between the asset prices of 
different countries cannot be explained by the fundamentals. We term this kind of 
contagion ‘pure contagion’, although it may carry different connotations in other studies. 
For instance, ‘pure contagion’ was once be defined as the result of the investors’ 
behaviour (Masson, 1999). Definition 4: Contagion refers to a significant increase in the 
co-movements of asset prices and quantities across markets/countries when one or more 
than one of them are in a crisis. Despite the similarity between their literal meanings, 
definitions 3 and 4 are actually quite different. Although they have the same starting 
point, they head in very different directions. Both discuss co-movement between assets, 
although definition 3 focusses on the reason why some co-movements cannot be 
explained by fundamentals and significant changes are not always certain. In contrast, 
definition 4 focusses on the result instead of the reason for the detected contagion. As 
long as co-movement significantly fluctuates, contagion happens. Definition 5: 
Contagion occurs when there is a significant change in the transmission channels after a 
shock in one market. The original channel may cease to work and have a new substitute, 
or may still work, but with a significantly higher or lower role. Some studies also refer 
to this category of contagion as ‘shift-contagion’ (Rigobon, 2002). Although each 
definition provides a sound theoretical and empirical background, there is no conclusive 
answer as to which is the most accurate. With this in mind, we will now review studies 
under each definition. 
2.2 Definition 1: Significant Increase in the Probability of Crisis 
Literature related to the first definition mainly focusses on banking and stock markets 
and tends to use high frequency data (Aharony and Swary, 1983; Glick and Rose, 1999; 
Caramazza, Ricci and Salgado, 2000; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000; Hernández and 
Valdés, 2001; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2002; Bae, 
Karolyi and Stulz, 2003; Furfine, 2003; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2004; Geršl, 2007; 
Gropp, Duca and Vesalac，2009; Markwat, Kole and Van Dijk, 2009; Uhlig, 2010). Most 
of these studies investigate the time period from 1992 to 1999 or longer, covering at 
least three financial crises: the Mexican Crisis in 1995, the Asian Crisis in 1997 and the 
Russian Financial Crisis in 1998. Although the detailed assumptions are quite different 
from each other, some are similar: efficient market, rational behaviour and absolute 
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competition. Most of the papers under this definition exclude the effect of 
heteroscedasticity, while those which consider it usually employ the GARCH model. 
For instance, Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) took the GARCH effect as a sign of 
heteroscedasticity and compared the results of the abnormal returns with GARCH effect, 
multivariate normal and student distribution. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002) calculated 
the conditional variance based on the GARCH models they built in order to establish 
whether there was any change in the volatility during or around the target time period. 
 
Multivariate regression is one of the most popular methods under this definition. A 
discussion of possible transmission channels is usually provided in order to identify 
suitable variables for the multivariate regression. Although different papers use different 
regressions, they usually come to a similar point when the regressions are estimated: a 
hypothesis test, and more often than not a t-test, is applied to the estimated coefficients 
in order to examine if there is any significant change. Likewise, the ratio test is also a 
popular choice, but in another methodology framework. In a ratio test, the ratios of 
different macroeconomic variables are calculated before and after shock. These ratios 
represent the condition of the economy. The more ratios change, the higher the 
possibility of contagion. The ways in which previous studies have built the multivariate 
regression can be split into two categories: the same model applied within different time 
periods and different variables applied in the same period. Indeed, a few others bring in 
the idea of different weights for different variables (Hernández and Valdés, 2001).  
 
Besides the multivariate regression, some studies employ the probability method. Their 
methods can be divided into two categories: the first calculates the possibility of the 
crisis directly (Glick and Rose, 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000; Markwat, Kole 
and Van Dijk, 2009) while the second one deduces the possibility based on different 
macroeconomic indicators (De Gregorio and Valdes, 2001; Hernández and Valdés, 2001; 
Geršl, 2007). Despite the focus on the crisis, the studies in the first category have little 
in common and their approaches are quite different. While Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(2000) looked at the conditional probability of crises, Markwat, Kole and Van Dijk 
(2009) and Glick and Rose (1999) began with probability equations of crises which 
were built in different ways with different variables. Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero 
(2014) directly compared the number of changes in causal relationships between stable 
and tranquil periods during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. They found that the 
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tranquil period has 70% more changes than that of the stable period. Naoui, Liouane 
and Brahim’s (2010) dynamic conditional correlation approach suggested that compare 
to the emerging stock markets, the developed stock markets are far more easily affected 
by shocks during the subprime crisis. Studies under the second category are also quite 
different. The indicators are calculated with various kinds of fundamental factors 
including international and local borrows, fiscal budget and GDP growth, inflation and 
trade links etc. The probability method is quite controversial because its advantage is as 
obvious as its disadvantage. The advantage is that the result is much easier to 
understand and it provides ideas to predict contagion. If a crisis occurs in one country 
then the higher the probability of a crisis in another country, which can result in 
contagion. The disadvantage is that they usually assume contagion will happen, with 
different possibilities. However, they cannot determine the timing of previous and future 
contagion nor can they illustrate how long the contagion effect will last. 
 
As for the evidence relating to contagion, the results usually conclude that contagion 
spreads through several channels including foreign capital flows and bank lending; 
however, there are those who disagree. For example, the results found by Aharony and 
Swary (1983) suggest that no contagion is observed under the capital market channel. 
Instead of the contagion effect, the downside turbulence of capital price is taken as an 
unfavourable signal by investors. Timing and geographic proximity are also proved to 
be important in financial contagion. From the geographic aspect, Glick and Rose (1999) 
and Hernandez and Valdes (2001) found evidence in favour of significant cross-border 
contagion. Using the bank credit to foreign countries of 17 countries around the world, 
Degryse, Elahi and Penas (2010) illustrated a cross-border contagion process where the 
stability of the whole financial system would be impaired as long as the shock affects 
the liability of one of the target countries. The cointegration and granger causality based 
approach of Gray (2009) also suggested that the cross-border links of the banking sector 
were the reason for the contagion among EU-8 countries during the subprime crisis. 
Timing issues under this definition relate not to breakpoints, but instead to the 
occurrence of specific issues. They do not usually assign the timing in their 
methodologies, but do use it for the implications. Gropp, Duca and Vesalac’s (2009) 
study is a typical example. They blame the introduction of the Euro for the cross-border 
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contagion they find. Kleimeier, Lehnert and Verschoor (2008) applied the similar 
method where they define Thailand’s decision to float their currency on 2 July 1997 as 
the structural change. While Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013) used FT news to 
resemble public attention allocation during the Asia financial crisis. Since the 
specification of the factors which trigger the initial crisis and the spread is not relevant, 
this definition is consistent with many different views regarding the international 
transmission mechanism. However, our framework can provide an idea as to how 
contagion spreads among countries by combining the breakpoint test with impact 
coefficients. 
2.3 Definition 2: Volatility Spillover of Asset Prices 
Under the second definition, it is believed that financial turmoil is usually accompanied 
by an increase in return volatility (Baig and Goldfajn, 1999; Calvo, 1999; Masson, 1999; 
Allen and Gale, 2000; Calvo and Mendoza, 2000a; Calvo and Mendoza, 2000b; 
Schinasi and Smith, 2000; Nogués and Grandes, 2001; Gromb and Vayanos, 2009; 
Uhlig, 2010). Under this definition, contagion refers to the enhancement of volatility 
and the spread of uncertainty across international financial markets. Usually covering 
the period spanning 1994 to 1998, previous studies tend to look for the relationship 
between country risk and macroeconomic factors in their framework in different 
equilibriums. They always take asymmetric information into consideration, with one 
common conclusion being that rational but imperfectly informed investors could react 
strongly to signals implied by informed individuals. However, there is more than one 
reason for the simultaneous rise of volatility in different markets: the normal 
interdependence between these markets or the structural change which influences 
cross-market linkages or ‘pure contagion’. Such a distinction is usually neglected in this 
definition. However, a few studies have noticed this. Indeed, Nogués and Grandes (2001) 
considered the possible structural change in cross-market linkages by introducing 
dummy variables and found even more transmission channels. Cross-border contagion 
is still a heated topic under this definition (Baig and Goldfajn, 1999) while capital 
market remains one of the most popular transmission channels (Calvo and Mendoza, 
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2000a). The disadvantage of the studies under this definition lies in the definition itself. 
Volatility is not the only feature which spills over. Change in mean should also be 
considered. A significantly higher volatility usually suggests turmoil, thus meaning it is 
easier to get people’s attention. As a result, change in mean does not attract enough 
attention in the contagion literature. A framework which takes into account both change 
in volatility and mean would be more appropriate. 
 
The methodologies included here are different, and share almost no similarities. The 
common methods include correlation analysis (Baig and Goldfajn, 1999), portfolio 
analysis (Schinasi and Smith, 2000) and logistic regressions (Masson, 1999). Baig and 
Goldfajn (1999) calculated and compared the correlation of tranquil and turmoil periods 
in order to identify contagion. Their study covers foreign debt market and stock markets. 
Significant changes in correlations are detected by the t-test. High volatility is evaluated 
by rolling correlation and good news as well as bad news is employed to represent 
shocks, which are presented through dummy variables. Calvo and Mendoza (2000a) 
examined whether or not the security markets were becoming more volatile or sensitive 
to contagion using an international portfolio diversification model. They concluded that 
globalisation of securities markets can reduce incentives for information gathering. As a 
result, high volatility is produced in capital flows. With a more comprehensive study, 
Masson (1999) used the macroeconomic model to illustrate several possible 
transmission channels, including fiscal deficits, foreign debt, international interest rate 
and political noise. With the US as a benchmark, Chiang, Jeon and Li (2007) employed 
a dynamic conditional-correlation model on 9 Asian countries to analyse the Asian 
financial crisis. They found that the international sovereign credit-rating agencies play 
an important role in contagion. A similar source of contagion was illustrated by Mink 
and De Haan (2013). By using the bank exposure to Greece of 48 European banks, they 
conclude that the news about the Greek bailout has a significant effect on the contagion 
during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) employed 
a principal components analysis to analyse the European countries as well. They found 
an increasing number of contagion during the sovereign debt crisis and argued that there 
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are multiple sources for contagion, for instance, the shift in fundamentals and the 
change in country-specific market expectations. 
 
More evidence related to contagion can be found in other studies. Indeed, Allen and 
Gale (2000) found that small liquidity preferences shocks were highly transferable. The 
completeness of the structure of interregional claims plays an important role in the 
transmission process. Baur (2012) examined the excessive volatility of 25 developed 
and emerging countries and reached a similar conclusion regarding the financial sector. 
However, they also found that some sectors, such as healthcare, telecommunication, are 
much less affected by crisis. Calvo and Mendoza (2000b) found that globalisation 
promoted contagion by weakening the incentive to gather costing information and 
strengthening the incentive to imitate arbitrary portfolios. 
2.4 Definition 3: Jumping between Multiply Equilibriums 
Literature under the third previous definition tends to focus on two aspects: Explaining 
contagion by fundamentals (Frankel and Schmukler, 1998; Calvo, 1999; Majnoni and 
Chang, 2000; Kodres and Pritsker, 2002) and jumping between multiple equilibriums 
(Baig and Goldfajn, 1999; Masson, 1999; De Gregorio and Valdes, 2001). These studies 
usually build their models based on macroeconomic factors, and again tend to focus on 
the Mexican and Asian crises (1994 to 1998). Interestingly, although they define 
contagion by this definition, most of the studies conclude that fundamentals can more 
effectively explain contagion, with only a few concluding that the role of fundamentals 
is relatively weak (De Gregorio and Valdes, 2001). Relative papers also use the ideas 
from the first two definitions, discussing the effects of various macroeconomic variables 
(usually ratios) and different transmission channels. However, the reason is to find 
possible links between contagion and the fundamentals rather than identifying the 
variables which should be used in the model. The Granger Causality test is introduced 
to examine the relationship between different assets and to calculate the correlation 
between asset prices and fundamental ratios (Frankel and Schmukler, 1998). These 
statistical relationships and correlations are used to represent different equilibriums. 
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Another important feature is that the shock is split into smaller segments (Kodres and 
Pritsker, 2002). In their attempts to find different reasons for the shocks, studies under 
the first two definitions discuss different macroeconomic variables and transmission 
channels. However, the fact that the shock may consist of different components is not 
recognised. On occasions, the reasons found only focus on one of the possible 
components, mostly the macroeconomic fundamentals, which is not sufficient to cover 
the effects of others. The jumps between equilibriums are usually assumed to be 
stochastic. An additional assumption is that there are two sets of investors – informed 
and uninformed, who are assumed to behave competitively. For example, Masson (1999) 
argued that a crisis in one country readjusts investors’ expectations and shifts them from 
one equilibrium to another. He also found that it might be useful to formulate models 
which do not imply a unique equilibrium mapping between those fundamentals and 
crisis expectations. Asymmetric information makes a country more vulnerable to 
contagion from abroad. One possible protection against undesired, excessive price 
movements is a reduction in informational asymmetries through increased transparency 
and more open access to information underlying the value of assets. As informational 
asymmetries shrink in developed country markets, these countries begin to transmit 
contagion among emerging market countries instead of refraining it. 
 
Majnoni and Chang (2000) argued that different combinations of fundamentals will 
cause different contagions, thus correspondingly impacting the effectiveness of 
international rescue packages. Frankel and Schmukler (1998) described contagion as a 
result from herd behaviour; a description which is fairly similar to that put forth by 
Masson (1998). Their causality-based test also suggested that fundamentals influence 
the sensitivity of markets to shocks. Yiu, Ho and Choi’s (2010) asymmetric dynamic 
conditional correlation model illustrated that the impacts of bad news and good news on 
contagion among Asia countries are not very different from 1993 to 2009. De Gregorio 
and Valdés (2001) discovered a strong neighbourhood effect. Meanwhile, trade links 
and similarity in pre-crisis growth are also proven to be effective transmission channels 
of contagion. Debt composition and exchange rate flexibility have less of an influence 
15 
 
on contagion, while no definite link was observed between capital control and 
contagion.  
2.5 Definition 4: Significant Increase in Co-Movements 
Despite much less literature, the forth definition is said to be most commonly accepted 
(Forbes and Rigobon, 2001; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2002; Kodres and Pritsker, 2002;  
Bae, Karolyi and Stulz, 2003; Fratzscher, 2003; Bekaert, Harvey and Ng, 2005; 
Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin, 2005; Baur and Lucey, 2009). Studies usually convey the 
notion of contagion as ‘excessive co-movements’. The unique time period studied is 
more recent, generally from 1994 to 2006. The bond market is the favourite one, and is 
allegedly the most easily affected by contagion in these studies. This is true according to 
the review of the last three definitions. The open issue is thus how to draw a distinction 
between normal co-movements. Indeed, this is difficult because of simple 
interdependence and excessive co-movements in prices and quantities due to certain 
structural breaks in the data. The former refers to a significantly strengthened or 
weakened correlation while the emphasis of the latter is on the vanishing and 
substituting of the original correlation. In other words, the structural break we discuss 
here is the structural change mentioned in the fifth definition. Definition 5 is a 
combination of definition 3 and 4. However, reasons for the changes in co-movement 
are seldom discussed in this definition. The research interest here is the detection of 
contagion.  
 
The methodologies used to identify breakpoints and structural changes are quite 
different in the literature. Indeed, the Markov-Switching model was more widely used 
(Fratzscher, 2003). A small group of studies noticed the importance of heteroscedasticity. 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) found that tests for contagion that do not correct for 
heteroscedasticity are biased, especially during recent financial crises. They measured 
contagion via correlation coefficients and corrected it for heteroscedasticity. They found 
that the correction of heteroscedasticity significantly affects the detection of contagion. 
Contagion is usually identified using different criteria depending on their methodologies. 
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Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) found that the return volatility of one market is related 
with the conditional variance of other markets. Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005) used 
correlations among the model residuals as an indicator of contagion. Their two-factor 
asset pricing model contained time-varying expected returns and time-varying risk 
loadings. Surprisingly, they found no evidence of contagion during the Mexican Crisis. 
However, economically meaningful contagions were detected during the Asian Crisis 
period. As we have already established from the results of the last three definitions, 
economic fundamentals are not the only reason for the contagion transmission. Indeed, 
financial links also play a role in this. Fratzscher’s (2003) study confirmed that it is not 
only countries with similar economic fundamentals which are vulnerable to contagion, 
but also countries which are closely linked financially. The panel data models in his 
study found evidence of contagion in the Latin American Crisis and the Asian Crisis, 
thus suggesting that real and financial interdependence is an important indicator when it 
comes to identifying and predicting contagion. However, a possible loophole here lies 
with the question of, what if the interdependence cannot explain the estimated contagion? 
Or what if interdependence is only part of the reasons of contagion? If so, what are the 
other reasons?  
2.6 Definition 5: Change in Transmission Channels 
Studies under the fifth definition have, more often than not, associated their result with 
political issues, while it is easy to observe from their findings that political instability 
usually results in structural changes (Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia, 2001; Rigobon, 
2002; Gravelle, Kichian and Morley, 2006; Marais and Bates, 2006; Rodriguez, 2007; 
Billio and Caporin, 2010). Research studies occasionally still examine the time period 
during the Mexican Crisis and the Asian Crisis (1994 to 1998). Previous results have 
often concluded that the international transmission mechanism may change in response 
to a crisis in one country. For instance, some channels of transmission might be active 
only during financial crises (Gravelle, Kichian and Morley, 2006). Some studies even 
view strengthened transmission mechanism as shift contagion; however, we prefer to 
consider it as a breakpoint in time series but not as a structural change. Shift contagion 
can also be measured by the jump between multiple equilibriums and excessively strong 
co-movement. Different methodologies have one thing in common: they all consider 
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structural change to some extent. As discussed previously, the fifth definition is the 
combination of the third and fourth, which are even the same under specific conditions. 
Although the literal meaning of definition 5 seems narrow, it is actually the most 
comprehensive definition of all, with a research area covering most features of the other 
4 definitions. Billio and Caporin (2010) modelled stock market returns with a 
simultaneous equation system and volatility with a special multivariate GARCH model. 
They identified the mean relationship and volatility spillover at the same time, and thus 
addressed the disadvantage of definition 2. More importantly, their study detected 
evidence of contagion and loss of interdependence at the same time, which suggests that 
interdependence may not be the only reason for contagion. It is important that research 
studies under this definition begin to realise that non-existent links may also play a role 
in the estimation of contagion. Marais and Bates (2006) concluded that non-existent 
links during the tranquil period play a key role during the crisis, thus helping to answer 
the questions we raise in definition 4 and encouraging us to explicitly distinguish 
between interdependence and pure contagion. Their study is based on a causal 
relationship system. Elasticity calculated from a VAR model is used to identify 
contagion with evidence from the South Korean Crisis. The elasticity they calculated is 
a good indicator of the overall contagion effect. Although they noticed the importance 
of the non-existent links, their framework was not able to separate it from the overall 
effect. However, Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006) successfully split the contagion 
effect into two segments, namely interdependence and idiosyncratic shock, using the 
‘Identification through Heteroscedasticity’ process. However, their interest lies only in 
the interdependence. The idiosyncratic shocks were not studied. Another example that 
distinguished contagion and interdependence is Gallegati (2012). They accomplished 
that by using the frequency domain analysis where the higher frequency domain is 
associated to contagion and lower frequency domain is associated to interdependence. 
Their further correlation analysis provided strong evidence of international contagion 
initiated from the US during the subprime crisis. One of the purposes of Rigobon’s 
(2002) study was to examine multiple techniques with which to measure contagion. The 
methods used in the study include: OLS, principal components analysis, correlation and 
probit-logit models. He concluded that if the data suffers from heteroscedasticity, 
omitted variables and simultaneous equation problems, the estimation could be biased. 
The second purpose of his study was to detect contagion in bond and stock markets. He 
found evidence of contagion and concluded that regional variables and trade links are 
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very important transmission channels for contagion in bond markets, but not as 
important in stock markets. 
2.7 Conclusion 
We have reviewed the definitions, research frameworks and main findings of previous 
contagion studies, during which time we have begun to notice the evolution of 
contagion studies. Research studies tend to include an increasing number of features and 
definitions. We are convinced that the trend of contagion research will become 
increasingly comprehensive, encapsulating all previous features as well as many 
additional ones. Financial contagion is a wide topic which covers many subfields. 
Although the estimation of contagion and its transmission channel has been repeatedly 
examined in previous studies, there remain many unsolved questions and details to be 
nuanced. While certain studies have focussed on the residuals ( Bekaert, Harvey and Ng, 
2005; Gravelle, Kichian and Morley, 2006), we see no discussion relating to the 
features of the residuals. Do different forecasting models have different impacts on the 
final results? Is there any criterion we can use to determine which model fits our 
framework? Data-mining bias is very common in econometric studies. One way in 
which to deal with this is to fully understand the features of the data used. For instance, 
do the low/high auto-correlation and long/short memory features of the data used affect 
the estimation of contagion? If so, what impact will they create? Timing is another 
factor which should imply economical and statistical significance while also fitting the 
contagion identification process. How do we detect an appropriate one? Is there any 
more appropriate way to illustrate how contagion spreads? How long does it last when 
we detect one? The remainder of this study attempts to address the above questions in a 
more detailed level and suggests directions for further study. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review on the Methodologies 
3.1 Introduction 
Given the multiple definitions of contagion from previous studies, we can further 
summarise them into two categories: Category 1 includes definitions which focus on the 
significant increase in the probability of the crisis. Only definition 1 fits this category. 
Category 2 covers definitions which focus on the significant changes in co-movement 
and structural changes, including all of the other four definitions. In our study, we focus 
on the second category. The issues facing us include, what kind of co-movement can be 
identified as contagion and what role do structural changes play? Based on the 5 
previously discussed definitions, the co-movements considered in previous studies are 
the price and returns movements caused by another market or country, the co-movement, 
which cannot be explained by fundamental reasons, the excess co-movement, which no 
one expected, and co-movement, which is purely caused by information asymmetries. 
Indeed, as we explained in the last chapter, in order to distinguish between these similar 
kinks of co-movements, people should define and detect contagion in different ways. 
What we should also consider is that the definition of contagion is not the only 
definition to which we should pay attention. Indeed, if only the above co-movements 
are defined as contagion, what about the others? Two usual terms used by the literature 
to describe the non-contagion co-movements are common shock and interdependence. 
Indeed, changes in common shock or interdependence are also occasionally defined as 
contagion, although they are usually referred to as changes in transmission channels. 
Indeed, because there are many different ways in which to define and detect contagion, 
these two terms are also defined and detected in different ways. However, regardless of 
how different they are, they always boil down to one problem: what fundamentals can 
explain and what fundamentals cannot explain. The former sums up how previous 
studies like to define common shock and interdependence while the latter is a fitting 
summary of what is usually referred to an idiosyncratic shock or speculative attack. 
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Indeed, one problem with the previous literature is that scholars always focus on only 
one of these, which, in our opinion, should be seen as a limitation. Another problem is 
that co-movement is always treated as a whole, and can either be explained by 
fundamentals or not. We argue that one single co-movement, or shock, can contain 
different information. There is information which can be explained by fundamentals and 
there is information which cannot be explained by fundamentals. Treating co-movement 
as a whole (either can or cannot be explained by fundamentals) will overemphasise the 
effect of one kind of information much while ignoring the other completely. As a result, 
we define contagion as a significant change in both common shock and idiosyncratic 
shock. Crises are usually treated as structural changes. A significant change following a 
crisis is usually identified as contagion, thus suggesting a change in transmission 
channels. The previous channels are either wider, less, or are replaced by new ones. 
 
When we talk about contagion, another thing which attracts our interest is the reason 
behind it. What starts it and how does it spread? It may be because of the change in 
exchange rate, interest rate and equity market returns (Bae, Karolyi and Stulz, 2003). 
However, it may also stem from trade links and region (Glick and Rose, 1999), or be 
triggered by international portfolios and investments (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2004) as 
well as financial competition in banking centres (Hernández and Valdés, 2001). It may 
be a result of political noise (Nogués and Grandes, 2001) and liquidity shocks (Corsetti, 
Pesenti and Roubini, 1999), while certain studies have argued that information 
asymmetries and herd behaviour (Calvo and Mendoza, 2000b) also play a role. We can 
summarise 5 kinds of reasons from previous studies: Political reasons, information 
asymmetries, trading links, financial links and region. Normally, there are two ways in 
which to examine these factors. The first is to include the suspected factors in the 
modelling process and assess how these factors or their corresponding coefficients 
behave together in the co-movement. The second is to apply the same tests to data 
relating to different factors and to detect contagion in different variables separately. 
However, the number of factors included is limited. Moreover, because many factors are 
linked by the economic system, change in one element may transfer to another and 
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continue to spread along the existing linkage. As a result, the factors which seem to be 
behind co-movement may actually be part of the transmission process. In addition, the 
existing linkages may occasionally break or change into another one due to the 
structural changes in the corresponding areas of the economic system. In view of the 
above reasons, we feel that there is a limitation when it comes to the capability of the 
economic models and system designed for specific economic factors. Indeed, it is more 
appropriate to identify the structural changes first when we are looking for the reasons 
behind contagion.  
 
Based on Gravelle, Kichian and Morley’s (2006) study, we propose a new approach, and 
consider the more appropriate algorithm of ‘Identification through Heteroscedasticity’ 
with a more comprehensive definition of contagion. We also try to address the following 
issues: First, we illustrate how we can split co-movement into common shock and 
idiosyncratic shock using the technique ‘Identification through Heteroscedasticity’ and 
put the new algorithm into practice. Second, we examine the effect of two features of 
the data: the long memory and short memory feature, and Heteroscedasticity. No 
contagion study has yet focussed on the former yet, and although Heteroscedasticity has 
already been considered, we examine its effect from a totally different angle. Third, we 
would like to shed light on the reasons behind the occurrence of contagion and how it 
spreads. We will do this by using the breakpoint tests. We review 4 main methodologies 
used in the literature from Section 2 to section 5. They are correlation method, weighted 
multivariate OLS regression, herd behaviour and portfolio diversification and 
identification through heteroscedasticity.  
3.2 Correlation Method 
The transmission of financial crisis are often accompanied by the substantial 
devaluation of financial assets. Moreover, the panic caused by such devaluation are 
generally not contained within a single market. The behaviour of different markets 
appears to be linked during crises. For instances, the 2008 subprime crisis quickly 
spread through the banking system, the real estate markets, the stock markets and it 
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caused varying degrees of sovereign debt defaults across nations as well. In order to 
gain a more rational view regarding the dissemination of financial crisis, many 
techniques were applied to study the linkages among different markets. One commonly 
used method to capture the overall effect of financial shocks is the correlation method. 
 
While there are various kinds of correlation methods, they are all generated from the 
most basic definition of correlation. The basic process of computing correlation is as 
follows: 
This is the relationship between variable X and Y: 
1 2t t ty x                (1) 
Their correlation is calculated as: 
2
( )
xy x
x y y
 
 
  
            (2) 
Since x  and y  are known, so the problem is how to compute and adjust 2 . Here 
we use the study of Marais and Bates (2006) to illustrate how this can be achieved. 
 
Marais and Bates (2006) used the concept of ‘elasticity’ to measure relation intensity, 
which is representative of financial contagion. The elasticity is defined as follows: 
t
XY
t
X
e
Y
 , the data used here are in logarithm. 
We can see that it is actually another version of 2 . 
The basic theory is as follows: 
First we need to estimate the VAR model: 
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
p pk k
t i t i j t j i t i j t j Xt
i j k i j k
p pk k
t i t i j t j i t i j t j Yt
i j k i j k
X a X a X b Y b Y
Y a X a X b Y b Y


   
     
   
     
    
    
   
   
            (3) 
Once the causal relation is identified, the elasticity of X related to Y must be calculated 
from the first equation in the system using backward operator L: 
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1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1
p pk k
i j i j
t i j t i j
i j k i j k
X a L a L Y b L b L
     
   
      
   
    , where L=1     (4) 
The backward operator is used for lag-shift, L=1 means shift lag for one period, for 
instance: 
L : Lag-shift one period        1( )t tL X X   
2L : Lag-shift two periods       
2
2( ) ( ( ))t t tL X L L X X    
 
From equation (2) we can obtain the following: 
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1
pk
i j
i j kt
XY pk
t
i j
i j k
b b
X
e
Y
a a
  
  

 
 
 
 
                           (5) 
 
The bootstrap estimation is employed to obtain the statistical distribution of XYe , and 
the higher the level of XYe , the more intense the causal relationship, and the higher the 
likelihood that contagion will spread. 
 
There are other correlation methods besides this one. For instance, Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002) and Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia (2005) adjusted the basic definition of 
correlation for Heteroscedasticity, thus meaning that their new correlation is less biased. 
However, some potential problems with these previous studies are that: first, they do not 
consider structural changes very well. What they did was to assign a breakpoint to a 
specific date and estimate the correlation prior to and following this date before 
identifying significant changes. Second, their method does not deal with transmission 
channels. It is hard to see how contagion spreads based on their results. Third, they do 
not split shocks into smaller segments. Indeed, they fail to even consider different kinds 
of shocks. Their study tracks the overall movement of the market, which lacks more 
detailed analysis. 
 
Another more direct example of the adjusted correlation method is Forbes and 
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Rigobon’s (2002) study. They define the unadjusted correlation as a conditional 
correlation and the adjusted (adjusted for Heteroscedasticity) correlation as the 
unconditional correlation. Their equation for the adjusted correlation is: 
*
21 [1 ]


 

 
, where 
2 2( ) 1xH xL                        (6) 
H represents high volatility and L represents low volatility. They argued that correlation 
that is not adjusted for heteroscedasticity is biased, and that one can only identify the 
occurrence of contagion when significant change in the adjusted correlation is detected. 
 
The correlation methods have an advantage when analysing the overall effect of shocks. 
They calculate the correlation coefficients before and after shocks, and the comparison 
is very straight forward. However, this method only illustrates a very general picture, 
it’s not suitable for more detailed analysis. In addition to the changing correlation 
among asset values, another concern is what factors are responsible for it. Although the 
correlation method can be used to illustrate the changes of the relationship among 
different markets, it is not appropriate to identify the reasons behind them. 
3.3 Weighted Multivariate OLS Regression 
As soon as the changes in the correlation between different markets are detected, further 
detailed questions are raised as well. What have caused the financial crisis and the 
changes in correlation? Which market factors facilitated the transmission of the crisis? 
With these questions in mind, research techniques start to include more and more 
economic factors into consideration, for example, the weighted multivariate OLS 
regressions. 
 
In this methodology framework, the performance of contagion is explained in a single 
or multivariate OLS regression. In particular, specific countries and markets are picked 
as transmission channels of contagion, and serve as variables in the regression. 
Contagion is assumed to transfer through the picked markets among the picked 
countries. A general single variable model is as follows:  
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, 0 1 , , ,i c i j j c i c
j
X m X             (7) 
where X is the picked market, the transmission channel of contagion. ,i jm is a set of 
weights from country i to j that add up to one. c  represents crisis. They are used to 
measuring the importance of each country in this specific transmission channel. ,i c is 
the stochastic shock. The existence of contagion is tested by evaluating whether or not 
1 is significantly different from 0. If it is 0, there is no contagion. If it is not 0, there is 
contagion. Change the transmission channel and a new 1 is estimated. Since 1 is 
measured in a weighted average regression, we can directly compare the size of 1  in 
each country. Indeed, the greater the size the more important the transmission channel in 
that country. Although the OLS estimation of this regression has a positive bias (De 
Gregorio and Valdes, 2001), it is proportional to the true 1 , and thus it is 0 when 
1 0  . Since the hypothesis test is 1 0  against 1 0  , this bias does not affect the 
identification of contagion, nor the importance of each transmission channel because the 
bias is proportional to the true 1 . 
 
However, the possibility that contagion is transferred through only one transmission 
channel is quite low. When one country’s performance affects that of other countries, 
the other countries will in turn affect the origin country. When one market is changed, 
the previous balance is impaired and the system will adjust to a new equilibrium. Thus, 
we might want to include more than one transmission channel in the regression. A 
general model of multivariate regression is as follows: 
1 1 2 2
, 0 1 , , 2 , , ,i c i j j c i j j c i c
j j
X m X m X            (8) 
where 
1
,i jm  and 
2
,i jm  are the weights of each transmission channel and the 
significance of both 1  and 2 ’s is tested and compared. 
 
Finally, on occasions, a mutual variable that is assumed to affect all countries 
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simultaneously is added to the regression. It is either called interdependence or common 
shock, and is not weighted. An expression of this kind of variable is as follows: 
1 1 2 2
, 0 1 , , 2 , , ,i c i j j c i j j c n t i c
j j
X m X m X Y             (9) 
where tY  is the common shock that affects all countries; it is usually measured by 
index data which covers an industry.  
 
Another issue relating to this framework is how to evaluate the weights of the 
transmission channels in each country. Trade links are usually measured by taking each 
country’s export and import and dividing them by the sum of exports and imports. 
Region and political variables are usually measured by assigning dummy variables.  
 
De Gregorio and Valdes (2001) proposed the following method: 
First, a similarity index between country i  and j  is calculated: 
For regressions with a single variable, the similarity index is: 
, exp( ) i j i jX X             (10) 
For regressions with multiple variables, the similarity index is: 
, , ,exp( ) i j i s j s
s
X X            (11) 
The weight of country j  to i  is calculated as follows: 
, ,
,
, ,
min( )
max( ) min( )
a
i j i j
i j a a
i j i j
M
 
 



        (12) 
where ,
a
i j  represents all the ,i j . 
 
However, this is not the only way to calculate weights. This topic is quite controversial. 
Different studies have used different methods to measure weights. For instance, 
Hernández and Valdés (2001) measured the weights in financial competition as follows: 
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where ,
abs
i jm  is the absolute competition and ,
rel
i jm  is the relative competition. icb  
represents the stock of debt of country i  in banking centre c  and i ic
c
b b . The 
absolute competition suggests that countries on a larger scale have more competition 
while the relative competition measures the competition by scaling countries according 
to their size. 
 
One advantage of this framework is its simplicity. It is fairly easy to find countries and 
markets to test while the classic OLS estimation is not statistically difficult. Although 
the calculation of weights is controversial, it brings in many possibilities and new 
thoughts while also providing a relatively straight forward way to illustrate the 
importance of different countries. The disadvantage is also quite obvious: there is no 
guarantee that the picked variables are definitely the reasons that contagion occurred. 
Indeed, as previously explained, the transmission of contagion is caused by a string of 
changes in different variables. What we chose as the reason behind contagion may in 
fact be the result of it. Although this framework considers the possible transmission 
channels by including multiple variables in the regression, it neglects the fact that when 
the transmission channel changes, the variables included in the regression may no 
longer play any role in it, and thus keeping them in the regression will most certainly 
create a bias. The variables included in this framework are rather fixed, and a more 
flexible way to analyse the possible reasons is needed. Last but not least, the variables 
analysed under this framework are usually macroeconomic factors. As a result, the 
effect of idiosyncratic shock, or stochastic shock cannot be considered in this 
framework. 
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3.4 Herd Behaviour and Portfolio Diversification 
As the research regarding the reasons and dissemination of the financial crisis keep 
developing, more and more research studies start to realize that the macroeconomic 
fundamentals are not enough to explain the behaviour of markets during financial crisis. 
As a result, researchers start to seek other reasons for the excess co-movement. One of 
the widely considered factor is the herd behaviour. 
 
We use Calvo and Mendoza’s (2000b) study to illustrate this kind of methodology. 
Indeed, Calvo and Mendoza (2000b) investigated the role played by rational expectation 
and globalisation in contagion. They argued that globalisation weakens incentives to 
gather costly information and strengthens incentives to imitate arbitrary market 
portfolios, thus promoting contagion. 
 
In their study, contagion is defined as “a situation in which utility-maximizing investors 
choose not to pay for information that would be relevant for their portfolio decision – 
thereby making them susceptible to react to country-specific rumours – or in which 
investors optimally choose to mimic arbitrary ‘market’ portfolios”. Using a basic 
framework of mean-variance portfolio diversification, they considered two 
characteristics of imperfect information: a fixed cost of gathering and processing 
country-specific information and a variable cost or gain that depends on the mean return 
of their portfolios relative to that of a given market portfolio. 
 
They started by assuming a globalised securities market consisting of J countries 
(2 )J  and a large number of identical investors. The countries were divided into 
1J   identical countries and a country i  with different asset return characteristics. All 
countries with the exception of i  pay asset returns that follow i.i.d. processes with 
mean   and variance 
2
J . Each one of the 1J   countries will be allocated an 
identical share in the portfolio. Country i  pays expected return *r with variance 
2
i , 
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while the correlation coefficient between country i  and the 1J   countries is . The 
share of the portfolio invested in the 1J   identical countries is  . The following 
expected utility function is given to characterise investors’ preferences: 
2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))
2
EU

               ,     (14)                   
where , 0    
 
 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion,  and  are the mean and standard 
deviation of the portfolio as a function of ,  represents a fixed cost of acquiring 
country-specific information and ( ( ) ( ))     represents the variable performance 
cost (benefit) of obtaining a mean portfolio return lower (higher) than the mean return 
of an arbitrary portfolio . Contagions under two circumstances were considered after 
giving the expected utility function. 
 
The first type of contagion is driven by fixed information costs and short-selling 
constraints. They assumed an initial equilibrium in which all countries are identical to 
the rest and asset returns are uncorrelated ( 0)  , thus meaning that the investor 
allocates an equal amount to each country. The investor then hears a rumour indicating 
that country i  has a lower return yet its variance remains unchanged. Now the investor 
faces two choices. The first is whether to acquire country-specific information at the 
fixed cost  in order to evaluate the veracity of the rumour, while the other is whether 
to choose not to pay  and simply believe that the rumour is true. In their study, they 
focus solely on the case that the investor pays  to acquire precise information. By 
paying , the investor will earn a new return 
Ir with zero variance. Clearly, the 
investor will only pay for the information when expected utility conditional on costly 
information IEU exceeds that conditional on free information UEU , which means the 
gain from costly information I US EU EU  must be positive. A new expected utility 
function is given as follows: 
2
2 2( )(1 ) [ (1 ) ]
2 1
U
U U U UEU r
J
 
         

   (15) 
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where U and I represent the portfolio shares chosen by the investor if he decides to 
be uninformed or informed respectively. The corresponding first-order condition implies 
that the optimal portfolio and U for the optimal portfolio is: 
2
1
( )[1 ]U
J r
J



 
           (16) 
They assumed that optimal portfolios may reflect corner solutions (the quantity of one 
of the arguments in the maximised function is zero) because of short-selling constraints. 
They also assumed that ,0 ,1
Ua b a b       , Ua b   , a and b are 
given constants. The case 0, 1a b  is the extreme, whereby the short position in 
country i and the 1J   identical countries are ruled out. Short-selling constraints imply 
that: 
U b  for minr r ,           (17) 
U a   for maxr r ,           (18) 
With (3), (4) and (5), we can get: 
2
min
2
max
[ ( 1) 1]
1
[ ( 1) 1]
1
J b
r
J
J a
r
J




 
 

 
 

         (19) 
As J  goes to , the interval of returns that supports internal solutions for U shrinks 
and converges to
max min 2( )r r a b   . 
They then simplified the model by assuming the information is free (i.e. 0  ). For r in 
the interval min maxr r r  , UEU valued at the maximum is: 
2
2
( ) 1 ( )
( [2 ])
2 2
U r J rEU r
J J
   

  
        (20) 
They then examined the portfolio problem under the assumption that the investor pays 
information cost  and earns
Ir . State-contingent utility ( )
I IU r is: 
2
2( )( ) (1 ) [ ]
2 1
I
I I I I IU r r
J
 
        

    (21) 
Taking first-order condition, ( )
I Ir for the optimal state-contingent portfolio is: 
2
( )
( ) ( 1)[ ]
I
I I rr J




           (22) 
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Short-selling constraints imply: ( )
I Ir a  if max
I Ir r  and ( )
I Ir b   if min
I Ir r , 
then we can get: 
2
min
2
max
1
1
I
I
b
r
J
a
r
J




 

 

           (23) 
 
As we can see in the equations, as J grows infinitely large, optimal portfolios 
conditional on costly information always hit the short selling constraints. 
 
The other case they considered is contagion driven by performance-based incentives. 
The performance-based incentive is one of the reasons why price correction may fail to 
undo the effects of rumours. 
 
They assumed that information cost 0   and considered the situation in which 
investors, or mutual fund managers face the variable cost or benefit of obtaining mean 
returns that deviate from the mean return of an arbitrary market portfolio. They stated 
that the cost function ( ( ) ( ))      satisfies the following properties: 
0  if ( ) ( )    , 0   if ( ) ( )    , (0) 0,   
' 0  with 
' '( ) ( )x x     for all
'( ) ( ) 0, 0x         .  (24) 
The conditions here imply that investors or managers pay a cost (earn a benefit) when 
the mean return of their portfolios is smaller (larger) than that of the market portfolio, 
and that the marginal cost exceeds the marginal benefit. 
 
The expected utility function which investors and managers must optimise is: 
2
2( )( ) (1 ) ( ( ) ( )) [ ((1 ) ) 2 (1 ) ]
2 1
J
i j iEU r
J

                       
  
Since ( ) (1 ) , ( ) (1 )r r            , it follows that
( ( ) ( )) (( )( ))r           . Within a certain range of values of , choosing 
   is optimal for a representative investor and is also a rational-expectations 
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equilibrium in which all investors select the same portfolio. Any rumour in that range 
calling for a different  results in a herding panic whereby all investors re-set their 
portfolios to that new . 
 
This method emphasises the effect of information and human behaviour on contagion. It 
effectively illustrates that they indeed play a role in the whole process. However, that is 
all this method is capable of. First of all, one of the key variables, the information, or 
the rumour, is very hard to quantify. It is a very subjective variable and therefore more 
susceptible to errors arising from personal subjective opinion. Secondly, information 
and human behaviour play a role in the whole process doesn’t mean they caused 
contagion. This method cannot be used to detect the reasons for contagion, nor the 
channels through which it is transferred. Because instead of being the reason for 
contagion, we argue that human behaviour caused by the information, or rumour, is 
merely a result of contagion. It is more like a side effect which increases the volatility 
and instability.  
3.5 Identification through Heteroscedasticity 
In order to provide a more flexible way to analyse both fundamental and 
non-fundamental related factors, we illustrate a more comprehensive technique which 
allows us to capture more features in the economy. The process we illustrate here is 
referred to as ‘Identification through Heteroscedasticity’ (Rigobon, 2003; Gravelle, 
Kichian and Morley, 2006).  
 
The idea behind this method is to build nonlinear equation sets from a covariance 
matrix to measure structural shocks. Although they share the same idea, the difference 
between the studies of Rigobon (2003) and Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006) is 
clear from the very beginning. Rigobon (2003) started with simultaneous equations 
while Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006) started with a return estimation. They used 
forecast error to reflect shock and then further split it into two parts: common shock and 
idiosyncratic shock. Our contagion test follows that used by Gravelle, Kichian and 
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Morley (2006), although we look at a different variable. 
 
They combined two approaches from previous literature. The first approach is also 
referred to as “identification through heteroscedasticity” in Rigobon’s (2003) study, 
while the other approach is the Markov switching model developed by Hamilton (1989). 
Although their methodology is quite similar to these previous studies, they slightly 
revised the model. The first approach helped to identify the parameters related to the 
structural transmission of common shocks in the presence of regime-switching volatility 
in common shocks, which is their first contribution. The second approach helped to 
estimate the timing of changes endogenously, which is their second contribution. 
 
Indeed, the reduced form of the covariance matrix was first considered after giving two 
simultaneous equations (Rigobon, 2003): 
Simultaneous equations: t t t
t t t
p q
q p
 
 
  
 
  
, residuals t and t  represent the structural 
shocks which have 
2
 and 
2
 variance. 
Based on the definition of covariance and the general expression of a covariance matrix: 
cov( , ) [( )( )]i j i i j jX X E X X     
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[( )( )] [( )( )] [( )( )]
[( )( )] [( )( )] [( )( )]
[( )( )] [( )( )] [( )( )]
n n
n n n n n n n n
E X X E X X E X X
E X X E X X E X X
E X X E X X E X X
     
     
     
      
 
       
 
 
      
 
The generated covariance matrix from the above simultaneous equations is: 
2 2 2 2 2
^
2 2 2 2 22
1
(1 )
   
   
     
     
  
       
       (25) 
However, the unknowns  ,   ,
2
  and 
2
  cannot be solved since there are only 
three moments: the variance of tp , the variance of tq and the covariance of tp and tq . 
As such, the author then employed a state variable {1,2}S   to the new matrix, with the 
covariance matrix becoming: 
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2 2 2 2 2
^
11, 12, , , , ,
2 2 2 2 22
21, 22, , , , ,
1
(1 )
s s s s s s
s s s s s s
   
   
       
       
   
           
  (26) 
Now there are six unknowns: ,   ,
2
,1  ,
2
,2  ,
2
,1  and
2
,2 , and six conditions, 
meaning that the problem can be solved. 
 
We combine this approach with Hamilton’s (1989) study, assuming the volatility 
regimes are Markov switching and the value of the state variable {0,1}S  . The 
switching models we can obtain are as follows: 
1
1
Pr[ 0 | 0]
Pr[ 1| 1]
jt jt j
jt jt j
S S q
S S p


  
  
           (27) 
The four moments are displayed (Hamilton, 1989): 
1
1
1
1
Prob[ 1| 1] ,
Prob[ 0 | 1] 1 ,
Prob[ 0 | 0] ,
Prob[ 1| 0] 1 ,
t t
t t
t t
t t
S S p
S S p
S S q
S S q




  
   
  
   
           (28) 
 
Referring back to Gravelle, Kichian and Morley’s (2006) study, one of their main 
research questions related to whether or not there is any shift-contagion between assets 
associated with different countries. In order to address this research question, they 
considered the following hypotheses: 
*
1 1
0 *
2 2
: c c
c c
H
 
 
   vs. 
*
1 1
1 *
2 2
: c c
c c
H
 
 
 ,         (29) 
where 
*
1c  and 
*
2c corresponds to high volatility, 1c and 2c correspond to low 
volatility (i.e.
*| | | |  ). 1c , 2c  ,
*
1c  and
*
2c  determine the impact of the structural 
shocks on the asset returns. 
 
Their process of identification through heteroscedasticity was almost identical to that of 
Rigobon (2003). They also provided two return functions at the beginning, although the 
difference can only be seen in the next step. Differing from Rigobon (2003), they 
decomposed the residual into two segments: common structural shocks and the 
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idiosyncratic structural shocks. 
Return function: 
it i itr u            (30) 
Decomposition of residuals: 
it cit ct it itu z z   , where 1,2i  .  (31) 
where
i is the expected return on asset i ,( i =1,2), 1tr and 2tr denote continuously 
compounded returns on the two assets. 
ctz is the common shock, itz is the idiosyncratic 
shock, and 
cit and it determine the impact of the structural shocks on the asset 
returns. The model assumes serially uncorrelated returns, while the expected return is 
constant and the forecast error has mean zero and is uncorrelated across time.  
 
A common shock is a result of interdependence. Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006) 
defined contagion as a structural transmission, by which they mean different scales of 
assets return movement before and after turmoil. They felt that a change in 
interdependence is a signal of contagion by which is measured by
1 2/c t c t  . it was 
ignored in their study, and they felt that idiosyncratic shock has nothing to do with 
contagion. However, we feel that not only co-movement caused by interdependence, but 
also co-movement caused by idiosyncratic shock should be identified as contagion.  
 
It is our contention that there are three sources of co-movement: change in 
interdependence, contagion which cannot be explained by the fundamentals and 
coincidence. Interdependence is measured by
cit , contagion which cannot be explained 
by the fundamentals and coincidence is measured by
it . Instead of measuring only
1 2/c t c t  , we should focus on both 1 2/t t  and 1 2/c t c t  . 
The covariance matrix for residual 
itu can be easily represented in terms of the 
coefficients: 
2 2
1 1 1 2
2 2
1 2 2 2
*
*
c t t c t c t
t
c t c t c t t
   
   
 
   
 
          (32) 
We share the same assumption to that put forth by Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006). 
We assume that 1c  and 2c have a correlation coefficient of nearly 1 and that 1 and 
2 are independent of cit  and each other. This matrix can provide us with 3 
moments while we have 4 variables. In order to solve the problem, we introduce a state 
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variable, just as Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006) did: First, the state variable in 
their model has the value of {0,1}  (before and in crisis). Second, two functions are 
constructed to represent regime switching: 
*
*
(1 )
(1 )
cit ci ct ci ct
it i it i it
S S
S S
  
  
  
  
           (33) 
When S=0, there is no 
*
cit and 
*
it in the functions, which represent the moment before 
crisis or shocks. When S=1, they stated that this represented an increase in volatility and 
*
cit and 
*
it  were used to represent higher variance. However, we feel that a change in 
volatility could be both positive and negative, and thus 
*
cit and 
*
it  in our framework 
are only used to measure the shock after the breakpoints. In our study, 1ctS  means the 
change in co-movement comes from common shock, while 1itS  means that the 
change in co-movement comes from the idiosyncratic shock. 
Based on the covariance matrix and the state variable, we now have 8 variables and 8 
moments: 
2 2
1 1 1
2 2
2 2 2
1 2 1 2
*2 2
1 1 1
*2 2
2 2 2
* *
1 2 1 2
2 *2
1 1 1 1
2 *2
2 2 2 2
var( )
var( )
cov( , )
var( | 1)
var( | 1)
cov( , | 1)
var( | 1)
var( | 1)
t c
t c
t t c c
t ct c
t ct c
t t ct c c
t t c
t t c
u
u
u u
u S
u S
u u S
u S
u S
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  

 



   

  
  

   

  
          (34) 
By solving this non-linear equation set, we can obtain the impact coefficients we need 
to measure contagion. Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006) solved this system under a 
Markov-Switching model. The drawback is that they had to endogenously estimate the 
structural change. We improved the power of the test by introducing breakpoint tests. 
 
By splitting the shock into two sections, this framework allows us to analyse 
fundamental and non-fundamental related factors separately. The timing of the structural 
changes are interpreted as the timing of the contagion effects. The corresponding events 
are usually interpreted as the possible reasons and transmission channels. Therefore, this 
method works better when combined with a Chronology that includes the major global 
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economy events and country specific incidents. As a result, the fixed variable bias 
suffered by weighted multivariate OLS regressions is dealt with and more economic 
features can be included. 
 
Our study is based on Gravelle, Kichian and Morley’s (2006) model using a new 
algorithm. We will provide a more detailed analysis under a more comprehensive 
definition and estimate the structural changes in a more appropriate way while also 
examining the role played by the new features in contagion.
38 
 
 
Chapter 4 Methodology Design 
We aim to provide a more comprehensive analysis of contagion, which encapsulates 
most of the features included in the previous study. We also try to make them more 
appropriate. As our aim is to thoroughly examine the reasons behind contagion, we will 
not focus on Herd behaviour methods. We would instead like to examine the overall 
effect as well as the details it implies. Our method mainly focusses on co-movement, 
although it also sheds light on the changes of equilibrium.  
 
This thesis is consistent with 3 empirical studies, while the main methodology used is 
‘Identification through Heteroscedasticity’. We start with Gravelle, Kichian and 
Morley’s (2006) idea of splitting the co-movement into two segments, although we 
make the following changes based on their framework: First, we use two different 
forecasting models to obtain the residuals and to examine the effect of long memory and 
short memory features. Second, we estimate the breakpoints before proceeding with the 
contagion test. We want statistically significant breakpoints with practical significance 
and also wish to examine the effect of Heteroscedasticity. This is accomplished by 
employing multiple breakpoint tests and building a chronology. Third, we estimate the 
coefficients using a different approach: iterative least square method. Fourth, we also 
examine the change in idiosyncratic shock. 
4.1 Forecasting model: 
When we try to estimate the expected return, we consider models that have two 
different features: short memory and long memory. The property of long/short memory 
is very important. A long memory process suggests that the observations have 
statistically significant correlations even they are a large distance apart, which implies 
better forecasting performance. Long and short memory processes react very differently 
under the same shock. Therefore, it is reasonable for us to expect that short memory 
models and long memory models will affect the identification of contagion differently. 
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The short memory and long memory models we consider in this study are the ARMA 
(Auto Regressive Moving Average) and ARFIMA (Auto Regressive Fractionally 
Integrated Moving Average) models. 
4.1.1 What is Long Memory and Short Memory 
Long-memory processes are stationary processes whose autocorrelation functions decay 
more slowly than short-memory processes. Because the autocorrelations die out so 
slowly, long-memory processes display a type of long-run dependence. The 
autoregressive fractionally integrated moving average (ARFIMA) model provides a 
parsimonious parameterisation of long-memory processes. This parameterisation nests 
the autoregressive moving-average (ARMA) model, which is widely used for 
short-memory processes (Granger and Joyeux, 1980). 
 
The ARFIMA model also generalises the autoregressive integrated moving-average 
(ARIMA) model with integer degrees of integration. The ARFIMA model provides a 
solution for the tendency to overdifferentiate stationary series that exhibit long-run 
dependence. With the ARIMA approach, a nonstationary time series is differenced in 
terms of times until the differenced series is stationary, where d is an integer. Such 
series are said to be integrated of order d, denoted I(d), with not differencing, I(0), being 
the option for stationary series. Many series exhibit too much dependence to be I(0) but 
are not I(1), and ARFIMA models are designed to represent these series.  
 
The ARFIMA model allows for a continuum of fractional differences, -0.5 < d < 0.5. 
The generalisation to fractional differences allows the ARFIMA model to handle 
processes that are neither I(0) nor I(1), to test for overdifferencing, and to model 
long-run effects that only die out at long horizons. 
 
There are several possible definitions of the property of 'long memory'. Given a discrete 
time series process ty  with autocorrelation function j  at lag j, then according to 
McLeod and Hipel (1978), the process possesses are long memory if the quantity: 
  
n
lim =
n
j
j n



             (34) 
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A stationary and invertible ARMA process has autocorrelations which are geometrically 
bound, i.e.,
k
k cm
 , for large k, where 0 < m < 1 and is hence a short memory 
process. 
 
In particular, the process ty  is said to be integrated of order d, or I(d), if: 
  (1 )
d
t tL y u              (36) 
where L is the lag operator, -0.5 < d < 0.5, and tu  is a stationary and ergodic process 
with a bound and positively valued spectrum at all frequencies.  
 
For 0 < d < 0.5, the process is long memory in the sense of the condition (l), while its 
autocorrelations are all positive and decay at a hyperbolic rate. For -0.5 < d < 0, the sum 
of absolute values of the processes autocorrelations tends to be constant, thus meaning 
that it has short memory according to equation (35). In this situation the ARFI MA(0, d, 
0) process is said to be 'antipersistent' or to have 'intermediate memory', while all its 
autocorrelations, excluding lag zero, are negative and decay hyperbolically to zero 
(Hosking, 1981; Qiao, Chiang and Wong, 2008). 
 
Alternatively, the memory of a process ty  can be expressed in terms of the behaviour 
of its partial sum: 
  
1
T
T t
t
S y

              (37) 
Rosenblatt (1956) defined short range dependency in terms of a process that satisfies 
strong mixing, thus meaning that the maximal dependence between two points of a 
process becomes trivially small as the distance between these points increases. More 
concretely, a process ty  can be defined as having short memory if: 
  2 1 2lim ( )T
T
E T S 

            (38) 
exists and is nonzero, and: 
  
1/2
[ ][1/ ] ( )  for all  [0,1]rTT S B r r         (39) 
where [rT] is the integer part of rT, B(r) is standard Brownian motion, and denotes 
convergence in distribution. 
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A wider definition of long memory is to include any process which possesses an 
autocovariance function for large k, such that: 
  
2 2( ) Hk k k
              (40) 
where denotes approximate equality for large k and where ( )k  is any slowly 
varying function at infinity. Helson and Sarason (1967) showed that any process with H > 
0 and autocovariance function given by (40) violates the strong mixing condition, and 
hence is long memory or long range dependent. 
 
We follow McLeod and Hipel’s (1978) definition. Indeed, if we define long memory 
features as those whose autocorrelations decay at the hyperbolic rate as the second one 
did, then all ARFIMA models are long memory processes regardless of what value d 
holds. Thus, in order to make things easier, we select the first one. 
4.1.2 The Difference between Short Memory and Long Memory 
Long-memory processes are stationary processes whose autocorrelation functions decay 
more slowly than short-memory processes. The ARFIMA model provides a 
parsimonious parameterisation of long-memory processes that nests the autoregressive 
moving-average (ARMA) model, which is widely used for short-memory processes. By 
allowing for fractional degrees of integration, the ARFIMA model also generalises the 
autoregressive integrated moving-average (ARIMA) model with integer degrees of 
integration. 
 
Granger and Joyeux (1980) showed that the autocorrelations from an ARMA model 
decay exponentially, whereas the autocorrelations from an ARFIMA process decay at a 
much slower hyperbolic rate. Box, Jenkins and Reinsel (2013, pp. 260-262) defined 
short-memory processes as those whose autocorrelations decay exponentially fast and 
long-memory processes as those whose autocorrelations decay at the hyperbolic rate. 
 
In our study, we use the ARMA model to represent the short memory models and the 
ARFIMA model to represent the long memory models and some of the short memory 
models. Because long-memory processes are stationary, one might be tempted to 
approximate the processes with many terms in an ARMA model. However, these 
approximate models are difficult to fit and to interpret because ARMA models with 
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many terms are difficult to estimate and the ARMA parameterisation has an inherent 
short-run nature. In contrast, the ARFIMA model has the d parameter for the long-run 
dependence and ARMA parameters for short-run dependence. Using different 
parameters for different types of dependence facilitates estimation and interpretation, as 
discussed by Sowell (1992). Granger and Joyeux (1980) also argued that the ability of 
ARFIMA models to capture this long-range dependence, which cannot be captured by 
stationary ARMA models, is an important advantage of ARFIMA models over ARMA 
models when modelling long-memory processes. 
4.1.3 The Features of ARFIMA Model and How to Model It 
The general ARFIMA (p, d, q) model is defined as: 
2( )(1 ) ( ) ( ) ,    ~ (0, )d t t tL L y L nid               (41) 
where 
2 3( 1) ( 1)( 2)(1 ) 1 ...
2! 3!
d d d d d dL dL L L
  
          (42) 
For 0 < d < 0.5, the ARFIMA process is said to possess a long memory or long-range 
dependence. The correlations and partial correlations are all positive and decay 
monotonically and hyperbolically to zero as the lag increases. When d=0, an ARFIMA 
process can be reduced to the conventional ARMA process. For -0.5 < d < 0, it has a 
short memory and is 'antipersistent'. The correlations and partial correlations of the 
process are all negative and decay monotonically and hyperbolically to zero. The model 
is nonstationary for d ≥ 0.5 as it possesses infinite variance. For 0.5 <d<1, the process is 
mean-reverting because there exists a non-long-run effect of an innovation on the future 
values of the process. For d > 1, the process is not mean-reverting, since any shock to 
the process could make it drift away from its equilibrium permanently. In this case, the 
data is usually handled by differencing (Qiao, Chiang and Wong, 2008). 
 
There are two approaches to the estimation of an ARFIMA (p, d, q) model: exact 
maximum likelihood estimation, as proposed by Sowell (1992), and semiparametric 
approaches. Sowell’s approach requires specification of the p and q values, while 
estimation of the full ARFIMA model is conditional on those choices. The 
semiparametric approaches assume that the short memory or ARMA components of the 
time series are relatively unimportant, so that the long memory parameter d may be 
estimated without fully specifying the data generating process. We follow Sowell’s 
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(1992) approach in our study. The best fitting ARMA model is estimated first, followed 
by the maximum likelihood estimation of d. The exact order is as follows: 1. p × q 
ARMA models are built and ranked based on AIC (Akaike info criterion) excluding 
those with insignificant coefficients. The one with the lowest AIC is the best fitting 
model. 2. Estimate d for the best fitting ARMA model. 3. If the result is significant and 
lies within the boundary of -0.5 < d < 0.5, accept the result. For 0 < d < 0.5, the model is 
a long memory process. For -0.5 < d < 0, the model is a short memory process and 
decays at hyperbolical rate. If the result is insignificant or lie out of the boundary of -0.5 
< d < 0.5, abandon the model and estimate d for the next one. Repeat the process until a 
significant estimation which lies within the boundary is found. If no such estimation is 
found, conclude that the data is best described using the ARMA model, and its short 
memory process decays exponentially. 
4.2 Dealing with Structural Changes: 
The ways in which previous studies have considered breakpoints include: 1. Pick one 
point as the breakpoint based on a specific property, for instance, a dummy variable 
based on date. 2. Pick the timing of real life events as the breakpoint, treat the 
breakpoints as known. There are a few drawbacks when it comes to these methods. 
Firstly, it is very likely that there is more than one breakpoint and it may not occur due 
to the property picked; the reason for the breakpoint is debatable. It may be because of 
financial liberalisation or bank activities, changes in interest rate and exchange rate 
regimes, or new government policies and changes in political environment. Secondly, 
the date of breakpoint may not correspond to the exact date of real life events. Although 
we know that the breakpoint is very likely to occur around that time period, this may be 
reflected differently in the data. Breakpoint tests in other studies are often used to solve 
the timing problem only, although they serve three purposes in our framework. First, it 
they are used to detect the timing of shocks. Endogenous estimation of timing will 
lower the power of the contagion test (Gravelle, Kichian and Morley, 2006), and thus 
we want to determine the breaks at the beginning of our framework. Second, the result 
from the breakpoint test will help us to explore how contagion or interdependence 
spread through countries. Third, breakpoint tests in our study should fit the 
heteroscedasticity situation as the contagion test requires. When choosing suitable 
breakpoint tests, we consider two aspects: 1. Do the features or the assumptions of the 
tests fit our framework well? 2. Are the tests accurate enough to properly identify the 
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structural changes.  
4.2.1 Testing for Structural Change Known a Priori 
The Chow test is a classic test dealing with a single breakpoint known a priori. It splits 
the target sample into two sub-periods and estimates the parameters of each sub-period 
under the null hypothesis that they have the same parameters for every regressor. The 
equality of the two sets of coefficients is tested by a classic F statistic: 
1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
( ) / ( )
( , 2 )
( ) / ( 2 )
cESS ESS ESS PF F P N N P
ESS ESS N N P
 
   
  
      (43) 
where cESS  is the sum of squared residuals of the whole sample; 1ESS  is the sum of 
squared residuals of the first sub-period; 2ESS is the sum of squared residuals of the 
second sub-period; 1N and 2N are the number of observations in the first and second 
sub-period respectively; P is the total number of the parameters. 
 
An important limitation of the Chow test is that the breakpoint must be known a priori. 
A researcher only has two choices: 1. Choose an arbitrary observation as possible 
breakpoint and perform the test. 2. Pick an observation with the timing of some 
significant issues. There are a number of clear problems which can make the test 
insignificant with both these choices. Firstly, the possibility of identifying the true 
breakpoint is very low for the first choice since one only randomly chooses an 
observation as a possible breakpoint, thus leading to the break being ignored. Secondly, 
choice 2 seems to be better as it provides a criterion to pick a possible breakpoint. 
However, one can identify a breakpoint falsely when it is actually not a true breakpoint. 
Finally, the result is very sensitive to the choice of breakpoint, and thus the arbitrary 
choices are very misleading. 
 
Due to these problems with the Chow test, researchers (such as Quandt, 1960; Andrews 
and Ploberger, 1994; Bai and Perron, 2003; Perron and Qu, 2006) came up with a 
solution: treat the breakpoint as unknown.  
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4.2.2 Testing for Structural Change with Unknown Timing 
4.2.2.1 Quandt’s statistics (1960) 
Quandt (1960) performed the Chow test on all observations. This procedure is not 
specifically designed for a single breakpoint because it can track all possible breaks, 
although one can always find the break date with the largest Chow statistic through this 
procedure. These are the Quandt’s statistics. However, if the break date is unknown a 
priori, then the chi-square critical values are inappropriate (Hansen 2000). If this is the 
case then what critical value should be used instead? 
4.2.2.2 Andrews-Ploberger Test (1993, 1994) 
Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) provided some elegant and general 
statements. The statement in Andrews (1993) covered Wald, Lagrange multiplier (LM), 
and likelihood-ratio (LR)-like tests based on the generalised method of moments (GMM) 
estimators. The data used in this test may be stationary or non-stationary under the null 
hypothesis of parameter stability. 
 
The null hypothesis of interest here is: 
0 0: tH   ,              (44) 
The on-time change alternative with change point  is: 
1
1
2
( )
( ) :
( )
T tH
 
 
 

 
 ,  
1, ,
1,
t T
t T



          (45) 
Here T is the sample size, (0,1)  .T is the time of change, and for simplicity . 
 
Because   is unknown, one must construct test statistics that do not take   as given. 
Doing so is complicated by the fact that the problem of testing for structural change 
with an unknown change point does not fit into the standard ‘regular’ testing framework. 
The reason is that the parameter   only appears under the alternative hypothesis and 
not under the null.  
 
The assumption on the break dates (T , where (0,1)  ) is very helpful. This 
assumption specifies that the break dates are asymptotically distinct. An asymptotic 
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analysis is often viewed as a thought experiment about what would happen if we were 
able to collect increasing amounts of data in the future. If one adheres to this view, then 
the last regime should increase in length (assuming no other break will occur in the 
future) and all other segments then become a negligible proportion of the total sample. 
Hence, as the sample increases, we would find ourselves with a single break, in which 
case the framework becomes useless. However, with the assumed condition, when the 
sample size increases, all segments increase in length in the same proportions to each 
other. 
 
This test adopts a common method used in this scenario and considers test statistics of 
the form: 
sup ( )TW



, sup ( )TLM



and sup ( )TLR



, 
where   is some pre-specified subset of [0,1] whose closure lies in (0,1).  is 
required to be bound away from zero and one. This requirement is made to ensure that 
the estimators upon which the test statistics are based are uniformly consistent for 
   and to ensure that the functions are continuous. One rejects 
0H  for large values 
ofsup ( )TW



, sup ( )TLM



 and sup ( )TLR



.  
 
The sup ( )TW   and sup ( )TLR   tests are not optimal, except in a very restrictive sense. 
Andrews and Ploberger (1994) considered a class of tests that are optimal, in the sense 
that they maximise a weighted average power. The tests are called (average) exponential 
LM ,Wald  and LR  tests, denoted Exp LM , Exp Wald  and Exp LR  
respectively. The authors also showed that the asymptotic properties of these three tests 
are the same under the null and local alternatives. 
 
Despite all the advantages, there are four things we must know about this test. Firstly, 
this procedure is designed for a single unknown breakpoint. What should we do when 
the issue is about multiple structural changes? Secondly, the test Exp Wald  is 
optimal in finite samples with fixed regressors and known variance of the residuals. 
What should we do under heteroscedasticity？Thirdly, for a fixed sample size, the 
power of the test can rapidly decrease to zero as the change in mean increases. This is 
again because the variance of the errors is estimated under the null hypothesis of no 
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change. Finally, this test is not designed for heteroscedasticity situations, thus 
potentially rendering it inappropriate for our framework.  
4.2.2.3 Bai-Perron Test (2003) 
Bai and Perron (2003) provided a method which is performed under heteroscedasticity 
and which follows a multiple linear regression with m breaks: 
' ' ,t t t j ty x z u    1 1,...,j jt T T           (46) 
In this model, 1,..., 1j m  , 
ty is the dependent variable at time t, while ( 1)tx p and 
( 1)tz q are vectors of covariates, x is the matrix of regressors whose coefficients do not 
change across regimes, z is the matrix of regressors whose coefficient are allowed to 
change.  and ( 1,..., 1)j j m   are the corresponding vectors of coefficients. The 
indices
1( ,..., )mT T , or the breakpoints, are treated as unknown. If 0p  , then we have a 
partial structural change model because the parameter vector   is not subjected to 
shift and is estimated using the entire sample. When 0p  , we have a pure structural 
change model since all coefficients are subject to change. The variance of 
tu  should not 
be constant (i.e. heteroscedasticity). 
 
The method considered is based on the least-squares principle. For each m-partition
1( ,..., )mT T , the associated least-squares estimates of  and j are obtained by 
minimising the sum of squared residuals: 
1
1
2
1 1
( ) ( ) [ ]
i
i
Tm
t t t i
i t T
Y X Z Y X Z y x z     


  
              (47)
 
The breakpoints are estimated sequentially rather than simultaneously. Let 
,({ })r nSSR T  
be the sum of square residuals associated with the optimal partition containing r breaks 
using the first n observations. Let ( , )SSR i j be the SSR obtained by applying OLS to a 
segment that starts at i and ends at j . Let h T ( (0,1)  ) be the minimal permissible 
length of a segment. The optimisation procedure is based on solving the following 
recursive problem:
 
, 1,({ }) min [ ({ }) ( 1, )]r n r j
rh j n h
SSR T SSR T SSR j n
  
          (48) 
1. Compute and save ( , )SSR i j for pairs satisfying j i h   
2. Compute and store 
1,({ })nSSR T  for 2 ( 1)h n T m h    by solving the following 
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problem: 1,({ }) min [ (1, ) ( 1, )]n
h j n h
SSR T SSR j SSR j n
  
    
3. Sequentially compute and store 
,({ })r nSSR T for 2, , 1r m  . For each r , n ranges 
from ( 1)r h to ( )T m r h  . 
4. The estimates of the break dates are then obtained by solving: 
, 1,({ }) min [ ({ }) ( 1, )]m T m j
mh j T h
SSR T SSR T SSR j T
  
    
There are two things that we should know about the Bai-Perron test: 1. Due to the fact 
that the lease-squares method imposes equal weights on all residuals, even changes in 
the variance of residuals are allowed, thus meaning that this test is not sensitive to 
changes in variance (which needs different weights). 2. Although restrictions can be 
imposed, this method cannot be applied directly to models with restrictions since the 
SSR for a segment cannot be computed independently of other segments. 
 
We consider two breakpoint tests here: the Bai-Perron test and the Andrews-Ploberger 
test. Although the Andrews-Ploberger test has many disadvantages compared to the 
Bai-Perron test, we still use it to detect structural changes in order to gauge whether or 
not a breakpoint test that ignores heteroscedasticity affects the identification of 
contagion. 
4.2.2.4 Model Accuracy 
Combining breakpoint tests with other techniques to study financial crisis is an idea 
employed in other empirical work as well (e.g. Guesmi, Kaabia and Kazi, 2013; 
Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2014; Ismail and Isa, 2008; Fei, Tsui and Zhang, 
2011). Usually more than one breakpoint tests are included in order to increase the 
accuracy. The Andrews-Ploberger test and the Bai-Perron test are the mostly used 
methods among all the identification techniques. The standard procedure in the above 
literature is to employ the Andrews-Ploberger test first to identify a single breakpoint, 
and Bai-Perron test is used later to confirm it and identify the other possible breakpoints. 
Unlike previous work, we applied the breakpoint tests to some simulated data in order 
to compare their accuracy first, especially against the change in the variance before we 
apply them on our target data sample. The data generated are all stochastic processes 
with x mean, y variance (i.e. (x, y)) and 400 data length, namely: (1, 1), (1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 
1), (2, 2), (3, 1) and (3, 3). When the data are simulated, 12 conditions are created by 
combining series with different mean and/or variance to reflect the change in mean, 
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change in variance and change in both mean and variance. These 12 conditions are: 
[(1,1)(3,1)], [(1,1)(1,3)], [(1,1)(3,3)], [(1,1)(3,1)(2,1)], [(1,1)(3,1)(3,3)], [(1,1)(3,1)(2,2)], 
[(1,1)(1,3)(3,3)], [(1,1)(1,3)(1,2)], [(1,1)(1,3)(2,2)], [(1,1)(3,3)(1,3)], [(1,1)(3,3)(3,1)] 
and [(1,1)(3,3)(2,2)]. The idea here is to establish how these tests perform under each 
different kind of change in mean and variance. Since we created the breakpoints when 
simulating the data, we are able to measure the accuracy of both tests. When the 
condition is one single change in mean or variance, the data length is 800 (two series 
combined together) and the breakpoint we are expecting is 400. When the condition 
involves two changes in mean and/or variance, the data length is 1200 (three series 
combined together) and the breakpoints we are expecting are 400 and 800. Among all 
the 21 changing moments in the 12 conditions, we have 7 moments of change in mean, 
7 moments of change in variance and 7 moments of change in both mean and variance. 
The plots of the simulated data are presented in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Plots of the Simulated Data 
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We first look at the results from the Andrews-Ploberger test which are presented in 
Table 1. We can see that the results of the 7 changes in mean moments are very accurate 
and significant, while the results of the 7 changes in both mean and variance moments 
have an equally good performance. However, the results of the 7 changes in variance 
moments are much worse. 6 of the 7 changes in variance moments are insignificant and 
not at all accurate. As such, we reach the conclusion that the AP test is more sensitive to 
a change in mean. A change in only the variance is usually not clearly identified as a 
breakpoint. If there is a shift included in the overall change, it is more likely that it will 
detect a significant and accurate breakpoint. However, if the overall change is only a 
change in slope and/or curvature, the AP test will not perform as well as it does against 
a shift in the overall change. 
 
Table 1: Andrews-Ploberger Test Results on Stochastic Process 
 Possible Breakpoint P-value Is it a break at 5%? 
(1 yes, 0 no) 
ΔM: [(1,1)(3,1)] 401 0 1 
ΔM+ΔM:[(1,1)(3,1)(2,1)] 401 
802 
0 
0 
1 
1 
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ΔM+ΔV:[(1,1)(3,1)(3,3)] 401 
932 
0 
0.42488 
1 
0 
ΔM+ΔMV:[(1,1)(3,1)(2,2)] 401 
800 
0 
0 
1 
1 
ΔV: [(1,1)(1,3)] 519 0.15786 0 
ΔV+ΔM:[(1,1)(1,3)(3,3)] 519 
801 
0.50388 
0 
0 
1 
ΔV+ΔV:[(1,1)(1,3)(1,2)] 519 
802 
0.15786 
0 
0 
1 
ΔV+ΔMV:[(1,1)(1,3)(2,2)] 519 
801 
0.15786 
0 
0 
1 
ΔMV: [(1,1)(3,3)] 401 0 1 
ΔMV+ΔM:[(1,1)(3,3)(1,3)] 401 
802 
0 
0 
1 
1 
ΔMV+ΔV:[(1,1)(3,3)(3,1)] 401 
532 
0 
0.39285 
1 
0 
ΔMV+ΔMV:[(1,1)(3,3)(2,2)] 401 
787 
0 
0 
1 
1 
ΔM: Change in mean; ΔV: Change in variance; ΔMV: Change in mean and variance;                  
(x, y): Stochastic process with x mean and y variance. 
 
There are two ways in which to estimate breakpoints using the Bai-Perron test. The first 
method is to put all series with the same data length in a unique linear regression. The 
second method is to estimate the breakpoints for each series separately. Both methods 
involve purely structural change. The first method captures the structural change of the 
whole group while the second method focusses on the features of each series 
individually. The results of the first method are presented in Table 2 and Table 3 while 
the results of the second method are presented in Table 4. 1 significant breakpoint was 
detected in Table 2, and was as we expected. A total of 2 breakpoints were detected in 
Table 3, although this was not in keeping with our expectations. The breakpoints we 
expected are 400 and 800, although the results obtained, as seen in Table 3, are 400 and 
735. These results are significant, although the second estimated breakpoint is 
downward biased. Compared to the performance of the Andrews-Ploberger test, we feel 
that this is an improvement in terms of accuracy. Table 4 shows what we get if we wish 
to capture the feature of each series individually. We see that the Bai-Perron test 
reported significant and accurate results for changes in mean and changes in both mean 
and variance. With this said however, all 7 moments of change in variance are 
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insignificant, albeit 5 of them are more accurate than the Andrews-Ploberger test. 
 
Table 2: Bai-Perron Result of Data with 800 Observations 
Specifications 
tz ={(1,1)(3,1), (1,1)(3,3)}     q =2     p =0     h =120     m =5      =0.15 
Tests 
(1)TSupF    
(2)TSupF   
(3)TSupF   
(4)TSupF    
(5)TSupF   
(2 |1)TSupF  
67.03*     42.61*     31.12*     23.53*     18.86*      10.50 
(3 | 2)TSupF     
(4 | 3)TSupF   
(5 | 4)TSupF   
maxUD   maxWD  
  6.161.39        1.39        0.00      67.03*     67.03* 
Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure:          1 
LWZ:             0 
BIC:           1 
Breakpoint found 
396 
Note 
m : maximum number of breakpoint; h : minimum length of distance; *: 
significant at 5% level 
 
Table 3: Bai-Perron Result of Data with 1200 Observations 
Specifications 
ty ={(1,1)(1,3)(1,2)}     q =8     p =0     h =180     m =5      =0.15 
Tests 
(1)TSupF    
(2)TSupF    
(3)TSupF    
(4)TSupF    
(5)TSupF    
(2 |1)TSupF  
115.98*     83.02*     65.53*      75.08*      67.51*      30.39* 
(3 | 2)TSupF    
(4 | 3)TSupF     
(5 | 4)TSupF    
maxUD   maxWD  
  22.15       5.600.00       0.0000       115.98*   115.98* 
Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure:              2 
LWZ:                 0 
BIC:               0 
Breakpoint found 
400, 735 
Note 
m : maximum number of breakpoint; h : minimum length of distance; *: 
significant at 5% level 
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Table 4: Bai-Perron Results of Individual Series 
Number of breaks selected 
(1,1)(1,3) (1,1)(3,1) (1,1)(3,3) (1,1)(1,3)(1,2) 
1 
(397) 
1 
(399*) 
1 
(400*) 
2 
(446, 697) 
(1,1)(1,3)(2,2) (1,1)(1,3)(3,3) (1,1)(3,1)(2,1) (1,1)(3,1)(2,2) 
1 
(369, 800*) 
1 
(380, 800*) 
2 
(401*, 800*) 
2 
(400*, 800*) 
(1,1)(3,1)(3,3) (1,1)(3,3)(1,3) (1,1)(3,3)(2,2) (1,1)(3,3)(3,1) 
1 
(400*, 855) 
2 
(400*, 797*) 
2 
(400*, 786*) 
1 
(400*, 797) 
*indicates significant at 5% level 
 
We can see that both tests did well in terms of change in mean, although when it comes 
to change in variance the tests perform poorly and tend to detect different breakpoints. 
However, we did notice certain improvements in the Bai-Perron test when it comes to 
changes in variance. Since they are both very accurate, with regard to any changes 
which include a change in mean, they usually detect similar breakpoints when there is a 
shift included in the overall change. However, if the overall change only includes 
change in slope and/or curvature, they usually report different answers, and the 
Bai-Perron test has a higher accuracy. As a result of this, we place more trust in the 
breakpoints detected using the Bai-Perron test. However, we will still include the 
Andrews-Ploberger test in our structure so as to examine whether or not the feature of 
Heteroscedasticity affects the final result. As for the Bai-Perron test, we will apply the 
second method to the real data so that we can examine the features of each series and 
include all the possible breakpoints. 
4.3 Iterative Least Square Method 
After having obtained the residual breakpoints and constructing the nonlinear equation 
system, we use the iterative least square method to compute the coefficients. 
In order to perform the iterative least square method, we first slightly reorganised the 
equation system by moving the variance and covariance to the right hand side of the 
equations, giving us: 
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( , ) , ( 1,2,...,8)j jy f V j             (49) 
where V is the matrix of variance and covariance,  is the matrix of impact 
coefficients (
* *, ,  and it cit it cit    ), (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) 'jy  and j is the residual. The 
idea of this procedure is to estimate the value of  that can give us the minimum sum 
of squared residuals: 
28 82
1 1
min ( ) ( , )j jj jSSR y f V                (50) 
In order to solve (50), we must take the first derivative: 
8
1
( ) ( , )
2 ( , ) 0jj
SSR f V
y f V
 

 
 
      
      (51) 
(51) can be simplified to: 
8 8
1 1
( , ) ( , )
( , ) 0j jj j
f V f V
y f V
 
 
  
 
      
      (52) 
This is a nonlinear equation system with 8 equations and 8 variables. As we cannot 
obtain an analytical solution, the iterative method is instead used. All of the iterative 
methods have the same weakness, namely their inability to find the best initial values 
for the variables. This is a drawback we share, while the initial value we use for all of 
our impact variables is 1. 
4.4 The Structure of the Empirical Studies 
In terms of the first study, we focus on the contagion effects among countries with low 
degrees of dependence on foreign trade. Because of the low dependence, it is easier for 
us to observe the contagion effects from the idiosyncratic shocks. Because we want to 
split the movement into two segments, the method employed here is ‘Identification 
through Heteroscedasticity’. The data used is risk premium in interbank rate. The target 
countries all come from Europe. 
 
The second empirical study is identical to the first, although the focus is instead on the 
countries with a high degree of dependence. The reason for high dependence is that we 
are interested in the role played by trade in financial contagion. Besides this, we also 
wish to gauge how idiosyncratic shock responds to high dependence. The data used is 
still risk premium in interbank rate, while the target countries all come from Europe. 
 
In the third empirical study, we look at three markets in order to examine more possible 
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transmission channels: exchange rate market, interest rate market and stock market. As 
for the methods, except for ‘Identification through Heteroscedasticity’, we include 
Forbes and Rigobon’s (2002) adjust correlation, as well as Granger’s causality and 
impulse response analysis. The ‘Identification through Heteroscedasticity’ procedure 
can help us to examine interdependence and idiosyncratic shock separately, but cannot 
explain the combined effect. This is why we brought in the adjusted correlation. Besides 
this, by combining the results of the split effect and the overall effect together, we are 
able to see how the split shocks contribute to the overall shock. In addition, the reason 
for the Granger causality and impulse response analysis is that we would like to see if 
there are any changes in the statistical equilibrium and how long the contagion effects 
last after each shock. 
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Chapter 5 Contagion in Risk Premium - Low Trade Links 
5.1 Introduction 
Contagion is defined as the transmission of shocks from one market to another in this 
study. These shocks may be transferred through the fundamentals, as suggested by 
studies, or through other links which cannot be directly explained. Based on the review 
in Section 2, trade and financial linkages are the primary transmission channels 
considered. On this basis, we define fundamental using the balance of payments. 
Assuming there is no surplus or deficit, the balance of payments equation is: 
Current Account + Capital Account = 0, where 
Current Account = Inflows of goods and services 
              + Outflows of goods and services 
Capital Account = Foreign direct investment 
              + Portfolio investment 
              + Other investment 
              + Reserve account 
We define fundamental as the elements of the current account and the capital account. In 
our study, current account is measured by trade link, which is calculated as the sum of 
total export and total import. We would also like to use net capital flows to represent 
capital account, although this is not involved in the modelling process. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the methodology of this chapter is based on 
‘Identification through Heteroscedasticity’, whereby we split the shock into two 
segments: common shock, which represents the shock component caused by 
fundamentals (henceforth referred to as interdependence), and the idiosyncratic shock, 
which is the part of the shock which cannot be directly explained (henceforth referred to 
as pure contagion). Indeed, since all past studies have examined interdependence, we 
would like to pay more attention to pure contagion. We do this by splitting shock into 
two segments and choosing countries with low trade links. Based on the balance of 
payments, when the trade link is low, the net capital flows must also be low, assuming 
no surplus or deficit. When the effect of interdependence between countries is not so 
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significant, the pure contagion is easier to observe.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the data, explains 
how we chose the countries with low trade links and how the market behaved. Section 3 
presents the result of forecasting, and compares the differences between the ARMA and 
ARFIMA models. Section 4 provides the findings of two breakpoint tests: the 
Andrews-Ploberger test and the Bai-Perron test. Section 5 then presents the results of 4 
procedures of contagion test based on the forecasting and breakpoint models, following 
which Section 6 concludes the paper. 
5.2 Data 
The most widely used interest rate data in previous studies are government bond yields. 
Constancio (2012) examined the contagion phenomena among 7 European countries 
during the sovereign debt crisis using the daily 10-year government bond yields. The 
study detected contagion effect among those countries and suggested that central bank 
should contribute to the stability of the financial markets. The other studies that 
employed government bond yields include Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) and Missio 
and Watzka (2011). European countries were still the research targets and large 
proportion of contagion were detected in both studies. We follow the previous studies 
and choose 7 European countries as research targets, namely, Greece, Latvia, Iceland, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania, with Germany serves as a benchmark. Government 
bond yields are good measure of country risk and easier to collect. However, they lack 
the capacity to measure the market risk due to the macroeconomic regulation and 
control. As a result, daily interbank rates are employed in this study instead of 
government bond yields. 
 
The subprime crisis was well analysed by many previous work. Contagion effects were 
usually identified, however, many different possible reasons were provided. For 
instance, contagion may come from the volatility changes caused by the transmission of 
the instantaneous information (Peng and Ng, 2012), or the central banks failed to keep 
the financial stability of the markets (Constancio, 2012), or even the changes in the 
monetary variables (Syllignakis and Kouretas, 2011). The reason for contagion effects is 
one of our research interests. Therefore we follow previous work and build our data 
sample around the subprime crisis. We are interested to see what possible reasons for 
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contagion our result can illustrate. 
 
We look at the premium of 6 European countries’ interbank rate over the benchmark. 
The 7 countries are divided into 3 groups. Group 1 is made up of Greece, Latvia and 
Germany, while group 2 contains Iceland, Bulgaria and Germany, and group 3 is 
composed of Romania, Lithuania and Germany. The similarity between these three 
groups is that they all contain Germany. Indeed, the other two countries’ degree of 
dependence on foreign trade is very low with each other but considerably higher with 
Germany. The degree of dependence on foreign trade is calculated as follows:  
Between country A and B: 
The degree of dependence on foreign trade of country ( )AB AB AA E I GDP   
ABE is export from A to B, ABI is import from B to A. AGDP is country A’s GDP. The 
degrees of dependence on foreign trade of the selected countries are presented in Table 
5 (Please see Appendix 2 for detailed results): 
 
Table 5: Degrees of Dependence on Foreign Trade 
 Bulgaria Germany Greece Iceland Latvia Lithuania Romania 
Bulgaria  0.001361 0.009238 0.000044 0.001071 0.001385 0.013988 
Germany 0.118494  0.039717 0.024121 0.107001 0.123488 0.112227 
Greece 0.070401 0.003426  0.000378 0.001051 0.001483 0.011360 
Iceland 0.000052 0.000344 0.000066  0.001961 0.002685 0.000076 
Latvia 0.000608 0.000672 0.000075 0.002449  0.070522 0.000141 
Lithuania 0.001192 0.001198 0.000113 0.005718 0.106473  0.000355 
Romania 0.048204 0.004335 0.004777 0.000200 0.000883 0.001448  
(Source: Data are collected with DataStream in Newcastle University. GDP are collected from Oxford Economics. 
Export and Import are collected from IMF - Direction of Trade Statistics.) 
 
The aim is to select countries with a low degree of dependence on foreign trade in order 
to reduce the effect of interdependence and thereby make it easier for pure contagion to 
be detected. Since the other two countries in each group have relatively lower GDP than 
Germany, although their degrees of dependence on foreign trade are higher with 
Germany, Germany’s degree of dependence on foreign trade with them is much lower. 
This means that it is almost impossible for a change in interdependence of one country 
to spread through Germany to the other country, and thereby pure contagion is easier to 
detect. However, they can both be simultaneously affected by changes in Germany. 
With this in mind, each group is studied individually. 
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We assume that a German investor has invested in the other two countries in each group 
and the data we want to analyse is not exchange rate or interest rate data, but the risk 
premium: D Fr r . Where Dr is the domestic interest rate (we use Germany interbank 
rate here) and Fr is the foreign interest rate. The interest rate data used to calculate the 
risk premium is each country’s interbank rate at daily frequency and is extended from 
February 17, 2003 to June 25, 2012. After having obtained the risk premium, we 
calculate the increment by differencing the data. Data from February 17, 2003 to April 
25, 2007 are treated as the stable period and used to build the forecasting model while 
data from April 26, 2007 to June 25, 2012 are the turbulent period and used for 
contagion identification.  
 
Figure 2 present the plots of the interbank rates. It is very clear that the interbank rates 
had an upward trend during February 17, 2003 to April 25, 2007, with the exception of 
Romania. Moreover, this trend changed from upward to downward, starting at the 
beginning of 2009. As a matter of fact, when the interbank rate in one country is raised, 
banks in that country will begin to reduce the amount of loans in order to keep sufficient 
capital for daily operation. The decrease of loans will then result in tight market 
liquidity and slow the growth of the economy while repressing inflation. It seems that 
all countries are trying to repress inflation before the crisis, again with the exception of 
Romania. Indeed, when the crisis occurred in 2008, all of the banks started to take out 
more loans in order to stimulate the economy. 
 
Figure 2: Plots of the Data in Level 
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(Source: Data are collected with DataStream in Newcastle University. Germany from Thomson Reuters, Latvia from 
Bank of Latvia, Bulgaria from Bulgarian National Bank, Greece from Bank of Greece, Iceland from Central Bank of 
Iceland, Romania from National Bank of Romania, Lithuania from Bank of Lithuania.) 
 
After a quick view of the plots, we now proceed to the descriptive statistics. The 
statistics include the mean, the standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, normality and the 
ADF unit root test. The test regression for the ADF test is: 
1 2 1
1
m
t t i t i t
i
Y t Y Y     

      
 
In order to properly perform the ADF test, the intercept, the trend variable and the 
proper length of the lag terms must be considered. The 1st differenced data are flat and 
have close to zero mean in all cases, therefore no intercepts and trend variables are 
included in the test regressions. The regressions with lag length from 1 to 16 are 
estimated and the best fitting lag length is determined by the AIC criteria. The statistics 
information is summarised in Table 6 and Table 7.  
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics (February 17, 2003 to April 25, 2007) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera ADF 
Latvia 0.0034 0.0977 -3.8041 164.7485 1193031** -10.51**[11] 
Greece 3.30e-5 0.0442 -0.0608 489.6254 10774596** -16.55**[12] 
Iceland -0.0067 0.0604 0.1034 117.5700 597247** -31.76**[4] 
Bulgaria -9.34e-5 0.0432 0.6848 102.5499 450998** -18.74**[5] 
Romania 0.0092 0.1176 1.7672 39.6658 61737** -19.81**[3] 
Lithuania 0.0002 0.0206 1.2281 28.8109 30586** -15.39**[15] 
**denotes significance at 1%. The number in [] are the best fitting lag terms for the ADF test. 
 
Table 6 summarises the statistics for the time period prior to April 25, 2007. The ADF 
unit root test reaches the conclusion that all data are stationary. The Jarque-Bera test 
strongly rejects the hypothesis of normality in all cases while we can also see that 
although the skewness of all samples is not far from 0, the kurtosis is too much bigger 
than normal distribution. However, because we have a large sample, we assume that the 
data are normally distributed based on the Central Limit Theorem. Although normality 
the hypothesis is strongly rejected, stationary data represent a strong basis from which 
to forecast the expected return. 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics (April 26, 2007 to June 25, 2012) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera ADF 
Latvia 0.0032 0.2484 -0.9228 86.6079 1190605** -11.25**[13] 
Greece 2.97e-6 0.0079 -0.3863 193.0428 7806688** -21.63**[14] 
Iceland 0.0038 0.2434 -4.3834 403.2913 32944330** -18.10**[8] 
Bulgaria -0.0007 0.0256 -0.5159 11.9691 1883170** -13.46**[8] 
Romania -0.0008 0.4025 -3.7456 317.9020 1983086** -22.55**[10] 
Lithuania 8.46e-5 0.0843 4.4351 116.9328 3110226** -7.43**[15] 
**denotes significance at 1%. The number in [] are the best fitting lag terms for the ADF test 
 
Table 7 summarises the statistics for the time period following April 25, 2007. The 
means of all samples remain close to 0 while the standard deviation has increased 
significantly, especially Latvia, Iceland and Romania. The Jarque-Bera test still strongly 
rejects the hypothesis of normality in all cases. All samples are stationary judging by the 
ADF unit root test, while we also assume that the data are normally distributed based on 
the Central Limit Theorem. 
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5.3 A Retrospect of Methodology 
As stated in Chapter 4, while we employ Gravelle, Kichian and Morley’s (2006) idea, 
we also introduce 3 new elements. Firstly, we use two different models (ARMA model 
and ARFIMA model) to obtain the forecast error, which is interpreted as the shock. By 
doing so, we are able to quantify the shock and discuss the effect of long memory and 
short memory features on contagion. Secondly, we exogenously estimate the structural 
breaks using two different breakpoint tests (Andrews-Ploberger Test and Bai-Perron 
Test), thus allowing us to overcome one of Gravelle, Kichian and Morley’s (2006) flaws 
and improve the power of the contagion test while also examining the effect of 
heteroscedasticity. Last but not least, we use a different method to solve the equation set 
of the contagion test, namely the iterative least square method. This section provides a 
retrospect of the methods involved in the present chapter. 
5.3.1 Purpose of the Forecasting Models 
The target of the contagion test is the forecast error, which contains information that the 
market participants have no knowledge of. This unanticipated information brought 
about unexpected changes in the market, and hence shock occurred. With this in mind, 
the first task of the ARMA and ARFIMA models is to quantify the shock. In order to do 
so, we must bring in the forecasting methods. Once we have the forecast value, we can 
calculate the forecast error and quantify the shock. Out of sample forecast is used in this 
study. The in sample forecasts usually suffer from the over fitting problem, where 
irrelevant regressors are included and lead to overly optimistic forecasting results. Such 
in sample results cannot guarantee the quality of the out of sample forecasting 
performance. Furthermore, the parameters and regressors may vary with the extension 
of time. Due to the above limitations, the results from in sample forecasts cannot be 
considered useful for policy guidance. No literature has yet provide a method to 
properly estimate the features of markets (recent papers - see Campbell and Thompson, 
2008; Li, Tsiakas and Wang, 2015 and references within). As a result, we treat the future 
actual value as the shock and employ out of sample forecast. 
 
The second task of the forecasting models is to measure the effect of long memory and 
short memory on contagion. As previously discussed, long memory and short memory 
measure the autocorrelation of the data. The autocorrelation of a long memory process 
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decays at a slower rate and never reaches 0 as the distance increases. In contrast, the 
autocorrelation of a short memory process decays faster and eventually reaches 0. As a 
result, a time series that possesses the long memory feature is more stable and 
predictable than a short memory process. However, here it is important to highlight a 
very interesting question: if the long memory and short memory feature only measures 
the autocorrelation of the data, will it change anything when our research target is the 
forecast error? The answer is no. Indeed, if we split the data into two elements, the first 
element is one which can be perfectly forecast based on the autocorrelation, while the 
other is the forecast error. Given that the data itself is constant as we know it, when the 
autocorrelation part is stable and predictable, the error part must be as stable and 
predictable as the autocorrelation part. When the stability and predictability of the 
autocorrelation drops, so will that of the forecast error. As a result, the forecast errors 
possess the same long memory and short memory feature as the data itself. When the 
feature of the data is identified by the forecasting models, we then also know the feature 
of the shock. As such, we expect the long memory processes to behave in a more stable 
fashion when we identify contagion and short memory processes which are more 
stochastic. 
5.3.2 Purpose of the Breakpoint Tests 
Previous studies examine regime shifts or structural breaks in two ways. Either choose 
the date of the breakpoints base on known knowledge of the markets (see Kleimeier, 
Lehnert and Verschoor, 2008; Mondria and Quintana-Domeque, 2013), or treat the 
break date as unknown and employ techniques to estimate the timing (see Guesmi, 
Kaabia and Kazi, 2013; Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2014). In this study, we 
follow the latter solution and combine it with chronology. The identified breakpoints are 
treated as regime shifts or structural breaks, which represent a significant change in the 
behaviour of the markets (Ismail and Isa, 2008). The corresponding events in the 
chronology are interpreted as the possible source where contagion occur or transmission 
channels it spread through.  
 
Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006) stated in their study that the power of their test 
was impaired because they estimated the structural breaks endogenously. Indeed, this is 
something which we intend to improve and make more appropriate by employing two 
breakpoint tests and exogenously estimating the breaks before the contagion test. We 
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also build a chronology to give the statistically identified breaks practical or economic 
meanings. Another aim here is to examine the effect of heteroscedasticity. It is now 
crucial to recall the detailed discussion pertaining to the Andrews-Ploberger test and the 
Bai-Perron test in Section 4.2. Indeed, it was stated that the Bai-Perron test deals with 
heteroscedasticity while the Andrews-Ploberger test does not. Moreover, many studies 
(Claessens and Forbes, 2001; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Billio and Caporin, 2010) 
argued that heteroscedasticity must be properly accounted for when identifying 
contagion. We expect that these two tests will generate very different answers. Indeed, 
with the addition of the Bai-Perron test’s improved accuracy (see Section 4.2), when 
differences are observed, the result of the Bai-Perron test shall prevail.  
5.3.3 The Contagion Test 
Once the shock has been quantified, the feature of the data estimated and the structural 
breaks detected, we proceed to the contagion test. The contagion test presented in this 
chapter consists of 5 sections. The first section addresses the co-integration and Granger 
Causality test, while the other four relate to procedures based on the two forecasting 
models and two breakpoint tests.  
5.3.3.1 The Co-integration and Granger Causality Tests 
Co-integration and Granger Causality tests in previous contagion literatures are mainly 
used as a tool to identify contagion (see Gray, 2009; Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 
2014). A regime shift is usually assigned or estimated first, then the statistical 
relationship in every regimes are modelled. A significant change between regimes is 
interpreted as contagion. The shift is usually interpreted as the possible source or 
transmission channel of contagion. This application of the co-integration and granger 
causality tests will be re-examined in chapter 7. 
 
Different from the previous studies, the purpose of these tests in this chapter is to 
eliminate the possibility of coincidental co-movement and illustrate that certain linkages 
exist among research targets. The way to achieve this is to show that statistical linkages 
exist among the data throughout the sample. We want to ensure that when we detect a 
contagion, it is because the original linkages between the data have changed and not 
because the research targets have no correlation at all and a stochastic jump just 
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occurred. The research targets are studied in pairs. 
 
However, the question seems to be, do the results of this section provide more hints 
rather than statistical relationships? Indeed, we split shock into two segments, namely 
common shock, which represents the changes in fundamentals and idiosyncratic shock, 
which represents the mystical content that cannot be directly explained. So, does this 
mean that when there is causal relationship, common shock prevails, with the shock 
only coming from the change in fundamentals? Does it also mean that when there is no 
causal relationship, idiosyncratic shock prevails and only pure contagion can be 
identified? Sadly, the answer to all these questions is no. Although the co-integration 
and Granger Causality tests, as members of the statistical test family, share the 
advantage of being able to explain the relationship between economic data when 
fundamentals fail to do so, they must also bear the drawback of lacking the power of 
economic explanation. The reason behind causal relationships can come from 
idiosyncratic shocks as well as common shocks. Indeed, when no causal relationships 
are detected, the only conclusion we can make is that no statistical causal relationship 
exists among the countries involved in the tests. However, this does not eliminate the 
possibility that the co-movements between these countries come from a mutual third 
party, in our case, Germany. Hence, shocks can still be transferred between countries 
through fundamentals, even when there are no statistical causal relationships. As a result, 
other than statistical relationships, the most we can get from the results of this section is 
that shocks are more likely to be transferred through a mutual third party to different 
countries rather than directly between them when there is no causal relationship. 
5.3.3.2 The 4 Contagion Test Procedures 
5.3.3.2.1 The Forming of the System 
Other than the new elements which we attempt to incorporate, we also form our 
equation set for the contagion test just like Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006) did. 
The dependent variables of their study are the weekly exchange rate and bond spread 
yield. We focus on interbank rate in this study. Recall how we split the shocks: 
it cit ct it itu z z                                                 
where ctz is the common shock, itz is the idiosyncratic shock, and cit and it
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determine the impact of the structural shocks on the asset returns. The variance of ctz
and itz  are normalised to unity, thus meaning that the absolute values of cit and it
are interpreted as the standard deviation of the shocks. The value of cit and it are 
allowed to be negative so the relationship between the forecast errors of different time 
periods can also be negative.  
 
The forming of the equations is mainly based on the covariance matrix as we know it: 
2 2
1 1 1 2
2 2
1 2 2 2
*
*
c t t c t c t
t
c t c t c t t
   
   
 
   
   
However, this matrix only provided us with 3 equations, which is not sufficient to solve 
the system. Thus, a state variable for both common shock and idiosyncratic shock is 
introduced: 
*
*
(1 )
(1 )
cit ci ct ci ct
it i it i it
S S
S S
  
  
  
    
When the state variables are equal to 1, this means that the shock has already occurred. 
When the state variable equals to 0, this is prior to the shock. Thanks to the state 
variables, 5 more equations are formed: 
*2 2
1 1 1
*2 2
2 2 2
* *
1 2 1 2
2 *2
1 1 1 1
2 *2
2 2 2 2
var( | 1)
var( | 1)
cov( , | 1)
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 
 
 
  
  
 
  
    
When combining them with the 3 equations we obtained from the covariance matrix, we 
can form a system to identify contagion. Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006) assumed 
that all impact coefficients to be positive except 2c t . However, we remove that 
restriction due to the fact that changes in the directions of the correlation may exist in 
both shocks and between any pairs of research targets. 
 
Contagion is measured by 1 2/c t c t  and 1 2/t t   in this system. Indeed, the changes in 
the co-movement between the assets of different countries reflect the state of their 
linkage and equilibrium. If the linkage and equilibrium remain unchanged, then the 
sigma of each country shall change by approximately the same proportion while their 
ratio before and after the shock shall remain statistically unchanged. On the contrary, if 
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statistically significant changes were detected in the ratio, this would suggest that the 
old linkage or equilibrium experienced a change after the shock, and hence contagion is 
identified. 
 
Finally, the system is solved by an iterative least square method (see Section 4.3 for a 
more detailed explanation). It is performed by a STATA code which we wrote (available 
upon request). We set the maximum number of iterations to 10000 and will obtain a 
result for every single iteration. If the program continues to generate constant results 
after a few iterations, it will stop automatically. If not, the program will stop after 
10,000 iterations. All estimated results are saved while the standard errors of every 
sigma are calculated. We will report the final iterated results, their standard errors and 
the t-statistics in Tables 19 to 42. 
5.3.3.2.2 The Interpreting of the 4 Procedures. 
We use two different forecast models (ARMA model and ARFIMA model) and two 
different breakpoint tests (Andrews-Ploberger test and Bai-Perron test) in order to get 
the information we need to build the system. As a result, we have 4 groups of 
information with which to form the equation set. We categorise each group of 
information as a procedure, while the 4 procedures we obtain are: the 
Andrews-Ploberger test and ARMA model based procedure, the Andrews-Ploberger test 
and ARFIMA model based procedure, the Bai-Perron test and the ARMA model based 
procedure and the Bai-Perron test and ARFIMA model based procedure. At this stage of 
the study, we look not only the change in the ratio, but also the change in the impact 
coefficients themselves. Indeed, it is possible for insignificant changes in two impact 
coefficients to create an amplification effect and lead to a significant change in their 
ratio while significant changes in two impact coefficients may offset each other and 
cause an insignificant change in their ratio. We would like to know as much about what 
is happening as we can.  
 
We anticipate that there are 6 possible situations: 1. While the impact coefficients in 
both countries experienced a significant change, the ratio did not. This is because the 
impact coefficients changed in the same direction, and hence the change in their ratio is 
not as big as the coefficients. Recall we stated that the absolute value of the sigma is 
interpreted as the standard deviation of the shock. In this case, the variance of the 
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shocks move proportionally in the same direction, thus suggesting that the original 
linkage or equilibrium between the two countries remains statistically unchanged, hence 
a non-significant change in the ratio. 
 
2. The impact coefficients in both countries experienced a significant change and so did 
their ratio. One reason for this is that the changes in the coefficients are in different 
directions, thus giving rise to an even bigger size change in their ratio. Another is that 
the coefficients changed in the same direction. Although the changes in their ratio are 
not as big as the coefficients, they are still big enough to be significant. Two things can 
happen given this situation. Either the shocks cause the variance to move in the same 
direction, yet non-proportionally in the two countries, and one of them is significantly 
bigger than the other, or the variance in one country becomes much bigger while the 
other becomes much smaller. Either way, this situation suggests that the previous 
balance is broken and a new one is forged. 
 
3. While none of the impact coefficients experienced significant changes, the ratio did 
exhibit a significant change. The coefficients changing in different directions could lead 
to this situation. In some way, this is similar to the last situation. The similarity is that 
the variance in one country continue to become bigger while the other becomes smaller. 
Indeed, there is no significant difference in either of the changes. However, since they 
move in different directions, the amplification effect they create still leads to a 
significant shift in the original linkages. 
 
4. None of the impact coefficients experienced significant changes, nor did the ratio. 
This is because either the coefficients changed in the same direction or changed in a 
different direction. Regardless, the change in their ratio remains insignificant. In this 
case, slight changes in the variance of both countries are observed, yet their linkage 
remains unchanged before and after the shock. 
 
5. Only one of the coefficients experienced significant change while their ratios also 
changed significantly. The significant change in one coefficient is strong enough to 
create a significant change in the ratio, or is enlarged by the change in the opposite 
direction to the other. Under this situation, although the assets of one country remain 
statistically stable, the variance of those in the other change dramatically, thus 
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eventually breaking their original linkage. 
 
6. Only one of the coefficients experienced significant change while their ratios did not 
change significantly. The significant change in one coefficient is not strong enough to 
create a significant change in the ratio, or is partly offset by the change in the same 
direction as the other one. In this case, the variance in both countries behaves in a 
similar fashion to that of the last situation, with the only change being that the 
significant change in the variance of the assets in one of the countries is not big enough 
to shake their existing relationship. As such, we may observe some turbulence in their 
linkage. Nevertheless however, the original linkage is not statistically broken. 
 
Meanwhile, we must also bear in mind that the procedures contain different features. 
Specifically, the feature of procedure 1 ignores long memory, short memory and 
heteroscedasticity; procedure 2 considers long memory and short memory features but 
ignores heteroscedasticity; procedure 3 ignores long memory and short memory feature, 
but considers heteroscedasticity, while procedure 4 considers everything. Theoretically 
speaking, procedure 4 is the most appropriate. Indeed, the results of each procedure are 
compared in order to gauge the effect of each feature. Procedures 1, 2, and 3 are 
compared so that we can tell how long memory, short memory, and heteroscedasticity 
affect the identification of contagion separately. Following this, procedure 4, deemed to 
be the most appropriate procedure, is studied in detail, not only with regard to the 
statistical effects of different features, but also the practical meaning of contagion. 
5.4 ARMA and ARFIMA Forecasting 
Here we must recall the procedure of ‘Identification through Heteroscedasticity’. The 
first step is to decompose the residuals: 
it cit ct it itu z z   , where 1,2i  , while we use 
cit to represent the interdependence and it to represent pure contagion. In order to 
obtain the residuals, we must build forecasting models through which to generate the 
estimated values. Two kinds of models are employed in our study, namely the ARMA 
and ARFIMA models. ARMA models represent the short memory process whose 
autocorrelations decay at a fast exponential rate. ARFIMA models represent both short 
and long memory processes. The short memory processes which they represent are 
those whose autocorrelations decay at a slower hyperbolic rate. With these processes, 
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the limit of the sum of the autocorrelations is also less than infinite. The 
autocorrelations decay hyperbolically to zero. The long memory processes they 
represent are those whose autocorrelations decay at hyperbolic rate and whose limit of 
the sum of autocorrelations is infinite. This suggests that the autocorrelations never 
reaches 0. There are two purposes here: the first is to obtain forecasting errors and the 
residuals, so we have the data to build equations for the contagion test. The second is to 
find the long memory and short memory features of the data and examine the effect of 
said long/short memory features. We would also like to establish whether or not data 
with long-term dependence and short-term dependence react differently in financial 
contagion. 
 
Here we must recall the estimation process in Chapter 4.1. The first step is to estimate 
the ARMA models. Indeed, Table 8 summarises the information of the best-fitting lag 
specifications for ARMA (p, q). The length of lag terms is determined by AIC (Akaike 
info criterion). The length we tried for both AR and MA terms is from 0 to 3. The one 
with the lowest AIC is the best fitting model. Table 9 presents the final estimation of 
ARFIMA (p, d, q) models. 
Table 8: ARMA Models 
 1p  2p  3p  1q  2q  3q  
Latvia 0.867 
(0.055) 
-0.766 
(0.069) 
0.116 
(0.042) 
-0.526 
(0.044) 
0.791 
(0.044) 
 
Greece -1.502 
(0.008) 
-0.996 
(0.009) 
 0.527 
(0.011) 
-0.458 
(0.013) 
-0.965 
(0.012) 
Iceland 0.880 
(0.066) 
  -0.825 
(0.079) 
  
Bulgaria 0.823 
(0.054) 
  -0.692 
(0.069) 
  
Romania   0.910 
(0.042) 
  -0.841 
(0.055) 
Lithuania -0.146 
(0.080) 
0.739 
(0.074) 
 0.266 
(0.092) 
-0.608 
(0.086) 
 
The statistics inside the ( ) are Std.Error and all coefficients are significant at 1% level. 
 
Table 9: ARFIMA Models 
 1p  2p  3p  1q  2q  3q  d  
Latvia 0.937 
(0.080) 
-0.799 
(0.078) 
0.192 
(0.057) 
-0.492 
(0.061) 
0.787 
(0.037) 
 -0.111 
(0.054) 
Greece -0. 921 
(0.008) 
-0.994 
(0.009) 
 -1. 887 
(0.011) 
1.889 
(0.013) 
-0.966 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(0.000) 
Iceland -0. 529 
(0. 239) 
-0. 113 
(0. 060) 
-0.087 
(0.037) 
0. 382 
(0. 250) 
  0.182 
(0.050) 
Bulgaria -0.683 
(0.146) 
  0.633 
(0.157) 
  0.189 
(0.028) 
Romania   -0.969 
(0.037) 
  0.961 
(0.041) 
0.117 
(0.020) 
Lithuania 1.830 -0.986  -1.821 0.985  0.119 
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(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.026) 
The statistics inside the ( ) are Std.Error and all coefficients are significant at 1% level. 
 
The AR and MA lag specifications of the best fitting ARMA model are identical to those 
of the final estimation of the ARFIMA model in most of our cases with the exception of 
Iceland, which is an ARMA (1, 1) but ARFIMA (3, 0.182, 1). The reason we changed 
the value of p  and q  is that the value of d  which we estimated for the Iceland 
ARFIMA (1, d , 1) is not significant. The value of d  is very sensitive to the value of 
p and q , meaning that we sometimes need to try different lag specifications to obtain a 
statistically significant result. We know that the ARFIMA model allows the property of 
long memory in the region 0 0.5d  and short memory in the region 0.5 0d   . 
Indeed, we can see from Table 9 that the two series in group 1, Latvia and Greece, 
possess short memory properties while the other four series in groups 2 and 3, Iceland, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania, possess long memory properties. Hence, we expect 
the prediction of group 2 and 3 to be better than that of group 1 and shocks to have a 
more persistent effect on group 2 and 3 than group 1, which is confirmed by breakpoint 
tests for having less structural changes. 
 
We use Mean Error (ME), Mean Absolute Error (MAE), Mean Squared Error (MSE), 
Mean Percentage Error (MPE) and Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) to 
measure the forecasting accuracy, where: 
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The advantage of ME is that it is easy to compute, but it is likely to be small since 
positive and negative errors tend to offset one another. MAE and MSE are more 
interpretable and are easier to explain, although they can only be used to compare the 
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accuracy of methods applied to the same data length. MPE shares the same weakness 
with ME, with the positive and negative errors tending to offset one another. Figure 3 
and 4 provide the plots of the forecasted data and table 10 and 11 report the calculated 
value for these criterions: 
Figure 3: Forecasted Result of the ARMA Model 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Forecasted Result of the ARFIMA Model 
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Figure 3 and 4 suggest that the predictions are all very bad, although these models fit 
the period from February 17, 2003 to April 25, 2007 fairly well. Their forecast accuracy 
is very low after the shock in 2008. However, this does not interfere with our study in a 
bad way. The reason for this drop in accuracy is the shock, while the reason for shock 
relates to the emergence into the economy of new information of which the market and 
investors were not previously aware, thus giving rise to significant changes. Previous 
statistical and fundamental linkages investors which used to forecast the market were 
broken or switched to new ones. Moreover, in terms of our research target, the residuals 
contain this information, and could well be the reason for contagion, or the route 
through which contagion spreads. 
Table 10: ME, MAE, MSE, MPE and MAPE for ARMA Model 
 ME MAE MSE MPE MAPE 
Forward premium return 
Latvia 0.0033 0.0782 0.0616 0.94 0.96 
Greece 4.06e-6 6.39e-5 6.51e-5 0.85 0.95 
Iceland 0.0038 0.0592 0.0591 0.90 0.90 
Bulgaria -0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.87 0.87 
Romania -0.0008 0.1618 0.1618 0.95 0.95 
Lithuania 0.0001 0.0071 0.0071 0.93 0.93 
 
Table 11: ME, MAE, MSE, MPE and MAPE for ARFIMA Model 
 ME
 
MAE
 
MSE
 
MPE
 
MAPE
 
Latvia 0.0023 0.0782 0.0616 0.89 0.96 
Greece 4.31e-6 3.68e-3 3.78e-3 0.84 0.87 
Iceland 0.0052 0.0325 0.0324 0.87 0.94 
Bulgaria -0.0006 0.0153 0.0153 0.86 0.86 
Romania -0.0023 0.0690 0.0690 0.92 0.96 
Lithuania 0.0003 0.0302 0.0302 0.95 0.95 
We then move on to the formal tests of accuracy. These criteria confirmed what we 
observed in the plots. The forecasts are very bad. This may not be very clear with ME, 
MAE and MSE since they only measure the scale of the error. Moreover, because the 
value of our observation is small, the errors are not much bigger either. But if we look at 
the MPE and MAPE, it becomes quite clear that the percentage error is very big.  
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5.5 Breakpoint Test 
The second step of ‘Identification through Heteroscedasticity’ is to detect breakpoints. 
We now have the residuals for the contagion period (April 26, 2007 to June 25, 2012). It 
is now necessary to establish whether there are any breakpoints during this period, so 
that we can further test whether there are any contagion effects before and after these 
breakpoints. Indeed, we also make the identification process more appropriate by 
estimating the structural breaks before the final contagion tests. We employ two 
breakpoint tests in this section with a view to achieving another of our research 
objectives: to examine the effect of heteroscedasticity. Indeed, one of the tests (the 
Bai-Perron test) deals with heteroscedasticity while the other one (the 
Andrews-Ploberger test) does not. 
 
The mechanism of using the Andrews-Ploberger for multi-breakpoint detection is: 1. 
Test a single break using the Andrews-Ploberger test for the full sample, separate the 
full sample into two sub-samples if the result shows that there is a structure change. 2. 
Carry out an Andrews-Ploberger test for each of the sub-samples; separate the 
respective sub-samples into two individual segments if a new break point is found. 3. 
Repeat the same procedure for each of the new segments until no break points are found. 
The plots of the breakpoints found are in Figure 5 while the summarised result is 
presented in Table 12. A Bai-Perron test is performed on each series individually. The 
plots of the breakpoints found are in Figure 6 while the summarised results of the 
Bai-Perron test are reported in Table 13 (please see Appendix 4 for the detailed results). 
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Figure 5: Plots of the Breakpoints Found Based on Andrews-Ploberger Test 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Plots of the Breakpoints Found Based on Bai-Perron Test 
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Table 12: Andrews-Ploberger Test Results 
 Possible Breakpoint P-value AP Statistics Is it a break at 5%? 
(1 yes, 0 no) 
Latvia 372 (2008/09/29) 
568 (2009/06/30) 
722 (2010/02/01) 
0.0056 
5.55e-8 
5.65e-38 
3.7034 
7.4035 
13.288 
1 
1 
1 
Greece 1024 (2011/03/30) 1.0000 0.0018 0 
Iceland 493 (2009/03/17) 0.4750 0.4585 0 
Bulgaria 382 (2008/10/13) 
492 (2009/03/16) 
714 (2010/01/20) 
2.15e-128 
0.0000 
0.0079 
19.670 
33.733 
7.4035 
1 
1 
1 
Romania 389 (2008/10/22) 0.8858 0.2335 0 
Lithuania 374 (2008/10/01) 
578 (2009/07/14) 
733 (2010/02/16) 
0.0182 
1.67e-7 
0.0000 
2.8629 
7.1906 
64.921 
1 
1 
1 
 
Table 13: Bai-Perron Test Results 
 Possible Breakpoint ( 1| )TSupF n n  maxUD  maxWD  
Latvia 642 (2009/10/12) 
844 (2010/07/21) 
35.36* 
(n=1) 
31.85* 39.97* 
Greece 658 (2009/11/03) 
1022 (2011/03/28) 
62.62* 
(n=1) 
209.4* 282.7* 
Iceland 385 (2008/10/16) 1.09 
(n=1) 
10.08* 10.26* 
Bulgaria 430 (2008/12/18) 
1119 (2011/8/10) 
9.51* 
(n=1) 
30.34* 31.23* 
Romania 390 (2008/10/23) 
592 (2009/08/03) 
109.8* 
(n=1) 
75.29* 98.90* 
Lithuania 402 (2008/11/10) 8.46 11.43* 19.84* 
*: significant at 5% level 
 
In group 1, the Andrews-Ploberger test reports 4 breakpoints (372, 568, 722, and 1024) 
although one of them is not statistically significant. The Bai-Perron test reports 4 
breakpoints (642, 658, 844, and 1022). The two tests reported no similar breakpoint for 
Latvia, thus suggesting that the change we observe in this country’s premium is mainly 
change in variance. With regard to Greece, on the other hand, the tests reported one 
similar breakpoint, thus suggesting a change in variance followed by a change in mean. 
In group 2, the Andrews-Ploberger test reports 4 possible breakpoint (382, 492, 493, 
and 714), one of which is again not statistically significant (493). The Bai-Perron test 
reports 3 breakpoints (385, 430, and 1119). The two tests detected different breakpoints 
for both Iceland and Bulgaria, a sign of change in mean. In group 3, the 
Andrews-Ploberger test reports 4 breakpoints (374, 389, 578, and 733) with one 
77 
 
insignificant breakpoint yet again. The Bai-Perron tests reports 3 breakpoints (390, 420, 
and 592). We obtained a similar breakpoint in both Romania and Lithuania, thus 
suggesting a change in mean followed by some changes in variance. It is very clear that 
these tests mostly generate very different breakpoints, especially in groups 1 and 2. 
However, we occasionally observe one similar breakpoint. The accuracy test we 
performed suggests that they tend to disagree on change in variance and the Bai-Perron 
test performs better in this regard. Thus, it is reasonable for us to conclude that group 1 
experienced a longer initial period of change in variance, followed by a shorter period 
of change in mean, while groups 2 and 3 experienced a shorter initial period of change 
in mean followed by a longer period of change in variance. Another of our ideas related 
to breakpoints is that breakpoints are the tracks left behind by contagion when it passes 
through. Indeed, whenever contagion comes to a market or a country, it leads to a 
structural change, and hence contagion, before it then moves on to another market or 
country. Thus, the sample where the first breakpoint was detected may be the place 
where contagion came to this group and the sample where the last breakpoint was 
detected may be the place where contagion left this group. If we take all 6 countries as a 
group, the result from the Andrews-Ploberger test suggests that contagion came to this 
group on 2008/09/29 in Latvia and left on 2011/03/30 in Greece. We can see that the 
first breakpoints detected in Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania are quite similar, 
perhaps because the contagion we may observe in this group did not originate within 
this group, and actually came from another country before simultaneously spreading to 
these four countries. In the same manner, the result from the Bai-Perron test suggests 
that contagion came to this group on 2008/10/16 in Iceland and left on 2011/03/28 in 
Greece.  
 
If n breakpoints were found, we should split the whole sample into n+1 subsample 
before moving on to the contagion test. However, all three groups have some 
breakpoints which are very close to each other (642, 658 in group 1; 492, 493 and 385, 
430 in group 2; 374, 389 and 390, 420 in group 3). Their intervals are less than 30 while 
we have approximately 1400 observations; we take them as one breakpoint for 
modelling convenience. Thus, now group 1 has 4 breakpoints detected by the 
Andrews-Ploberger test and 3 breakpoints detected by the Bai-Perron test; group 2 has 3 
breakpoints detected by the Andrews-Ploberger test and 2 breakpoints detected by the 
Bai-Perron test; group 3 has3 breakpoints detected by the Andrews-Ploberger test and 2 
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breakpoints detected by the Bai-Perron test. 
 
Most of the breakpoints detected correspond to important events in the countries. The 
breakpoints in group 1 are discrete throughout the whole sample. 7 breakpoints are 
detected by the two tests, 3 of which are found in Greece and Germany’s risk premium 
while 4 are found in Latvia and Germany’s risk premium. This may be because 
contagion transfers from Latvia to Greece after 568 (2009/06/30) and the two countries 
begin to share the same contagion shock later on. The first breakpoint is found on 
2008/09/29. Indeed, the reason for this seems to be the Latvian parliament’s approval of 
the European Union's Lisbon Treaty and the financial crisis. This may be when the 
contagion initiates in group 1. 2009/06/30 is the second breakpoint, and is probably due 
to the Latvian Central Bank’s expenditure of almost a billion Euros in 2009 to support 
the lat currency. This expenditure caused a shift in currency risk premium. The third and 
fourth breakpoints are detected at the end of 2009 and beginning of 2010. Many 
important things happened in Germany, Latvia and Greece at that time. The new 
elections in Germany and Greece, the major tax cut in Germany and the increase of 
unemployment in Latvia. However, it is our contention that the most likely reasons are 
related to the slump in exports and investment in Germany as well as the Latvian 
Government’s agreement to slash the budget deficit in 2010 in order to meet targets 
imposed by the EU in exchange for a 7.5bn rescue loan. The fifth breakpoint is on 
2010/07/21, and while many things could have led to this, the main culprit seems to 
debt-ridden Greece. For example, fears of a possible default on Greece's debts prompted 
euro zone countries to approve a $145bn (110bn Euros; £91bn) rescue package for the 
country. The last two breakpoints in group 1 are found at the beginning of 2011, with 
certain international leaders making it clear that Greece must reform its finance system. 
The breakpoints in group 2 and group 3 are quite similar, especially with regards to their 
starting point. They each have two breakpoints very near to each other (with an interval 
of less than 30 days). This could be a clear signal that contagion has been transferred 
from one country to another, i.e. the Bai-Perron test suggests that contagion is 
transferred from Iceland to Bulgaria in group 2 and from Romania to Lithuania in group 
3, although the Andrews-Ploberger test states the opposite. We have to say that 
breakpoints detected in group 2 and group 3 are more mysterious than group 1. 
Although it is not hard to find the corresponding economic event for them, it is hard to 
see where contagion initiates and how it is transferred among these countries, or at least 
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it is hard to see based on breakpoint tests. Just like group 1, besides the common major 
events in Germany which every groups share, the nature of the other events occurring in 
each country are quite similar. First are the events directly linked with the fundamental 
elements: Iceland’s government took over control of all three of the major banks in the 
October of 2008 in order to stabilise the financial system. Then in the following month, 
IMF approved a 2.1 billion dollar loan to help Iceland. At the same time, the European 
Commission permanently stripped Bulgaria of half of its aid. In January 2009, Russia 
cut gas supplies to Bulgaria, resulting in a severe energy shortage. Second are the events 
that indirectly influence the economy, mostly elections. For instance, Homeland Union, 
a conservative party, became the largest party after parliamentary elections in Lithuania 
on 2008/10/15.  
 
To sum up, based on the timing of the breakpoints and the chronology, we can split the 
corresponding major events into two categories. The first category is the events which 
are directly linked with the fundamental elements, most of which are financial account 
elements. In our case, we only observed 3 events related to current account elements, 
one of which pertains to energy supply. The other two are the changes in export in 
Germany and Latvia. The second category comprises events that are not directly 
associated with fundamental elements, although indirect influence may imply. Most of 
the events are elections, while the others usually suggest new political orders as well. 
For instance, the Latvian parliament approved the European Union’s Lisbon Treaty in 
2008 May. In conclusion, this provides a good reference for what kind of events may 
cause structural breaks. If a similar incident were to occur in a country, the market 
would suffer a shock and the corresponding time series data may exhibit a structural 
change.  
5.6 Detecting Contagion 
Since we used 2 forecasting models to obtain the expected return and 2 breakpoint tests 
to detect structural breaks, we now have 4 procedures with which to identify contagion. 
The Andrews-Ploberger test and ARMA model based procedure (procedure 1 
henceforth), the Andrews-Ploberger test and ARFIMA model based procedure 
(procedure 2 henceforth), the Bai-Perron test and ARMA model based procedure 
(procedure 3 henceforth) and the Bai-Perron test and ARFIMA model based procedure 
(procedure 4 henceforth).  
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5.6.1 Co-Integration and Granger Causality Tests 
Before we go through these 4 procedures one by one, let us examine the results of the 
co-integration and Granger causality tests and establish if the data are statistically 
linked.  
 
The Johansen test which is a multivariate extension and allows for more than one 
cointegrating vector. Although the unit root tests often suffer from poor size and power 
properties (i.e. Type I and Type II errors), the stationary pre-tests are usually required 
before the cointegration test. The Engle-Granger and Johansen cointegration testing 
procedures are typically used under the condition that all variables are I(1), however 
having stationary variables in the system is theoretically acceptable as well, because I(0) 
data are already stationary, and when the regression includes both I(1) and I(0), the 
stationary variable is more important than the non-stationary one in establishing a 
sensitive long-run relationship. Due to the above reasons, Johansen (1995, pp. 149-153) 
stated that there is little need to pre-test the variables in the cointegration system for the 
order of integration. However, we still employ the ADF unit root test for a more 
comprehensive estimation. Because the data used are flat with close to zero means, 
intercept and trend variables are not included in the regression.  
 
The Johansen test is the maximum likelihood estimator of the reduced rank model 
which can be affected by the lag order where the lag order is determined by using the 
information criteria in VAR (Worthington and Higgs, 2007). In order to carry out a 
Johansen test, we are asked to construct a VAR/VEC model with proper lag 
specification. The AIC criteria is used in this study to determine the best lag terms from 
lag 1 to 8. 
 
According to Granger, Huang and Yang’s (2000) study, the Linear Granger Causality 
test in this study are considered in two conditions, cointegrated or not cointegrated. The 
VEC models are employed to test Granger Causality for the cointegrated cases, while 
the 1st difference VAR models are employed to test Granger Causality for the not 
cointegrated cases. The general regression for VEC and VAR model are as follow: 
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VEC Model (Vector Error Correction): 
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VAR Model (Vector Autoregression): 
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Table 14 to 19 report the results of the stationary pre-test, the lag determination, the 
co-integration and the causality tests. The data are flat and have close to zero mean in 
all cases, therefore no intercepts and trend variables are included in the test regressions. 
 
Table 14: The rank of integration and the best fitting lag terms for the VAR/VEC models based on 
Andrews-Ploberger Test 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
 Rank Lag Rank Lag Rank Lag Rank Lag Rank Lag 
Latvia I (0) 
[8] 
8 
{-8.89} 
I (0) 
[11] 
6 
{-6.41} 
I (0) 
[1] 
7 
{-7.00} 
I (0) 
[10] 
2 
{-10.69} 
I (0) 
[3] 
8 
{-12.84} 
Greece I (0) 
[10] 
I (0) 
[8] 
I (0) 
[12] 
I (0) 
[13] 
I (0) 
[14] 
Iceland I (0) 
[11] 
3 
{-7.06} 
I (0) 
[8] 
2 
{-1.39} 
I (0) 
[0] 
1 
{-3.68} 
I (0) 
[1] 
1 
{-8.08} 
  
Bulgaria I (0) 
[5] 
I (0) 
[1] 
I (0) 
[1] 
I (0) 
[1] 
 
Romania I (0) 
[10] 
2 
{-5.55} 
I (0) 
[14] 
8 
{0.82} 
I (0) 
[1] 
1 
{-4.79} 
I (0) 
[12] 
1 
{-8.19} 
  
Lithuania I (0) 
[2] 
I (0) 
[1] 
I (0) 
[1] 
I (0) 
[10] 
 
The number in [] and {} are the best fitting lag terms for the ADF test and AIC criteria for the best fitting VAR/VEC 
respectively. 
 
Table 15: Co-Integration Test Based on Andrews-Ploberger Test 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
Group 1 282.74** 101.67** 100.12** 88.50** 210.02** 
Group 2 98.89** 47.97** 75.03** 223.45**  
Group 3 91.67** 101.87** 37.38** 173.39**  
The statistics in this table are trace statistics. ** indicates significant at 1% level. 
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Table 16: Granger Causality Test Based on Andrews-Ploberger Test 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group3 
Period 1 Greece does not granger cause Latvia 
Latvia does not granger cause Greece 
Iceland does not granger cause Bulgaria 
Bulgaria does not granger cause Iceland 
Romania does not granger cause Lithuania 
Lithuania does not granger cause Romania 
Period 2 Greece does not granger cause Latvia 
Latvia does not granger cause Greece 
Iceland does not granger cause Bulgaria 
Bulgaria does not granger cause Iceland 
Romania does not granger cause Lithuania 
Lithuania does not granger cause Romania 
Period 3 Greece does not granger cause Latvia 
Latvia does not granger cause Greece 
Iceland does not granger cause Bulgaria 
Bulgaria does not granger cause Iceland 
Romania does not granger cause Lithuania 
Lithuania does not granger cause Romania 
Period 4 Greece does not granger cause Latvia 
Latvia does not granger cause Greece 
Iceland does not granger cause Bulgaria 
Bulgaria does not granger cause Iceland 
Romania does not granger cause Lithuania 
Lithuania does not granger cause Romania 
Period 5 Greece does not granger cause Latvia 
Latvia does not granger cause Greece 
  
 
Table 17: The rank of integration and the best fitting lag terms for the VAR/VEC models based on Bai-Perron 
Test 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
 Rank Lag Rank Lag Rank Lag Rank Lag 
Latvia I (0) 
[15] 
8 
{-7.41} 
I (1) 
[14] 
8 
{-10.27} 
I (0) 
[4] 
2 
{-10.69} 
I (0) 
[3] 
5 
{-10.99} 
Greece I (0) 
[10] 
I (0) 
[12] 
I (0) 
[7] 
I (0) 
[13] 
Iceland I (0) 
[1] 
3 
{-5.25} 
I (1) 
[8] 
2 
{-5.07} 
I (0) 
[1] 
1 
{-8.50} 
  
Bulgaria I (0) 
[2] 
I (0) 
[7] 
I (0) 
[1] 
 
Romania I (0) 
[11] 
8 
{-0.41} 
I (0) 
[14] 
1 
{-2.44} 
I (0) 
[12] 
5 
{-6.58} 
  
Lithuania I (0) 
[9] 
I (0) 
[2] 
I (0) 
[12] 
 
The number in [] and {} are the best fitting lag terms for the ADF test and AIC criteria for the best fitting 
VAR/VEC respectively. 
 
Table 18: Co-Integration Test Based on Bai-Perron Test 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Group 1 341.32** 79.09** 100.06** 236.72** 
Group 2 45.40** 211.19** 75.03**  
Group 3 42.74** 62.23** 154.37**  
The statistics in this table are trace statistics. ** indicates significant at 1% level. 
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Table 19: Granger Causality Test Based on Bai-Perron Test 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group3 
Period 1 Greece does not granger cause Latvia 
Latvia does not granger cause Greece 
Iceland does not granger cause Bulgaria 
Bulgaria does granger cause Iceland 
Romania does not granger cause Lithuania 
Lithuania does not granger cause Romania 
Period 2 Greece does not granger cause Latvia 
Latvia does not granger cause Greece 
Iceland does not granger cause Bulgaria 
Bulgaria does not granger cause Iceland 
Romania does not granger cause Lithuania 
Lithuania does not granger cause Romania 
Period 3 Greece does not granger cause Latvia 
Latvia does not granger cause Greece 
Iceland does not granger cause Bulgaria 
Bulgaria does not granger cause Iceland 
Romania does not granger cause Lithuania 
Lithuania does not granger cause Romania 
Period 4 Greece does not granger cause Latvia 
Latvia does not granger cause Greece 
Iceland does not granger cause Bulgaria 
Bulgaria does not granger cause Iceland 
Romania does not granger cause Lithuania 
Lithuania does not granger cause Romania 
 
The results in Table 15 and 18 show that the time series are all co-integrated at every 
sub-period, thus meaning that there are statistically significant long-run connections 
between the series. Since the data are all co-integrated, it is not likely that they will 
accidentally jump and have a structural change. If a significant co-movement is detected, 
coincidence is not the reason for it. However, we did not observe any Granger causality 
relationship among them, with the exception of period 1 in group 2, Granger Causality 
Test based on Bai-Perron Test, where Bulgaria granger cause Iceland. The reason for the 
lack of Granger causality may be related to the fact that the shock at the root of the 
structural changes in these countries did not originate within them, but was transferred 
to them from somewhere else. If the shock were a tornado, these countries are just cities 
which it passed by. However, we should bear in mind that the lack of a causal 
relationship does not mean no correlation at all. Markets have no causal relationship but 
could still have a significant correlation between their co-movements. 
5.6.2 The 4 Contagion Test Procedures 
We now move on to the results of contagion tests. Indeed, following the previous study, 
we split the shock into two segments, namely common shock and idiosyncratic shock. 
Common shock is a change in the interdependence of fundamentals, represented by cit . 
Idiosyncratic shock is a change which cannot be directly explained, the pure contagion, 
represented by it . The ratio of the σ of the two countries is used to represent the 
equilibrium of the corresponding time period between them. After the ratios are 
calculated, a t-test is performed. If there is a significant change before and after a 
structural break, then the old equilibrium experienced a ‘shift’, hence contagion is 
detected.  
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4 testing procedures are formed based on the 2 forecasting models and 2 breakpoint 
tests. They each have different roles to play. Procedure 1, as the least appropriate one of 
the 4 procedures, is designed to provide a base line in terms of how the results look 
when heteroscedasticity is not adjusted and the long memory and short memory feature 
is ignored. Based on the base line provided by procedure 1, procedure 2’s role is to 
reveal the effect of the long memory and short memory features only. Correspondingly, 
procedure 3 is designed to show how the results behave when only heteroscedasticity is 
adjusted. Procedure 4, as the most appropriate one, provides a better identification of 
contagion because both heteroscedasticity and long memory and short memory features 
are considered. As it turns out, the estimation of sigma and the identification of 
contagion are highly sensitive to the models used. Although the absolute values of 
sigma are interpreted as the standard error of shock and their ratios are interpreted as the 
linkages between countries, we will not explore in detail their practical meaning in the 
first 3 procedures as they are relatively poorly estimated. Instead, we will mainly focus 
on the effects of the statistical features (long and short memory, and heteroscedasticity) 
and will not discuss the practical meaning at length until we reach the most appropriate 
procedure (procedure 4). The final iterated results of sigma, their standard errors and the 
t-statistics are reported in Tables 20 to 43. 
5.6.2.1 Procedure 1: Andrews-Ploberger and ARMA Based Identification 
The base line results are as follow: 
 
Table 20: Latvia, Greece and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.1326569 
(0.022438) 
0.007409 
(0.196307) 
17.9048 
(0.365319) 
0.4226829 
(0.016827) 
0.0071059 
(0.204105) 
59.4833 
(1.254317) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.4226829 
(0.016827) 
0.0071059 
(0.204105) 
59.4833 
(1.254317) 
0.2818184 
(0.0275) 
0.0040057 
(0.0388) 
70.3543 
(3.6827) 
Period 3/ Period 4 0.2818184 
(0.0275) 
0.0040057 
(0.0388) 
70.3543 
(3.6827) 
0.2470999 
(0.0289) 
0.0126797 
(0.0387) 
19.4878 
(1.0366) 
Period 4/ Period 5 0.2470999 
(0.0289) 
0.0126797 
(0.0387) 
19.4878 
(1.0366) 
0.2789751 
(0.0276) 
0.0112514 
(0.0386) 
24.7947 
(1.6101) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
-24.063499** 20.3659** 18.7821** -18.1502** 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
-2.555923* 3.2519** 4.3345** -4.8895** 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
-8.605486** -6.4844** 4.5686** -1.5521 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 21: Latvia, Greece and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.0110517 
(0.014456) 
0.0020992 
(0.046078) 
5.2647 
(0.408279) 
0.4014787 
(0.012336) 
0.0000819 
(0.046677) 
4902.0598 
(130.923026) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.4014787 
(0.012336) 
0.0000819 
(0.046677) 
4902.0598 
(130.923026) 
0.2488894 
(0.0289) 
0.0003811 
(0.0392) 
653.0816 
(39.5551) 
Period 3/ Period 4 0.2488894 
(0.0289) 
0.0003811 
(0.0392) 
653.0816 
(39.5551) 
0.2802393 
(0.0276) 
0.0120364 
(0.0386) 
23.2826 
(1.4647) 
Period 4/ Period 5 0.2802393 
(0.0276) 
0.0120364 
(0.0386) 
23.2826 
(1.4647) 
0.2456652 
(0.0290) 
0.0119371 
(0.0387) 
20.5799 
(1.1021) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
-21.496480** 0.2497 -18.0894** 18.6985** 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
18.816469** 2.2078* -8.0438** 5.2201** 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
-9.338389** -9.9072** 9.8915** -0.2313 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 22: Iceland, Bulgaria and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.0000337 
(0.616246) 
0.1135906 
(0.016438) 
0.000297 
(8.110755) 
0.6401925 
(0.257152) 
0.1165559 
(0.016947) 
5.492579 
(3.971525) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.6401925 
(0.257152) 
0.1165559 
(0.016947) 
5.492579 
(3.971525) 
-3.43E-6 
(47.0806) 
0.0266974 
(0.0102) 
1.2848E-4 
(845.5602) 
Period 3/ Period 4 -3.43E-6 
(47.0806) 
0.0266974 
(0.0102) 
1.2848E-4 
(845.5602) 
2.02E-6 
(41.9352) 
0.0171866 
(0.0068) 
1.1753E-4 
(390.1542) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-0.983164 0.2921 -0.5388 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-1.423615 21.5287** -7.9379** 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-1.150680 0.2497 -0.4684 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 23: Iceland, Bulgaria and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.1712472 
(0.455949) 
0.0104907 
(0.068116) 
16.323715 
(1.192034) 
0.6759517 
(0.208469) 
-0.0027209 
(0.035268) 
-248.429453 
(1.610380) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.6759517 
(0.208469) 
-0.0027209 
(0.035268) 
-248.429453 
(1.610380) 
0.2404349 
(0.0081) 
0.0014474 
(0.0109) 
166.1151 
(3.2931) 
Period 3/ Period 4 0.2404349 
(0.0081) 
0.0014474 
(0.0109) 
166.1151 
(3.2931) 
0.060855 
(0.0066) 
1.47E-6 
(0.0069) 
4.1793E4 
(0.0142) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-1.320327 3.2601** 66.5195** 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
1.755255 -0.4511 -51.2038** 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
0.548930 -9.4755** 9.1754** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
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standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 24: Romania, Lithuania and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 8.07E-6 
(1512.7212) 
0.5119757 
(0.001214) 
1.57E-5 
(4418.8245) 
0.8951838 
(0.310617) 
0.5190681 
(0.001169) 
1.724597 
(0.540555) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.8951838 
(0.310617) 
0.5190681 
(0.001169) 
1.724597 
(0.540555) 
7.52E-6 
(10.7903) 
0.0704617 
(0.0011) 
1.0673E-4 
(46.1335) 
Period 3/ Period 4 7.52E-6 
(10.7903) 
0.0704617 
(0.0011) 
1.0673E-4 
(46.1335) 
0.0555646 
(0.0428) 
0.0177222 
(0.0444) 
3.1353 
(0.1297) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-4.740076** -0.5482 -0.4351 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
59.805477** 326.1523** 11.5712** 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-1.830721 -0.1085 -1.7367* 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 25: Romania, Lithuania and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.455169 
(0.109569) 
0.0082139 
(0.002386) 
55.414480 
(1.483276) 
0.763305 
(0.092406) 
-0.0138554 
(0.000769) 
-55.090794 
(5.113707) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.763305 
(0.092406) 
-0.0138554 
(0.000769) 
-55.090794 
(5.113707) 
-5.51E-06 
(2.1834) 
-3.05E-06 
(4.5281) 
1.8066 
(55.5102) 
Period 3/ Period 4 -5.51E-06 
(2.1834) 
-3.05E-06 
(4.5281) 
1.8066 
(55.5102) 
0.0555646 
(0.0428) 
0.0024008 
(0.0452) 
23.1442 
(1.4172) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
12.418238** 1.6536* -0.4904 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-15.406652** -1.7131* 3.8434** 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
17.377366** -0.8217 -1.6373 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
We first summarise the overall statistical result. Since this procedure used the residuals 
of the ARMA model which does not distinguish between long memory process and 
short memory process, we will not discuss this feature here. We should also bear in 
mind that procedure 1 is the least appropriate among all 4 procedures (see Section 5.3 
for details). Tables 20 to 25 summarise the estimated results of it , cit  and the ratios. 
If we call the time period from period A to period A+1 a transmission period (for 
instance, period 1/period 2 is a transmission period), there are 20 transmission periods 
in procedure 1, with both idiosyncratic shocks and common shocks included. 10 of them 
are significantly identified as contagion, equating to 50%. 6 of them come from group 1, 
between Latvia and Greece, while 2 of the remaining 4 come from group 2, between 
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Iceland and Bulgaria. The other two come from group 3, between Romania and 
Lithuania. Recall the 6 situations we mentioned in Section 5.3.3.2.2. Indeed, a 
significantly identified contagion suggests that the original linkage or equilibrium is 
broken. Since most of the contagion effects we found (60%) are in group 1, we 
conclude that the linkage between Latvia and Greece is much more fragile than that of 
Iceland and Bulgaria, and Romania and Lithuania. The linkage continued to change 
after each shock until the last one, which is roughly after Germany grew by 3.6%. It 
seems that the improvement of a major country’s economy can also pacify the condition 
of smaller economic entities. Moreover, another fact we found in group 1 was that 
whenever we detect a contagion effect in the common shock, we detect a contagion 
effect in the same direction in the idiosyncratic shock too. Recall that we define 
significant change in idiosyncratic shock as pure contagion. It seems that pure contagion 
move in the same direction as the change in fundamentals, thus enhancing the effect of 
the shock. As for the remaining 2 groups, group 3 is fundamentally more stable than 
group 2 since it has one less contagion effect in the common shock.  
 
One fact we observed from Table 20 is that the absolute value of the ratios from period 
2 to period 4 first increased, before returning to normal. We call a phenomenon like this 
the counter contagion effect. It suggests that the linkage between two countries recovers 
after shocks. Unlike previous literature (Inci, Li and McCarthy, 2011), we observed 9 
counter contagion effects in this procedure, 3 in each of the groups. A larger ratio 
following the shock suggests that the increase in the variance of the numerator country 
is bigger than that of the denominator country. This is normally reflected in the 
estimation of sigma, as their absolute values are interpreted as the standard error. 
Another fact we observed from Table 23 is that the ratios changed their sign from 
positive to negative in the first transmission period. We call this phenomenon a change 
in direction. It suggests a negative correlation between shocks in different countries. We 
observed 4 changes in direction among all 20 transmission periods.  
5.6.2.2 Procedure 2: Andrews-Ploberger and ARFIMA Based Identification 
With procedure 2 we again used the Andrews-Ploberger breakpoint test, but switched 
from the ARMA model to the ARFIMA model in order to examine the effect of long 
memory and short memory features when heteroscedasticity is not considered. Tables 
26-31 present the result of procedure 2: 
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Table 26: Latvia, Greece and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.1281416 
(0.001775) 
0.0072243 
(0.009302) 
17.73758 
(0.102884) 
0.412603 
(0.001122) 
0.0074489 
(0.009655) 
55.391133 
(0.113693) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.412603 
(0.001122) 
0.0074489 
(0.009655) 
55.391133 
(0.113693) 
0.2797229 
(0.0276) 
0.0040731 
(0.0388) 
68.6757 
(3.5986) 
Period 3/ Period 4 0.2797229 
(0.0276) 
0.0040731 
(0.0388) 
68.6757 
(3.5986) 
1.31E-08 
(16.5754) 
0.0126812 
(0.0051) 
1.0331E-6 
(8.4321) 
Period 4/ Period 5 1.31E-08 
(16.5754) 
0.0126812 
(0.0051) 
1.0331E-6 
(8.4321) 
0.026588 
(0.0122) 
2.25E-08 
(4.8904) 
1.1817E6 
(2201.5417) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
-396.7425** 20.3731** 2.4965** -0.7267 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
-3.339098** 3.2519** -8.2406** -1.6939* 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
-282.0614** -6.4874** 3.9001** -3.8041** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 27: Latvia, Greece and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 -0.0363144 
(0.003166) 
0.0001151 
(0.002149) 
-315.5030 
(58.094727) 
0.4029376 
(0.000629) 
0.000073 
(0.002163) 
5519.693151 
(16.546496) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.4029376 
(0.000629) 
0.000073 
(0.002163) 
5519.693151 
(16.546496) 
0.2652591 
(0.0282) 
0.000301 
(0.0392) 
881.2595 
(53.1839) 
Period 3/ Period 4 0.2652591 
(0.0282) 
0.000301 
(0.0392) 
881.2595 
(53.1839) 
-5.06E-06 
(1.9706) 
0.012013 
(0.0051) 
-4.2121E-4 
(3.9993) 
Period 4/ Period 5 -5.06E-06 
(1.9706) 
0.012013 
(0.0051) 
-4.2121E-4 
(3.9993) 
0.026588 
(0.0122) 
0.0002277 
(0.0126) 
116.7677 
(1.9531) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
-150.8165** -0.2497 3.1074** -1.2465 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
17.424723** 2.2191* -15.4795** 36.3778** 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
-90.9479** -9.9938** 9.9608** -2.2601* 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 28: Iceland, Bulgaria and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.0000337 
(0.616246) 
0.1135906 
(0.016438) 
0.000297 
(8.110755) 
0.6401925 
(0.257152) 
0.1165559 
(0.016947) 
5.492579 
(3.971525) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.6401925 
(0.257152) 
0.1165559 
(0.016947) 
5.492579 
(3.971525) 
2.47E-6 
(17.7778) 
0.0264187 
(0.0025) 
9.3494E-5 
(177.9548) 
Period 3/ Period 4 2.47E-6 
(17.7778) 
0.0264187 
(0.0025) 
9.3494E-5 
(177.9548) 
-5.39E-6 
(37.6921) 
0.0170312 
(0.0036) 
3.1648E-4 
(251.1498) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-0.983164 0.4589 -0.5481 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-1.423615 13.6092** -44.4658** 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
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-1.150680 0.3946 -0.5179 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 29: Iceland, Bulgaria and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.1712472 
(0.455949) 
0.0104907 
(0.068116) 
16.323715 
(1.192034) 
0.6759517 
(0.208469) 
-0.0027209 
(0.035268) 
-248.429453 
(1.610380) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.6759517 
(0.208469) 
-0.0027209 
(0.035268) 
-248.429453 
(1.610380) 
-9.47E-06 
(8.3855) 
9.12E-07 
(7.9712) 
-10.3838 
(224.0417) 
Period 3/ Period 4 -9.47E-06 
(8.3855) 
9.12E-07 
(7.9712) 
-10.3838 
(224.0417) 
-5.87E-06 
(11.7253) 
1.08E-06 
(8.5304) 
5.4352 
(92.7093) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-1.320327 1.4455 0.6756 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
1.755255 -0.7264 1.0886 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
0.548930 0.1922 -0.4204 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 30: Romania, Lithuania and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 8.07E-6 
(1512.7212) 
0.5119757 
(0.001214) 
1.57E-5 
(4418.8245) 
0.8951838 
(0.310617) 
0.5190681 
(0.001169) 
1.724597 
(0.540555) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.8951838 
(0.310617) 
0.5190681 
(0.001169) 
1.724597 
(0.540555) 
2.31E-06 
(19.5039) 
0.0704569 
(0.0041) 
3.2786E-5 
(75.6477) 
Period 3/ Period 4 2.31E-06 
(19.5039) 
0.0704569 
(0.0041) 
3.2786E-5 
(75.6477) 
0.0555612 
(0.0428) 
0.0177243 
(0.0444) 
3.1348 
(0.1296) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-4.740076** -2.4527** -0.4345 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
59.805477** 114.3301** 11.5712** 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-1.830721 -1.9143* -1.7361* 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 31: Romania, Lithuania and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.455169 
(0.109569) 
0.0082139 
(0.002386) 
55.414480 
(1.483276) 
0.763305 
(0.092406) 
-0.0138554 
(0.000769) 
-55.090794 
(5.113707) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.763305 
(0.092406) 
-0.0138554 
(0.000769) 
-55.090794 
(5.113707) 
-8.63E-06 
(28.9201) 
6.75E-06 
(15.8412) 
-1.2785 
(673.9034) 
Period 3/ Period 4 -8.63E-06 
(28.9201) 
6.75E-06 
(15.8412) 
-1.2785 
(673.9034) 
0.0555612 
(0.0428) 
0.002397 
(0.0452) 
23.1795 
(1.4194) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
12.418238** 0.6316 -0.4892 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-15.406652** -1.5468 3.8434** 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
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17.377366** -0.3068 -1.6375 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
These results are obtained based on the same breakpoint test, although different 
forecasting models are used. Compared to the ARMA model, the ARFIMA model has 
the ability to capture the long memory and short memory characteristics of the data. 
From the ARFIMA models obtained in Section 5.3, we know that group 1 is the short 
memory group while the others are long memory groups. Procedure 2 has the same 
amount of transmission periods to that of procedure 1, although one more contagion 
was detected, equating to 11, or 55%. There remain 9 counter contagion effects, 
although they are in a slightly different location. Compared to procedure 1, there is one 
more counter contagion effect in group 1 and one less in group 2. There are 7 changes in 
direction (3 more than that of procedure 1), which is a relatively bigger change 
compared to the change in contagion and counter contagion effect. It is very clear that 
since we brought in the feature of long memory and short memory, the results relating to 
the short memory process had some observable changes in common shock. It became 
more volatile, with more counter contagion effects and more changes in direction, thus 
suggesting that given the same major economic or political events, the scale of the 
changes in the short memory process were more severe than we observed in procedure 1. 
On the contrary, long memory processes behaved almost the same. In actual fact, they 
are more stable since their long memory feature is considered. One less contagion and 
one less counter contagion effect were detected in total. 
5.6.2.3 Procedure 3: Bai-Perron and ARMA Based Identification 
Since procedure 3 used the Bai-Perron test instead of the Andrews-Ploberger test, we 
would like to compare procedure 3 with procedure 1, so as to examine the effect of 
heteroscedasticity on contagion identification. Table 32-37 reports the results of 
procedure 3: 
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Table 32: Latvia, Greece and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 1.03428 
(0.001388) 
-0.006618 
(30.287649) 
-156.28286 
(14.968849) 
0.9999999 
(0.001444) 
-0.0000512 
(1280.9556) 
-19531.233 
(1081.1559) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.9999999 
(0.001444) 
-0.0000512 
(1280.9556) 
-19531.233 
(1081.1559) 
-4.53E-08 
(0.7608) 
6.95E-06 
(45.9282) 
-0.0065 
(373.0602) 
Period 3/ Period 4 -4.53E-08 
(0.7608) 
6.95E-06 
(45.9282) 
-0.0065 
(373.0602) 
0.0106403 
(0.0063) 
-0.0000106 
(4.6498) 
-1003.8019 
(82.9038) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
551.080853** 2.1821* -478.49851** 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-9.807547** 7.9981** -27.686526** 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
2.056289* 1.2733 1.147790 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 33: Latvia, Greece and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.0068916 
(0.001704) 
1.005624 
(0.206041) 
0.006853 
(0.000907) 
-0.0242706 
(0.005055) 
1.011841 
(0.204757) 
-0.023986 
(0.000959) 
Period 2/ Period 3 -0.0242706 
(0.005055) 
1.011841 
(0.204757) 
-0.023986 
(0.000959) 
-7.99E-06 
(58.9937) 
0.0038821 
(0.0086) 
-0.0021 
(18.0011) 
Period 3/ Period 4 -7.99E-06 
(58.9937) 
0.0038821 
(0.0086) 
-0.0021 
(18.0011) 
0.0000107 
(10.0944) 
0.0124017 
(0.0063) 
8.6278E-4 
(72.8518) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-11.743593** 0.7163 -3.9005** 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
11.760293** 10.0157** -0.7442 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
61.792914** 0.6218 16.6908** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 34: Iceland, Bulgaria and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.1348977 
(0.117636) 
0.0232281 
(0.016647) 
5.807521 
(0.866889) 
0.1534613 
(0.039171) 
0.021784 
(0.016660) 
7.044679 
(0.306357) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.1534613 
(0.039171) 
0.021784 
(0.016660) 
7.044679 
(0.306357) 
1.51E-06 
(1.9753) 
0.0222212 
(0.0076) 
6.7952E-5 
(23.3378) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
2.861083** -1.6751* 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
10.059604** 12.9786** 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
2.33855* -1.6095 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 35: Iceland, Bulgaria and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.1337072 
(0.021882) 
-0.0081521 
(0.013959) 
-16.401565 
(50.187636) 
0.1524159 
(0.021440) 
0.0012072 
(0.013879) 
126.25572 
(1334.2185) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.1524159 
(0.021440) 
0.0012072 
(0.013879) 
126.25572 
(1334.2185) 
-5.37E-06 
(2.0306) 
0.0045495 
(0.0077) 
-0.0012 
(15.8479) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
-22.421721** 2.2778* 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
-20.630597** -10.9629** 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
-3.443440** 3.3959** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 36: Romania, Lithuania and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.6614737 
(0.007525) 
0.3584320 
(1.729040) 
1.864129 
(1.732606) 
0.5070249 
(0.007735) 
-7.14E-6 
(2.233539) 
-7.10E4 
(1533.5950) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.5070249 
(0.007735) 
-7.14E-6 
(2.233539) 
-7.10E4 
(1533.5950) 
0.058025 
(0.0041) 
-6.84E-06 
(21.6211) 
-8483.1871 
(306.0912) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
140.279314** 87.7504** 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
-1.962211* 1.9646* 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
4.547528** -2.9821** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 37: Romania, Lithuania and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.0077968 
(0.008046) 
0.5408644 
(0.382692) 
0.014415 
(0.005829) 
-0.025847 
(0.019711) 
0.5777088 
(0.358477) 
-0.044741 
(0.006956) 
Period 2/ Period 3 -0.025847 
(0.019711) 
0.5777088 
(0.358477) 
-0.044741 
(0.006956) 
8.28E-06 
(21.3445) 
0.0388989 
(0.0041) 
2.1286E-4 
(274.5958) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
1.018478 1.0945 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
0.863598 5.3817** 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
32.231541** 0.9673 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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First of all, it is clear that there are fewer breakpoints in all groups. There are 14 
transmission periods altogether, 9 of which are detected as contagion (3 in each group). 
The total number of contagion increased a little in percentile, namely 64.3%. Indeed, 
there are 7 counter contagion effects and 7 changes in direction, with less transmission 
periods, and higher percentage of contagion. It seems that a different breakpoint test 
brings about many differences. However, if we look closer, there are actually some 
similarities. 
 
In group 1, the ratios of idiosyncratic shock went up and down and up again in both 
procedure 1 and 3. The difference is that the first 2 up periods in procedure 1 were 
combined as 1 up period in procedure 3. The same thing happened in common shock as 
well, with the ratios all going up and then down in both procedures. Apparently, a new 
breakpoint test did not change the underlying contagion identification or transmission in 
group 1. However, after adjusting for heteroscedasticity, some major events could no 
longer cause breakpoints in this group, in this case, Germany’s $68 billion plan to save 
the country’s largest bank. 
 
Group 2 had almost the same experience, except that the ratio of common shock went 
up again at the end, thus suggesting a big change in Iceland but a relatively much more 
trivial one in Bulgaria. It seems as though the effect of the rise in unemployment at the 
end of 2009 in Iceland is eases away when heteroscedasticity is accounted for. 
 
Group 3 had nearly a completely opposite experience. Not only did the uptrend at the 
ending period in idiosyncratic shock disappear, the common shock also displayed a 
completely opposite result. It is worth mentioning that the ratio only represents a state 
of equilibrium. A very large ratio does not suggest a strong relationship. On the contrary, 
a very large ratio together with a very small ratio suggest that one country experienced a 
significant change while the other remained almost the same. Thus, based on the 
numbers we obtained, it is our contention that the overall economic environment of 
Europe and the stimulation package in Germany had more effect on Romania’s 
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idiosyncratic shock and Lithuania’s common shock. 
5.6.2.4 Procedure 4: Bai-Perron and ARFIMA Based Identification 
We examined how different forecasting models perform with the Andrews-Ploberger 
test. The result reveals that short memory processes are more easily affected. We now 
plan to establish whether the Bai-Perron test changes anything or simply further 
confirms this result.  
 
Table 38: Latvia, Greece and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.1846988 
(0.000709) 
-0.0069832 
(0.000861) 
-26.449020 
(0.194030) 
-2.5E-7 
(11.093263) 
0.0036324 
(0.000606) 
-6.88E-5 
(393.8667) 
Period 2/ Period 3 -2.5E-7 
(11.093263) 
0.0036324 
(0.000606) 
-6.88E-5 
(393.8667) 
0.0192963 
(0.0063) 
-1.37E-08 
(5.7213) 
-1.4085E6 
(9445.3611) 
Period 3/ Period 4 0.0192963 
(0.0063) 
-1.37E-08 
(5.7213) 
-1.4085E6 
(9445.3611) 
0.0264993 
(0.0086) 
-8.64E-09 
(7.7306) 
3.0671E6 
(9797.6588) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-0.647537 0.5604 -60.1851** 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-13.793113** 0.1333 -0.1909 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-0.758126 6.2166** 4.0742** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 39: Latvia, Greece and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.1846863 
(0.0778339) 
-0.0165844 
(0.000316) 
-2274.4285 
(496.3095) 
9.34E-7 
(0.001385) 
-0.0187755 
(0.000363) 
-2.96E-5 
(121.9118) 
Period 2/ Period 3 9.34E-7 
(0.001385) 
-0.0187755 
(0.000363) 
-2.96E-5 
(121.9118) 
0.0192963 
(0.0063) 
0.0013342 
(0.0064) 
14.4628 
(0.1286) 
Period 3/ Period 4 0.0192963 
(0.0063) 
0.0013342 
(0.0064) 
14.4628 
(0.1286) 
0.0264993 
(0.0086) 
0.0118648 
(0.0087) 
2.2334 
(0.0186) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
107.953564** -5.6118** -60.1851** 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-42.267246** -2.9505** -39.2512** 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
3.935044** 0.8423 9.4666** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 40: Iceland, Bulgaria and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.1348977 
(0.117636) 
0.0232281 
(0.016647) 
5.807521 
(0.866889) 
0.1534613 
(0.039171) 
0.021784 
(0.016660) 
7.044679 
(0.306357) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.1534613 
(0.039171) 
0.021784 
(0.016660) 
7.044679 
(0.306357) 
-8.78E-07 
(15.8901) 
0.0222213 
(0.0045) 
-3.9512E-5 
(12.0533) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
2.861083** -0.1346 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
10.059604** 13.0324** 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
2.33855* -0.4304 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 41: Iceland, Bulgaria and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.1337072 
(0.021882) 
-0.0081521 
(0.013959) 
-16.401565 
(50.187636) 
0.1524159 
(0.021440) 
0.0012072 
(0.013879) 
126.25572 
(1334.2185) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.1524159 
(0.021440) 
0.0012072 
(0.013879) 
126.25572 
(1334.2185) 
-5.39E-06 
(1.5249) 
0.0045496 
(0.0045) 
-0.0012 
(27.3644) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
-22.421721** 1.9779* 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
-20.630597** -10.8989** 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
-3.443440** 3.4085** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 42: Romania, Lithuania and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.6614737 
(0.007525) 
0.3584320 
(1.729040) 
1.864129 
(1.732606) 
0.5070249 
(0.007735) 
-7.14E-6 
(2.233539) 
-7.10E4 
(1533.5950) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.5070249 
(0.007735) 
-7.14E-6 
(2.233539) 
-7.10E4 
(1533.5950) 
0.0580189 
(0.0039) 
1.58E-06 
(4.9673) 
3.6721E4 
(999.4411) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
140.279314** 87.8364** 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
-1.962211* 1.9626* 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
4.547528** -6.6803** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 43: Romania, Lithuania and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.0077968 
(0.008046) 
0.5408644 
(0.382692) 
0.014415 
(0.005829) 
-0.025847 
(0.019711) 
0.5777088 
(0.358477) 
-0.044741 
(0.006956) 
Period 2/ Period 3 -0.025847 
(0.019711) 
0.5777088 
(0.358477) 
-0.044741 
(0.006956) 
0.0000161 
(20.6111) 
0.0389052 
(0.0039) 
4.1383E-4 
(71.7814) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
1.018478 -1.8016* 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
0.863598 5.3756** 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
32.231541** -1.6028 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
The result is identical to the comparison of procedure1 and 2, with only short memory 
processes affected. The number of identified contagion, counter contagion effects and 
change in direction of long memory processes did not change at all. As discussed in 
Section 4.1, the autocorrelation of long memory process decays slower than that of the 
short memory process, and theoretically never reaches 0. In other words, a long memory 
process is more stable and predictable when compared to a short memory process. As a 
result, the combination of two long memory processes will have a more persistent 
relationship than the combination of two short memory processes. Indeed, this is why 
we tend to see more identified contagion in short memory processes. It is also why, 
when their short memory feature is not properly accounted for, they tend to generate 
very different results. The lack of persistency makes them more vulnerable to 
uncertainty. We now have the results of the most appropriate procedure, and we would 
like to look at each group separately before assessing their practical meanings.  
 
It seems that common shock and idiosyncratic shock react in the same way in group 1 
judging by the absolute value of the ratios (Table 38 to 39). They both initially 
decreased before then returning after the second shock. This suggests that the variance 
of Latvia (the numerator) drops first and then rises again; a notion which is confirmed 
by the estimated value of sigma. The reason for the drop in market variance is that 
Latvia agreed to slash its budget deficit in exchange for a €7.5 billion rescue loan. 
Apparently, this alleviated the market’s anxiety. However, the depression across all of 
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Europe’s economy slowly drove it up again in the next transmission period. 
Interestingly, the first event was identified as contagion in common shock and the 
second event was identified as contagion in idiosyncratic shock. It seems that although 
the reasons for pure contagion may have a certain influence over the local fundamental 
elements, it originated outside of the affected country. However, this does not mean that 
influence coming from outside of the country only has an effect on pure contagion. 
Indeed, it also affects the common shock. As suggested by the result of the third 
transmission period, when Germany’s economy grew by 3.6%, both common shock and 
idiosyncratic shock are identified as contagion. 
 
Just like in group 1, common shock and idiosyncratic shock in group 2 (Table 40 to 41) 
also share many similarities. First, their movement throughout the sample is almost 
identical, with the absolute values of both ratios increasing before returning to almost 
zero. Second, they both had a counter contagion effect in the second transmission period. 
Finally, the first transmission period was detected as contagion in both shocks. However, 
despite these similarities, they have two differences as well. The first difference is that 
common shock experienced a change in direction in the first transmission period while 
idiosyncratic shock did not. Recall that we allow sigma to have a negative value, thus 
meaning that the shocks may have a negative correlation. This suggests that the 
common shocks in Iceland and Bulgaria acted reversely. This is quite reasonable when 
considering that around October 2008 October, Iceland was given a $2.1 billion loan 
from IMF while Bulgaria had half of its aid permanently stripped away by the European 
Commission. Then came the second transmission period, where the variance of 
Iceland’s shocks steadily approached zero after it obtained the rescue loan and the 
government stepped in to stabilise the financial system. 
 
Common shock and idiosyncratic shock react almost identically in group 3 (Table 42 to 
43) with the exception that idiosyncratic shock identified the second transmission period 
as contagion while common shock did not. It seems that the elections occurring in 
Lithuania did not affect the fundamental linkage between Romania and Lithuania as we 
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expected. However, from another perspective, those elections did create a contagion 
effect in the idiosyncratic shock. Although they may not have a direct effect on the 
fundamentals, the implied influence is reflected in the pure contagion. 
5.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have examined contagion under a more comprehensive definition. 
We used a different method to perform the contagion test. The process of ‘Identification 
through Heteroscedasticity’ was combined with different forecasting models, breakpoint 
tests and the iterative nonlinear least square method. By exogenously estimating the 
breakpoints before the contagion test, we improved the power of the tests compared to 
Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006). We introduced 4 procedures with which to 
examine the effect of short/long memory properties and heteroscedasticity. We 
concluded that short memory processes are more easily affected by different forecasting 
models while long memory processes seem to be immune to them. Since our definition 
was more comprehensive than those provided by previous studies, we were essentially 
testing for different things as well as examining the existing definitions. The contagion 
examined in most studies actually relates only to the change in interdependence (the 
common shock), while in our study, pure contagion is ignored. In this regard, we 
reached almost the same conclusion to those of previous studies, with many contagion 
effects detected. Only in our case, the movements were more active. As for the pure 
contagion, we observed that idiosyncratic shock is as volatile as common shock. 
Although not always identified as contagion at the same time, we normally expect a 
change in idiosyncratic shock in the same direction when the common shock has 
experienced a change. Meanwhile, we also concluded that coincidence is never the 
reason for significant co-movement because all data are statistically related. For the 
period under study, governments’ macroeconomic regulations, such as cutting tax, 
slashing budget deficit and international capital assistance could easily cause 
breakpoints. On the other hand, governments’ personnel adjustments and elections also 
showed some influence, but more with regard to idiosyncratic shock than common 
shock. We also illustrated the importance of breakpoints in the study of contagion. Our 
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results suggest that contagion exists and that an appropriate length of time should be 
allocated to detect it. Indeed, there exist not only contagion effects but also 
counter-contagion effects. The counter-contagion period usually offset the previous 
contagion effect. However, on occasions it bent back so hard, that it eventually caused 
contagion in another direction. The breakpoint test in our study also helps us to track the 
transmission of contagion. Unlike most studies, we did not need to know where 
contagion originated from before the test, meanwhile, based on the results, we could see 
how contagion is transferred between countries. 
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Chapter 6 Contagion in Risk Premium - High Trade Links 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we employ the same framework for research targets with a different 
feature: higher trade links (top 6 among European countries). Trade links and financial 
linkages are highly correlated based on the equation of the balance of payments. They 
have both been proven to be the reason for contagion.  
 
In the last chapter we illustrated that financial activities, such as cutting tax, slashing 
budgets and international capital assistance, would cause contagion. In this chapter, our 
attention falls on trade linkages. Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) use a binary variable 
based on newspaper reports about Mexico and Asia to test the importance of financial 
contagion relative to trade and bank lending. They concluded that trade linkages and 
country characteristics can help explain contagion.  
 
Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006) have examined why the interdependence between 
assets in different Latin American countries often increased during the financial market 
crises between 1991 and 2001. They find that shocks are generally transmitted via 
long-term linkages between these countries; for instance, trade linkages. As a result, any 
attempts to reduce Latin American countries’ vulnerability to contagion by employing 
short-term strategies may be ineffective.  
 
Glick and Rose (1999) argue that countries who trade and compete with the targets of 
speculative attacks are more likely to be attacked. They point out that countries may be 
attacked because of the actions (or inaction) of their neighbours, who tend to be trading 
partners merely because of geographic proximity. Allen and Gale (1998) show that even 
a small liquidity preference shock in one region can spread by contagion throughout the 
economy. The possibility of contagion depends strongly on the completeness of the 
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structure of interregional claims, with fluid international capital and trade as the main 
channels. 
 
Indeed, the role of trade has grown significantly in the last two decades, especially since 
the establishment of the WTO in 1995. Figure 7 presents the international trade balance 
and the research targets of this chapter between 2000 and 2014. 
 
Figure 7: International Trade Balance 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Data are collected with DataStream in Newcastle University. World Trade from Thomson Reuters, Germany 
from Deutsche Bundesbank, Latvia from Bank of Latvia, Lithuania from Statistics Lithuania, Netherlands from 
Statistics Netherlands, Belgium from National Bank of Belgium, Denmark from Statistics Denmark, Sweden from 
Statistics Sweden.) 
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The world trade balance reached a peak around 2008 and then declined due to the 
financial crisis. For the countries with a trade surplus, there was an obvious decline in 
trade around 2008, just as with the world trade balance. For the countries with a trade 
deficit, the trade balance almost reached 0 during the crisis, which also indicates a very 
weak trade link. We observe a similar, yet not so obvious situation during the European 
debt crisis, with the exception of Germany and the Netherlands.  
 
The above observation suggests that trade has a certain relationship with financial crisis. 
Since the relationship between trade and financial crisis is most significant during the 
2008 crisis, we would like to choose this period as the focus for our research in this 
chapter.  
 
In the last chapter, we chose countries with extremely low trade links in order to detect 
(successfully) pure contagion. However, we only did so when focusing on countries 
with low trade links. What would happen if we switched to those with higher links? 
Would it diminish our ability to identify contagion, especially pure contagion?  
 
In this chapter, our attention falls upon the effect of trade. We would also like to 
establish whether there meaningful changes are identifiable when the same framework 
is employed on targets with higher trade links. Do the long memory, short memory and 
heteroscedasticity features still work in the same way? If differences are observed, what 
does trade bring?  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the data and 
how we process it; Sections 3-5 present and discuss the empirical findings; and Section 
6 draws conclusions. 
 
 
103 
 
6.2 Data 
The currency risk premium of the 7 countries we studied is also divided into 3 groups. 
Group 1 contains the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany; group 2 contains Latvia, 
Lithuania and Germany, and group 3 comprises Denmark, Sweden and Germany. As 
before, we arrange the groups based on their degrees of dependence on foreign trade. 
The similarity between this chapter and the last chapter is that they are still European 
countries and use Germany as a benchmark, while the dependence of the other two 
countries remains very high with Germany while Germany’s dependence on each of 
them is very low. Moreover, judging by the plots, all countries involved still respond to 
shocks in a very similar way. However, the difference with the last chapter is that in this 
chapter each of the other two countries’ degree of dependence on foreign trade are 
relatively higher with each other. The degrees of dependence on foreign trade of the 
selected countries and their GDP (by the percentage of Germany’s GDP) are presented 
in Table 44: 
 
Table 44: GDP% and DoD 
Chapter 5 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
 Latvia Greece Iceland Bulgaria Lithuania Romania 
GDP% 0.91% 9.24% 1.40% 1.22% 1.25% 4.68% 
DoD 0.001051 0.000075 0.000044 0.000052 0.001448 0.000355 
Chapter 6 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
 Netherlands Belgium Latvia Lithuania Denmark Sweden 
GDP% 23.32% 13.81% 0.91% 1.25% 9.36% 13.99% 
DoD 0.147642 0.250134 0.106474 0.070523 0.080634 0.055421 
GDP%: Percentage of Germany’s GDP; DOD: Degree of Dependence on Foreign Trade. 
(Source: Data are collected with DataStream in Newcastle University. GDP are collected from Oxford Economics. 
Export and Import are collected from IMF - Direction of Trade Statistics.) 
 
The focus of this chapter is on what trade can do in our framework. However, are there 
any other differences between the targets we chose? First of all, they all come from the 
same region, Europe. However, none of the groups in Chapter 5 are neighbours, while 
all groups in Chapter 6 are neighbours. Research studies (Glick and Rose, 1999) have 
pointed out that countries which are neighbours tend to have more frequent trading 
activities because of the geographical convenience. This conclusion is confirmed by our 
findings. Second, we can see that the countries included in Chapter 6 have relatively 
higher GDP with the exception of group 2. However, the increase in GDP is much less 
significant than the increase in the degree of dependence on each other. Although trade 
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is not the only difference among them, it is our contention that the other differences are 
not sufficiently significant to conceal the effect of trade. 
 
Since the effect of trade has been emphasised so often in previous studies, we wish to 
determine whether a higher trade link will bring about any differences when compared 
to our findings from the last chapter. Thus, in this chapter we choose countries with a 
high degree of dependence on foreign trade. Moreover, because the other two countries 
in each of the groups still have relatively lower GDP than Germany, we can assume that 
it is almost impossible for changes in one country to spread through Germany to the 
other. With this said however, they can still be affected by changes in Germany. 
However, the higher trade links many cause some transmission among themselves. 
 
The time period examined spans from January 24, 2006 to December 31, 2009. We 
cannot choose the same data length as the last chapter due to data availability, although 
we try to use data which falls within the same time period. The simple is split into two 
periods: a stable period to build forecasting models and a turbulent period to observe 
and identify contagion. We process the data in the same as we did in the last chapter. 
Data from January 24, 2006 to December 31, 2007 is the stable period and used to build 
the forecasting model while data from January 02, 2008 to December 31, 2009 is the 
turbulent period and the target for contagion identification. Figure 8 presents the plots 
of the data in level: 
 
Figure 8: Plots of the Data in Level 
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(Source: Data are collected with DataStream in Newcastle University. Germany from Thomson Reuters, Netherlands 
from Wallich & Matthes B.V., Belgium from National Bank of Belgium, Latvia from Bank of Latvia, Lithuania from 
Bank of Lithuania, Denmark from Danmarks Nationalbank, Sweden from Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.) 
 
The plots are very similar to the last chapter in this time period and the situation is also 
very similar. All countries’ interbank rates showed an upward trend until the crisis. 
Indeed, this trend changed from upward to downward after the middle of 2008. Judging 
from the plots, we expect the forecasting to have large errors, as suggested by the 
significant drop seen. 
 
Table 45: Descriptive Statistics (January 14, 2006 to December 31, 2007) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera ADF 
Netherlands 2.57e-7 0.0051 -0.0205 53.0333 52674.27** -14.69**[10] 
Belgium 5.25e-5 0.0003 -0.3385 5.9991 198.9123** -21.37**[2] 
Latvia 0.0091 0.1502 2.4787 50.2938 47581.11** -11.32**[8] 
Lithuania 0.0053 0.0298 1.4837 10.0374 1227.356** -10.48**[16] 
Denmark 0.0002 0.0121 0.2425 8.9506 750.0395** -26.05**[3] 
Sweden 0.0008 0.0194 0.5217 7.4693 443.2121** -21.35**[1] 
**denotes significance at 1%. The number in [] are the best fitting lag terms for the ADF test. 
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Table 45 summarises the statistics for the time period prior to January 2, 2008. The unit 
root tests (ADF, PP, and KPSS) reach a unique conclusion that all data are stationary. 
The Jarque-Bera test strongly rejects the hypothesis of normality in all cases, but we 
still assume normality. Although normality the hypothesis is strongly rejected, 
stationary data represents a strong support base from which to forecast the expected 
return. All data are proved to be stationary by all three unit root tests, with the exception 
of Lithuania. The SPSS test concludes that Lithuania has a unit root. However, since the 
other two tests agree that it is stationary, we view Lithuania’s data as stationary despite 
the result of the SPSS test. 
Table 46: Descriptive Statistics (January 02, 2008 to December 31, 2009) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera ADF 
Netherlands -6.20e-5 0.0044 0.5683 7.1683 405.9951** -15.61**[11] 
Belgium -9.31e-5 0.0003 2.9942 45.2003 39513.81** -4.83**[16] 
Latvia 0.0013 0.3044 2.6308 52.9793 54932.23** -5.52**[12] 
Lithuania 0.0036 0.1184 -2.5898 55.2986 60073.12** -10.57**[15] 
Denmark 0.0008 0.0474 -2.5322 64.0951 81742.15** -22.89**[1] 
Sweden -0.0005 0.0682 -12.4116 204.0231 892325.9** -20.29**[1] 
**denotes significance at 1%. The number in [] are the best fitting lag terms for the ADF test. 
Table 46 summarises the statistics for the time period following January 2, 2008. The 
Jarque-Bera test still strongly rejects the hypothesis of normality in all cases and all data 
series are stationary. But again, we assume normality. All data are proved to be 
stationary by all the unit root tests. 
6.3 ARMA and ARFIMA forecasting 
Table 47 and Table 48 summarise the information related to the best-fitting lag 
specifications for ARMA (p, q) and ARFIMA (p, d, q) models. 
 
Table 47: ARMA Models 
 
1p  2p  3p  1q  2q  3q  
Netherlands 0.139 
(0.048) 
  -0.939 
(0.017) 
  
Belgium 0.844 
(0.111) 
  -0.774 
(0.132) 
  
Latvia   -0.341 
(0.114) 
0.265 
(0.041) 
0.123 
(0.041) 
0.519 
(0.098) 
Lithuania 0.277 
(0.077) 
 -0.607 
(0.071) 
-0.243 
(0.056) 
 0.773 
(0.053) 
Denmark -0.148 
(0.044) 
     
Sweden   -0.794 
(0.176) 
  0.835 
(0.161) 
The statistics inside the ( ) are Std.Error and all coefficients are significant at 1% level. 
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Table 48: ARFIMA Models 
 
1p  2p  3p  1q  2q  3q  d  
Netherlands 0.137 
(0.051) 
  -0.936 
(0.023) 
   
Belgium 0.722 
(0.115) 
  -0.417 
(0.108) 
  -0.265 
(0.155) 
Latvia   0.931 
(0.038) 
-0.065 
(0.026) 
-0.913 
(0.034) 
 0.254 
(0.048) 
Lithuania -0.171 
(0.057) 
     0.176 
(0.041) 
Denmark 1.105 
(0.175) 
 -0.175 
(0.094) 
-0.804 
(0.256) 
  0.461 
(0.136) 
Sweden   -0.919 
(0.081) 
  0.946 
(0.067) 
0.045 
(0.036) 
The statistics inside the ( ) are Std.Error and all coefficients are significant at 1% level. 
 
We can see from table 48 that the two series in group 1, Netherlands and Belgium, 
possess short memory properties, while the other four series in group 2 and 3, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Denmark and Sweden, possess long memory properties. Hence, we expect 
the prediction of group 2 and 3 to be better than that of group 1 and shocks to have a 
more persistent effect on group 2 and 3 than group 1, which is again confirmed by 
breakpoint tests for having less structural changes. 
 
Figure 9 and 10 provide the plots of the forecasted data while Table 49 and Table 50 
report the calculated value for these criteria: 
 
Figure 9: Forecasted Result of the ARMA Model 
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Figure 10: Forecasted Result of the ARFIMA Model 
  
  
  
 
 
As we can see from the figures above, the forecasting is very bad for both models, just 
as we anticipated when we presented the plot for the data in level. Despite the higher 
trade links, the shock still gave rise to many changes.  
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Table 49: ME, MAE, MSE, MPE and MAPE for ARMA Model 
 ME
 
MAE
 
MSE
 
MPE
 
MAPE
 
Netherlands -5.73e-5 0.0031 1.97e-5 0.9951 0.9951 
Belgium -9.27e-5 0.0002 1.27e-7 0.7914 0.7959 
Latvia 0.0012 0.1144 0.0925 0.9738 0.9738 
Lithuania -0.0053 0.0515 0.0141 0.7026 1.4954 
Denmark 0.0008 0.0184 0.0022 0.9717 0.9717 
Sweden -0.0005 0.0206 0.0046 0.9611 0.9808 
 
Table 50: ME, MAE, MSE, MPE and MAPE for ARFIMA Model 
 ME
 
MAE
 
MSE
 
MPE
 
MAPE
 
Netherlands -5.73e-5 0.0031 1.97e-5 0.9951 0.9951 
Belgium -0.0001 0.0002 1.41e-7 0.8625 0.8625 
Latvia -0.0014 0.1145 0.0924 0.9452 1.0376 
Lithuania 0.0012 0.0504 0.0141 0.8981 0.9993 
Denmark 0.0009 0.0184 0.0023 0.9697 0.9697 
Sweden -0.0006 0.0206 0.0046 0.9588 0.9744 
 
The formal tests of accuracy confirmed what we observed in the plots again. The 
forecasts are still very bad. The value of ME, MAE and MSE remain too small for us to 
see how big the error is. However, the percentage error presented by the MPE and 
MAPE gives us a much clearer picture. Judging by the forecasting results, we see that 
the nature of countries’ trade links is irrelevant. When shock occurs, it can bring the 
same changes to all kinds of countries. 
6.4 Breakpoint tests 
The plots of the breakpoints found by the Andrews-Ploberger test can be seen in Figure 
11, while the summarised result is presented in Table 51. The Bai-Perron test is 
performed on each series individually. The plots of the breakpoints found are in Figure 
12 while the summarised results of the Bai-Perron test are reported in Table 52 (please 
see Appendix 4 for detailed results). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 
 
Figure 11: Plots of the Breakpoints Found Based on Andrews-Ploberger Test 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 51: Andrews-Ploberger Test Results 
 Possible Breakpoint P-value AP Statistics Is it a break at 5%? 
(1 yes, 0 no) 
Netherlands 81 (2008/04/21) 1.0000 0.0711 0 
Belgium 31 (2008/02/12) 
203 (2008/10/09) 
280 (2009/01/26) 
0.0028 
0.0000 
0.0000 
4.1206 
28.8501 
313.9001 
1 
1 
1 
Latvia 330 (2009/04/06) 
389 (2009/06/26) 
8.44e-21 
8.95e-7 
10.8210 
6.8382 
1 
1 
Lithuania 191 (2008/09/23) 
399 (2009/07/10) 
480 (2009/11/02) 
0.0021 
0.0042 
2.85e-9 
4.2782 
3.8879 
7.9176 
1 
1 
1 
Denmark 201 (2008/10/07) 
243 (2008/12/04) 
8.28e-7 
0.0181 
16.1991 
2.8647 
1 
1 
Sweden 239 (2008/11/28) 1.0000 0.0845 0 
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Figure 12: Plots of the Breakpoints Found Based on Bai-Perron Test 
 
 
 
 
Table 52: Bai-Perron Test Results 
 Possible Breakpoint ( 1| )TSupF n n  maxUD  maxWD  
Netherlands 0 1.78 
(n=1) 
1.76 2.53 
Belgium 202 (2008/10/08) 
280 (2009/01/26) 
360 (2009/05/18) 
22.89* 
(n=2) 
61.01* 85.12* 
Latvia 113 (2008/06/05) 
191 (2008/09/23) 
388 (2009/06/25) 
20.02* 
(n=2) 
22.94* 22.94* 
Lithuania 190 (2008/09/22) 
398 (2009/07/09) 
14.42* 
(n=1) 
25.92*      25.92* 
Denmark 242 (2008/12/03) 8.17 
(n=1) 
13.76*       13.76* 
Sweden 238 (2008/11/27) 0.67 
(n=1) 
10.78*      15.52* 
*: significant at 5% level 
 
To sum up, in group 1, the Andrews-Ploberger test reports 4 breakpoints (31, 81, 203, 
and 280) although one of these is not statistically significant (the Netherlands). The 
Bai-Perron test reports 3 breakpoints (202, 280, and 360), with 2 of them identical to the 
findings of the Andrews-Ploberger, and the one in the Netherlands ignored. Because of 
the different breakpoint found in Belgium, we conclude that the Andrews-Ploberger test 
neglected a change in variance. Since the breakpoint found in the Netherlands by the 
Andrews-Ploberger test is not significant, we do not consider it in the contagion test. 
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The first 2 breakpoints are exactly the same, thus suggesting a significant change in 
mean. In group 2, the Andrews-Ploberger test reports 5 possible breakpoints (191, 330, 
389, 399 and 480), which are all significant. The Bai-Perron test reports 5 breakpoints 
(113, 190, 191, 388 and 398). The two tests detected 2 different breakpoints and 1 
identical breakpoint in Latvia. In contrast, the Bai-Perron test reported one less 
breakpoint in Lithuania. This result means there are more changes in variance in Latvia 
and almost no change in mean in Lithuania. Indeed, because certain breakpoints 
detected are very close to each other (190 and 191, 388 and 398, 389 and 399), we 
consider them as 1 breakpoint. Thus, the Andrews-Ploberger test has 4 breakpoints and 
the Bai-Perron test has 3 breakpoints. In group 3, the Andrews-Ploberger test reports 3 
breakpoints (201, 239, and 243) with 1 insignificant breakpoint. Bai-Perron tests reports 
2 breakpoints (238, and 242). We obtained one similar breakpoint in both Denmark and 
Sweden, thus suggesting a change in variance first and then some changes in mean in 
Denmark, followed by a change in mean in Sweden. If we take all 6 countries as a 
group, the result from the Andrews-Ploberger test suggests that contagion came to this 
group on 2008/02/12 in Belgium and left on 2009/11/02 in Lithuania. In the same 
manner, the result from the Bai-Perron test suggests that contagion came to this group 
on 2008/06/05 in Latvia and left on 2009/07/09 in Lithuania. 
 
Again, most of the breakpoints detected correspond to the important events in the 
countries. 4 breakpoints are detected by the two tests in group 1, and are all found in 
Belgium. The Netherlands is quite steady, and it seems as though nothing has caused 
any significant structural changes. The first breakpoint is found on 2008/02/12, with the 
reason relating to the transmission of minor power from main parties to regions in 
Belgium. A switching in power usually implies a switching in policies. And indeed, this 
may be when the contagion initiates in group 1. 2008/10/09 is the second breakpoint, 
and most likely results from the worsening global financial crisis. The third breakpoint 
is detected at the beginning of 2009, which corresponds to the appointment of 
Belgium’s new prime minister.  
 
5 breakpoints are detected by the two tests in group 2. Many breakpoints were found 
around two events: the 2008 financial crisis and the countries’ approval of the European 
Union’s Lisbon treaty. The first breakpoint is found on 2008/06/05 by the Bai-Perron 
test, when Latvia approved the Lisbon Treaty. However, the crisis occurred at the same 
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time, thus meaning it is difficult to tell which one caused the contagion in this group. 
Judging by the results in group 1, both global economy event and country specific issue 
have impact on structural changes. Indeed, it could well be both. The other breakpoints 
are all detected when there are major banking or government issues, such as the lat 
currency supporting plan and the slash of the budget deficit. 2 breakpoints are found by 
the two tests in group 3, and all occurred around the time when Sweden became the 24th 
member to ratify the Lisbon Treaty. Compared to Chapter 5, we start to see a lower 
number of fundamental related events. Perhaps the higher trade links have made those 
countries more vulnerable to events that imply political changes. 
6.5 Detecting contagion 
The research procedures are identical to those employed in the last chapter, although 
they are applied to countries with more significant trade links. The Andrews-Ploberger 
test and ARMA model based procedure (procedure 1 henceforth), the 
Andrews-Ploberger test and ARFIMA model based procedure (procedure 2 henceforth), 
the Bai-Perron test and ARMA model based procedure (procedure 3 henceforth) and the 
Bai-Perron test and ARFIMA model based procedure (procedure 4 henceforth). Their 
roles are exactly the same as in the last chapter. Procedure 1 provides a base line, while 
procedures 2 and 3 examine the effect of long and short memory and heteroscedasticity 
separately, and procedure 4 considers both features. 
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6.5.1 Co-Integration and Granger Causality Tests 
Tables 53 to 58 report the results of the co-integration test and the Granger causality 
test. 
 
Table 53: The rank of integration and the best fitting lag terms for the VAR/VEC models based on 
Andrews-Ploberger Test 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
 Rank Lag Rank Lag Rank Lag Rank Lag Rank Lag 
Netherlands I (0) 
[1] 
1 
{-20.31} 
I (0) 
[1] 
5 
{-21.18} 
I (0) 
[1] 
2 
{-21.33} 
I (0) 
[1] 
6 
{-24.29} 
  
Belgium I (0) 
[1] 
I (0) 
[1] 
I (0) 
[1] 
I (0) 
[1] 
 
Latvia I (0) 
[3] 
2 
{-6.08} 
I (0) 
[1] 
1 
{-0.93} 
I (0) 
[1] 
1 
{-0.87} 
I (0) 
[1] 
1 
{-2.24} 
I (0) 
[1] 
1 
{-3.46} 
Lithuania I (0) 
[1] 
I (0) 
[1] 
I (0) 
[1] 
I (0) 
[1] 
I (1) 
[2] 
Denmark I (0) 
[1] 
2 
{-7.85} 
I (0) 
[1] 
1 
{-2.25} 
I (0) 
[1] 
1 
{-6.90} 
    
Sweden I (0) 
[1] 
I (0) 
[1] 
I (0) 
[1] 
  
The number in [] and {} are the best fitting lag terms for the ADF test and AIC criteria for the best fitting VAR/VEC 
respectively. 
 
Table 54: Co-Integration Test Based on Andrews-Ploberger Test 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
Group 1 28.54** 145.47** 66.61** 168.22**  
Group 2 119.63** 94.72** 41.27** 93.61** 30.81** 
Group 3 148.58** 26.69** 289.01**   
The statistics in this table are trace statistics. ** indicates significant at 1% level. 
 
Table 55: Granger Causality Test Based on Andrews-Ploberger Test 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group3 
Period 1 Netherlands does not Granger Cause Belgium 
Belgium does not Granger Cause Netherlands 
Lithuania does Granger Cause Latvia 
Latvia does not Granger Cause Lithuania 
Sweden does not Granger Cause Denmark 
Denmark does not Granger Cause Sweden 
Period 2 Netherlands does not Granger Cause Belgium 
Belgium does not Granger Cause Netherlands 
Lithuania does not Granger Cause Latvia 
Latvia does not Granger Cause Lithuania 
Sweden does Granger Cause Denmark 
Denmark does not Granger Cause Sweden 
Period 3 Netherlands does not Granger Cause Belgium 
Belgium does not Granger Cause Netherlands 
Lithuania does not Granger Cause Latvia 
Latvia does not Granger Cause Lithuania 
Sweden does not Granger Cause Denmark 
Denmark does not Granger Cause Sweden 
Period 4 Netherlands does Granger Cause Belgium 
Belgium does not Granger Cause Netherlands 
Lithuania does not Granger Cause Latvia 
Latvia does not Granger Cause Lithuania 
 
Period 5  Lithuania does not Granger Cause Latvia 
Latvia does not Granger Cause Lithuania 
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Table 56: The rank of integration and the best fitting lag terms for the VAR/VEC models based on Bai-Perron 
Test 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
 Rank Lag Rank Lag Rank Lag Rank Lag 
Netherlands I (0) 
[1] 
7 
{-21.05} 
I (1) 
[1] 
1 
{-21.34} 
I (0) 
[1] 
1 
{-24.16} 
I (0) 
[1] 
1 
{-24.48} 
Belgium I (0) 
[1] 
I (0) 
[1] 
I (0) 
[1] 
I (0) 
[1] 
Latvia I (0) 
[1] 
1 
{-5.29} 
I (1) 
[1] 
1 
{-8.40} 
I (0) 
[4] 
5 
{0.02} 
I (0) 
[1] 
1 
{-2.28} 
Lithuania I (0) 
[2] 
I (0) 
[1] 
I (0) 
[1] 
I (0) 
[2] 
Denmark I (0) 
[11] 
5 
{-5.54} 
I (0) 
[1] 
1 
{-5.45} 
    
Sweden I (0) 
[1] 
I (0) 
[1] 
  
The number in [] and {} are the best fitting lag terms for the ADF test and AIC criteria for the best fitting 
VAR/VEC respectively. 
 
Table 57: Co-Integration Test Based on Bai-Perron Test 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Group 1 151.99** 73.39** 69.43** 114.26** 
Group 2 66.23** 111.19** 145.80** 121.45** 
Group 3 98.60** 470.81**   
The statistics in this table are trace statistics. ** indicates significant at 1% level. 
 
Table 58: Granger Causality Test Based on Bai-Perron Test 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group3 
Period 1 Netherlands does not Granger Cause Belgium 
Belgium does Granger Cause Netherlands 
Lithuania does not Granger Cause Latvia 
Latvia does not Granger Cause Lithuania 
Sweden does Granger Cause Denmark 
Denmark does not Granger Cause Sweden 
Period 2 Netherlands does not Granger Cause Belgium 
Belgium does not Granger Cause Netherlands 
Lithuania does not Granger Cause Latvia 
Latvia does not Granger Cause Lithuania 
Sweden does Granger Cause Denmark 
Denmark does not Granger Cause Sweden 
Period 3 Netherlands does not Granger Cause Belgium 
Belgium does not Granger Cause Netherlands 
Lithuania does not Granger Cause Latvia 
Latvia does not Granger Cause Lithuania 
 
Period 4 Netherlands does Granger Cause Belgium 
Belgium does not Granger Cause Netherlands 
Lithuania does not Granger Cause Latvia 
Latvia does not Granger Cause Lithuania 
 
 
The results in Table 54 and Table 57 show that the time series are all co-integrated at 
every sub-period, thus meaning there are statistically significant long-run connections 
between the series. As a result, there are no accidental jumps. If a significant 
co-movement is detected, coincidence is not the reason for it. The difference here 
compared to the last chapter is that we observe more causal relationships; 3 in the 
Andrews-Ploberger based causality test (1 in each group) and 4 in the Bai-Perron based 
causality test (2 in group 1, 2 in group 3). Recall how we argued that no causal 
relationship implies that the shock transfers through fundamentals from a mutual third 
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party, in our case, Germany. Conversely, if causal relationships were detected, this 
might imply that besides originating from a mutual third party, shocks are likely to be 
transferred through fundamentals between the two countries studied. Evidently the 
increase in trade has made the transfer through fundamentals more possible, as there is 
one more transmission channel available. This makes us more curious as to whether the 
increase in trade will affect our ability to detect pure contagion. 
6.5.2 The 4 Contagion Test Procedures 
6.5.2.1 Procedure 1: Andrews-Ploberger and ARMA Based Identification 
The estimated value of impact coefficients and the results of their hypothesis tests are as 
follow: 
Table 59: Netherlands, Belgium and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.8165 
(0.5773) 
0.0043 
(13.3351) 
189.8837 
(0.3148) 
-7.45E-6 
(22.1391) 
0.0049 
(11.8201) 
0.0015 
(93.2984) 
Period 2/ Period 3 -7.45E-6 
(22.1391) 
0.0049 
(11.8201) 
0.0015 
(93.2984) 
2.44E-4 
(0.0305) 
0.0044 
(0.0304) 
0.0555 
(0.0463) 
Period 3/ Period 4 2.44E-4 
(0.0305) 
0.0044 
(0.0304) 
0.0555 
(0.0463) 
-3.04E-9 
(6.9667) 
0.0036 
(6.71E-6) 
-8.44E-7 
(0.0485) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
0.8680 1.2514 4.9081** 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-48.3391** 27.0451** 10.2820** 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
1.0302 0.7101 0.0748 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 60: Netherlands, Belgium and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.8165 
(0.5774) 
-2.72E-7 
(1.4142) 
-3.0018E6 
(53.9974) 
-3.90E-6 
(26.8779) 
0.0043 
(19.0055) 
-9.07E-4 
(0.0134) 
Period 2/ Period 3 -3.90E-6 
(26.8779) 
0.0043 
(19.0055) 
-9.07E-4 
(0.0134) 
2.44E-4 
(0.0305) 
2.96E-4 
(0.0305) 
0.8243 
(0.7473) 
Period 3/ Period 4 2.44E-4 
(0.0305) 
2.96E-4 
(0.0305) 
0.8243 
(0.7473) 
1.21E-5 
(0.0142) 
0.0034 
(0.4088) 
0.0036 
(0.0435) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
366.7848** 24.4168** 5.0062** 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-79.5721** 7.6079** -2.0317* 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-34.7228** 24.0351** 5.8765** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
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standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 61: Latvia, Lithuania and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.1722 
(0.7846) 
1.38E-6 
(72.9439) 
1.25E5 
(94.1479) 
0.2071 
(0.6662) 
0.1994 
(0.0464) 
1.0386 
(1.2119) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.2071 
(0.6662) 
0.1994 
(0.0464) 
1.0386 
(1.2119) 
0.4817 
(0.0021) 
-2.17E-6 
(9.5734) 
-2.22E5 
(471.7723) 
Period 3/ Period 4 0.4817 
(0.0021) 
-2.17E-6 
(9.5734) 
-2.22E5 
(471.7723) 
0.4806 
(0.0025) 
-6.13E-7 
(18.3686) 
-7.84E5 
(1013.3811) 
Period 4/ Period 5 0.4806 
(0.0025) 
-6.13E-7 
(18.3686) 
-7.84E5 
(1013.3811) 
3.49E-6 
(8.6457) 
0.0485 
(1.7095) 
7.19E-5 
(62.2356) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
5.9799** 8.2080** 165.9029** 1.2425 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
0.1712 1.0363 1.4427* -1.7131* 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
6.9544** 6.6386** -7.0934** 7.1961** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 62: Latvia, Lithuania and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.0045 
(0.0618) 
0.1236 
(0.0174) 
0.0364 
(0.4246) 
0.0272 
(0.0612) 
0.2161 
(0.0151) 
0.01258 
(0.2528) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.0272 
(0.0612) 
0.2161 
(0.0151) 
0.01258 
(0.2528) 
0.4358 
(0.0023) 
-2.53E-7 
(12.6309) 
-1.72E6 
(1091.6067) 
Period 3/ Period 4 0.4358 
(0.0023) 
-2.53E-7 
(12.6309) 
-1.72E6 
(1091.6067) 
0.4345 
(0.0028) 
-4.51E-7 
(22.4519) 
-9.63E5 
(6380.9712) 
Period 4/ Period 5 0.4345 
(0.0028) 
-4.51E-7 
(22.4519) 
-9.63E5 
(6380.9712) 
-1.71E-6 
(3.0241) 
0.0485 
(1.7095) 
3.53E-5 
(21.7622) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
-11.1268** -6.4093** 129.7705** 0.0662 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
-5.9716** 0.8432 -0.0706 -0.2161 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
22.4569** 2.2607* -1.0981 -3.3168** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 63: Denmark, Sweden and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.3239 
(0.3434) 
7.83E-6 
(806.5552) 
4.14E4 
(1020.1812) 
0.3343 
(0.3322) 
0.1564 
(0.1135) 
2.1375 
(0.8016) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.3343 
(0.3322) 
0.1564 
(0.1135) 
2.1375 
(0.8016) 
0.0366 
(1.0104) 
2.19E-6 
(14.7085) 
1.67E4 
(196.3013) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
5.0725** 9.6924** 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
-6.1436** -0.7204 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
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1.9041* -13.8101** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 64: Denmark, Sweden and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 -0.0154 
(0.0264) 
0.1581 
(0.1119) 
-0.0974 
(0.1935) 
-0.0241 
(0.0248) 
0.2531 
(0.0704) 
-0.0952 
(0.1101) 
Period 2/ Period 3 -0.0241 
(0.0248) 
0.2531 
(0.0704) 
-0.0952 
(0.1101) 
-2.45E-6 
(0.2294) 
-1.04E-6 
(2.4870) 
2.3557 
(5.9925) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
22.0219** -2.7090** 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
18.3105** 1.5562 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
22.4344** 1.5310 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Tables 59 to 64 summarise the estimated results of
it , cit as well as the ratios. We 
cannot see that procedure 1 performed differently in this and the last chapter. There are 
18 transmission periods in procedure 1, with both idiosyncratic shocks and common 
shocks included. 13 of them are significantly identified as contagion, equating to 72.2%. 
In Table 59, we detect no significant changes throughout the whole sample. The ratio 
continues to become smaller and smaller, thus suggesting a continuous contagion effect 
moving in the same direction and a weakened correlation. Moreover, no 
counter-contagion effect was detected here. The figures in Table 60 report a completely 
different situation. There are contagion effects throughout the sample. We observe one 
counter-contagion effect in this table, in period 2/period 3. All contagion effects in 
group 1 concentrate on common shocks; pure contagion is not a key player here. The 
absolute value of the ratio continues to go down in common shocks, with the same 
holding true for idiosyncratic shock, although on a smaller scale. Based on the 
chronology, we can see that the financial sector salvation plan of European governments 
in October 2008 still plays a role in this and serves as the reason for the counter 
contagion we detect in common shock.  
 
Among all 3 groups, group 2 reports the most contagion. Like Table 60, Table 61 reports 
contagion throughout the whole sample but with one more transmission period. We 
again observe a counter-contagion effect in idiosyncratic shock, with the ratio becoming 
smaller (although bigger in the absolute value) in period 3/period 4 and going up in the 
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following period. The direction of the change is altered once. Table 62 reports a slightly 
different situation, and this time only 3 contagion are detected out of 4 transmission 
periods. Although the ratios change from positive to negative, as long as the value 
continues to rise, we do not view it as a counter contagion effect. Thus, compared to 
idiosyncratic shock, common shock is less dynamic and active and has one less 
significant change.  
 
There are fewer transmission periods in group 3, with Table 63 reporting 2 contagion 
out of 2 transmission periods. The direction of the ratio changes and the absolute value 
is bigger. Table 64 reports 1 significant change out of 2 transmission periods. The 
direction of the ratio does not change but the absolute value is much smaller, thus 
suggesting a much weaker interdependence level. Given that Denmark and Sweden’s 
dependence on foreign trade with Germany is fairly high, Germany’s recession in 
November 2008 must have hit them hard. Indeed, Sweden becoming the 24th member to 
ratify the EU’s Lisbon Treaty has surely had a certain level of influence. 
6.3.3.2 Procedure 2: Andrews-Ploberger and ARFIMA Based Identification 
Given that we have nothing to show that procedure 1 performed differently in this and 
the last chapter, we will now establish whether procedure 2 reports differently in terms 
of long and short memory features. 
 
Table 65: Netherlands, Belgium and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 4.03E-4 
(3.24E-5) 
-3.17E-6 
(0.0139) 
-127.1293 
(34.5214) 
3.70E-4 
(4.99E-5) 
0.0019 
(1.37E-5) 
0.1947 
(77.2966) 
Period 2/ Period 3 3.70E-4 
(4.99E-5) 
0.0019 
(1.37E-5) 
0.1947 
(77.2966) 
2.37E-4 
(1.63E-4) 
0.0039 
(9.78E-6) 
0.0607 
(0.0237) 
Period 3/ Period 4 2.37E-4 
(1.63E-4) 
0.0039 
(9.78E-6) 
0.0607 
(0.0237) 
3.73E-4 
(0.0312) 
-2.20E-9 
(3.0819) 
-1.69E5 
(367.7164) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
15.1512** 20.3659** -27.0904** 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-6.2906** 3.2519** 0.8557 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-4.4945** -6.4844** -1.1043 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 66: Netherlands, Belgium and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 5.18E-5 
(8.68E-6) 
0.0043 
(4.34E-6) 
0.0121 
(0.0137) 
-5.76E-5 
(7.92E-6) 
0.0047 
(3.96E-6) 
-0.0123 
(0.0138) 
Period 2/ Period 3 -5.76E-5 
(7.92E-6) 
0.0047 
(3.96E-6) 
-0.0123 
(0.0138) 
1.21E-5 
(1.29E-5) 
0.0060 
(0.0074) 
2.02E-3 
(0.0284) 
Period 3/ Period 4 1.21E-5 
(1.29E-5) 
0.0060 
(0.0074) 
2.02E-3 
(0.0284) 
3.03E-4 
(0.0384) 
-1.28E-9 
(24.5012) 
-2.36E5 
(38.2084) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
24.7253** 0.2497 -24.6104** 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-22.2971** 2.2078* 5.2473** 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
18.3076** -9.9072** -13.3204** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 67: Latvia, Lithuania and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.1906 
(0.0029) 
-0.0884 
(0.5181) 
-2.1561 
(0.1227) 
0.2554 
(0.0027) 
-0.1522 
(0.3942) 
-1.6781 
(0.1169) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.2554 
(0.0027) 
-0.1522 
(0.3942) 
-1.6781 
(0.1169) 
0.4825 
(0.0769) 
2.68E-6 
(20.3890) 
1.80E5 
(950.4964) 
Period 3/ Period 4 0.4825 
(0.0769) 
2.68E-6 
(20.3890) 
1.80E5 
(950.4964) 
0.2532 
(0.0022) 
0.0455 
(0.0120) 
5.5648 
(0.1206) 
Period 4/ Period 5 0.2532 
(0.0022) 
0.0455 
(0.0120) 
5.5648 
(0.1206) 
0.2127 
(0.0443) 
0.0165 
(0.5684) 
12.8909 
(0.2326) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
-57.4957** 54.4601** 50.9807** 46.1514** 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
5.0092** -0.3511 -1.6797* 26.6817** 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
11.2078** -6.6787** 4.0203** -12.2778** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 68: Latvia, Lithuania and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 -0.0074 
(0.0053) 
-0.2644 
(0.1138) 
0.0279 
(0.0042) 
0.0047 
(0.0024) 
0.3283 
(0.0922) 
0.0143 
(0.0045) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.0047 
(0.0024) 
0.3283 
(0.0922) 
0.0143 
(0.0045) 
0.4093 
(0.0906) 
3.98E-7 
(9.7842) 
1.03E6 
(551.0849) 
Period 3/ Period 4 0.4093 
(0.0906) 
3.98E-7 
(9.7842) 
1.03E6 
(551.0849) 
-0.0012 
(0.2192) 
0.0455 
(0.0120) 
-0.0264 
(4.7858) 
Period 4/ Period 5 -0.0012 
(0.2192) 
0.0455 
(0.0120) 
-0.0264 
(4.7858) 
5.84E-7 
(3.8677) 
0.0165 
(0.5684) 
3.54E-5 
(84.4552) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
-7.1909** -19.9169** 2.5491** -1.4087 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
-6.9986** -3.3537** -0.6052 26.6816** 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 Period 4/ Period 5 
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0.2093** -3.2807** 3.9143** -1.2649 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 69: Denmark, Sweden and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.1001 
(0.2349) 
2.27E-6 
(36.2723) 
4.09E4 
(281.7692) 
0.1178 
(0.2273) 
0.1924 
(0.0838) 
0.6123 
(0.4555) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.1178 
(0.2273) 
0.1924 
(0.0838) 
0.6123 
(0.4555) 
0.0428 
(1.0104) 
2.50E-6 
(6.4801) 
1.71E4 
(79.0754) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
4.5512** 9.9895** 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
-10.0254** -0.1786 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
2.4445** 0.1813 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 70: Denmark, Sweden and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.0068 
(0.0242) 
0.0616 
(0.2352) 
0.1104 
(0.1336) 
-0.0095 
(0.0172) 
0.2052 
(0.0636) 
-0.0463 
(0.0779) 
Period 2/ Period 3 -0.0095 
(0.0172) 
0.2052 
(0.0636) 
-0.0463 
(0.0779) 
-6.89E-6 
(0.0003) 
1.77E-6 
(0.6028) 
-3.8927 
(67.7307) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
1.0484 -7.3665** 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
-1.6966* 2.7701** 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 
21.9208** -26.2489** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
The contagion test performed here is still based on the AP test, although with the 
ARFIMA model instead used. Procedure 2 detects 2 more contagion effects than 
procedure 1, which is 15 in total, equating to 83.3%. In addition, 2 more contagion 
effects are detected in group 1’s idiosyncratic shock where procedure 1 detects nothing. 
Which indicates that when the long memory and short memory feature is properly 
considered, the implied changes in policies and global crisis affects the idiosyncratic 
shock as well. Among all 3 groups, group 1 contains exclusively short memory 
processes while group 2 and group 3 contain only long memory processes. We reach the 
same conclusion as that reached in Chapter 5. The short memory processes are 
significantly affected while long memory processes behave almost exactly the same. 
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Although additional contagion are detected in group 1, the counter contagion effect 
disappears. Which suggests that the structural changes have more persistent effects on 
the short memory processes, and they do not tend to self-recover.  
6.3.3.3 Procedure 3: Bai-Perron and ARMA Based Identification 
Having established that the first 2 procedures react similarly to an increase in trade, we 
now move on to procedure 3 in order to establish if we have a similar result again. 
 
Table 71: Netherlands, Belgium and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 2.46E-4 
(0.0019) 
0.0045 
(0.0333) 
0.0547 
(97.7264) 
1.37E-9 
(0.0026) 
0.0061 
(0.0014) 
2.25E-7 
(55.7901) 
Period 2/ Period 3 1.37E-9 
(0.0026) 
0.0061 
(0.0014) 
2.25E-7 
(55.7901) 
7.24E-4 
(0.0059) 
-2.49E-9 
(0.9141) 
-2.91E5 
(887.3681) 
Period 3/ Period 4 7.24E-4 
(0.0059) 
-2.49E-9 
(0.9141) 
-2.91E5 
(887.3681) 
-2.01E-9 
(37.7241) 
0.0032 
(8.02E-5) 
-6.28E-7 
(57.9568) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-1.6136 6.1245** 0.2558 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
8.6614** 0.9897 -0.4183 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
6.1785** 1.0368 -1.2991 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
Table 72: Netherlands, Belgium and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 -3.13E-4 
(0.0013) 
8.46E-4 
(0.0019) 
-0.3699 
(0.0036) 
2.64E-5 
(0.0013) 
0.0042 
(0.0019) 
0.0063 
(0.0013) 
Period 2/ Period 3 2.64E-5 
(0.0013) 
0.0042 
(0.0019) 
0.0063 
(0.0013) 
7.24E-4 
(0.0059) 
-0.0012 
(0.0059) 
-0.6033 
(0.0352) 
Period 3/ Period 4 7.24E-4 
(0.0059) 
-0.0012 
(0.0059) 
-0.6033 
(0.0352) 
4.58E-7 
(4.75E-5) 
0.0109 
(0.0218) 
4.20E-5 
(0.0213) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-39.5051** -0.9807 13.3652** 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-38.9611** 6.5143** -2.3223* 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-15.5486** 14.2641** -12.8783** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 73: Latvia, Lithuania and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.0561 
(0.0165) 
-0.0462 
(0.0372) 
-1.2143 
(3.7134) 
1.08E-7 
(0.4614) 
0.0114 
(0.1503) 
9.47E-6 
(17.7442) 
Period 2/ Period 3 1.08E-7 
(0.4614) 
0.0114 
(0.1503) 
9.47E-6 
(17.7442) 
0.3325 
(0.0402) 
0.1747 
(0.0496) 
1.9033 
(0.0628) 
Period 3/ Period 4 0.3325 
(0.0402) 
0.1747 
(0.0496) 
1.9033 
(0.0628) 
0.2456 
(0.0454) 
0.0466 
(0.0564) 
5.2704 
(0.2821) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-3.0444** 3.9222** 10.6339** 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-12.6188** 3.2474** 8.0998** 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-7.6586** -3.4168** -5.0197** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 74: Latvia, Lithuania and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.0479 
(0.0194) 
0.0264 
(0.0487) 
1.8144 
(0.0154) 
5.65E-7 
(68.9228) 
-4.87E-7 
(67.5087) 
-1.1602 
(0.0861) 
Period 2/ Period 3 5.65E-7 
(68.9228) 
-4.87E-7 
(67.5087) 
-1.1602 
(0.0861) 
0.3325 
(0.0402) 
-0.0119 
(0.0613) 
24.9412 
(5.6121) 
Period 3/ Period 4 0.3325 
(0.0402) 
-0.0119 
(0.0613) 
24.9412 
(5.6121) 
0.2456 
(0.0454) 
-0.0010 
(0.0604) 
-242.1374 
(49.6962) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-2.1907* -4.7321** 10.6339** 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-0.9952 8.1997** -7.5802** 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
2.9441** 0.1971 -0.5788 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 75: Denmark, Sweden and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.0467 
(0.0033) 
0.0128 
(0.1855) 
4.09E4 
(0.1091) 
0.0499 
(0.0044) 
0.0726 
(0.0043) 
0.6123 
(0.0525) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
-24.3338** 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
23.2606** 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
38.2081** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 76: Denmark, Sweden and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.0018 
(0.0107) 
0.0407 
(.0054) 
0.1104 
(0.0052) 
-0.0036 
(0.0053) 
0.0823 
(0.0027) 
-0.0463 
(0.0025) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
23.3847** 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
-23.7317** 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
2.5811** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Again, just as in Chapter 5, procedure 3 reduces the number of transmission periods. 
While there are still 3 transmission periods in each shock in group 1, the numbers in 
group 2 and group 3 are each reduced by 1. 10 out of 14 transmission periods are 
identified as contagion, equating to 71.4%. Another obvious difference compared to 
procedure 1 is that we observe more changes in direction in all groups.  
 
Table 71 shows that only the 1st transmission period is significantly identified as 
contagion. The value of the ratio lowers to unity in the next transmission period, and 
changes direction in the period after that. In the meantime, Table 72 reports a 100% 
contagion, with one counter contagion effect. Common shock prevails in group 1. The 
bank saving project in Germany and Belgium must have played a role in this, and could 
well have created significant changes in interdependence.  
 
Table 73 and Table 74 report a reversed situation. Only one contagion is detected in 
common shocks while idiosyncratic shock reports a 100% contagion. We see one 
counter contagion effect in idiosyncratic shock and one change in direction in common 
shocks. In our opinion, this suggests a change in transmission channels. Moreover, we 
feel that the Lisbon Treaty is still the reason.  
 
Table 75 and Table 76 suggest a one off contagion in group 3, which is most likely 
caused by the Lisbon Treaty as well. However, the results are still quite different to 
those obtained from the last two procedures. Based on the superiority of the BP test over 
the AP test, although a similar proportion of transmission periods are significantly 
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detected as contagion, we think the details of the results based on the BP test are more 
trustable. 
6.3.3.4 Procedure 8: Bai-Perron and ARFIMA Based Identification 
Given what we find in the first 3 procedures, we see no reason to assume that procedure 
4 will not be affected by an increase in trade either. Let us now see if the results confirm 
our hypothesis. 
 
Table 77: Netherlands, Belgium and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 2.29E-5 
(0.0004) 
0.0062 
(0.1855) 
0.0037 
(0.1092) 
-1.84E-4 
(0.0004) 
0.0067 
(0.0276) 
-0.0275 
(0.0525) 
Period 2/ Period 3 -1.84E-4 
(0.0004) 
0.0067 
(0.0276) 
-0.0275 
(0.0525) 
-2.59E-9 
(2.8771) 
0.0038 
(0.0088) 
-6.82E-7 
(68.1079) 
Period 3/ Period 4 -2.59E-9 
(2.8771) 
0.0038 
(0.0088) 
-6.82E-7 
(68.1079) 
-6.18E-10 
(0.5849) 
0.0032 
(0.0046) 
-1.93E-7 
(9.8427) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-24.3338** 1.3547 -1.3083 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
23.2606** 5.9994** 45.8972** 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
38.2081** 1.3178 -1.3027 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
Table 78: Netherlands, Belgium and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.0039 
(0.0016) 
-3.89E-5 
(0.0507) 
-100.2571 
(0.0052) 
0.0039 
(0.0011) 
2.17E-5 
(0.0313) 
179.7235 
(0.0025) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.0039 
(0.0011) 
2.17E-5 
(0.0313) 
179.7235 
(0.0025) 
0.0013 
(0.0088) 
0.0012 
(0.0088) 
1.0833 
(0.0021) 
Period 3/ Period 4 0.0013 
(0.0088) 
0.0012 
(0.0088) 
1.0833 
(0.0021) 
6.46E-4 
(0.0046) 
5.92E-4 
(0.0046) 
1.0912 
(0.0041) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
23.3847** -3.6899** 31.4184** 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-23.7317** -3.6088** 30.2571** 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
2.5811** -89.9424** -10.3631** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 79: Latvia, Lithuania and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.0176 
(0.0801) 
0.0720 
(0.0011) 
0.2444 
(0.6813) 
2.87E-6 
(17.2649) 
0.0577 
(0.0011) 
4.97E-5 
(50.3561) 
Period 2/ Period 3 2.87E-6 
(17.2649) 
0.0577 
(0.0011) 
4.97E-5 
(50.3561) 
0.3202 
(0.0409) 
0.1747 
(0.0496) 
1.8329 
(0.0581) 
Period 3/ Period 4 0.3202 
(0.0409) 
0.1747 
(0.0496) 
1.8329 
(0.0581) 
0.2456 
(0.0454) 
0.0467 
(0.0564) 
5.2591 
(0.2814) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
8.7761** -4.5931** 10.5724** 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
81.2612** 10.3225** 8.0996** 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
6.3612** -9.7169** -5.1271** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 80: Latvia, Lithuania and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.1261 
(0.0556) 
4.72E-4 
(0.0009) 
267.1610 
(2.0118) 
0.0901 
(0.0578) 
0.0088 
(0.0007) 
10.2386 
(32.8591) 
Period 2/ Period 3 0.0901 
(0.0578) 
0.0088 
(0.0007) 
10.2386 
(32.8591) 
0.3326 
(0.0402) 
0.0119 
(0.0598) 
27.9495 
(2.0346) 
Period 3/ Period 4 0.3326 
(0.0402) 
0.0119 
(0.0598) 
27.9495 
(2.0346) 
0.2616 
(0.0444) 
-9.37E-4 
(0.0605) 
-279.1889 
(341.4351) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
21.7592** 8.8959** 10.7130** 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
21.6034** 0.5325 -0.3972 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 Period 2/ Period 3 Period 3/ Period 4 
-9.7298** 2.1480* 2.6768** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 81: Denmark, Sweden and Germany (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
 
1  2  1 2/   
*
1  
*
2  
* *
1 2   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.0467 
(0.0033) 
0.0128 
(0.1867) 
4.09E4 
(0.1092) 
0.0499 
(0.0044) 
0.0726 
(0.0043) 
0.6123 
(0.0525) 
T-Test on
1 and 
*
1  
-244.8592** 
T-Test on
2 and 
*
2  
23.2325** 
T-Test on 1 2/   and 
* *
1 2   
38.3959** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 82: Denmark, Sweden and Germany (Common Shock) 
 
1c  2c  1 2/c c   
*
1c  
*
2c  
* *
1 2c c   
Period 1/ Period 2 0.0018 
(0.0107) 
0.0407 
(.0054) 
0.1104 
(0.0061) 
-0.0036 
(0.0053) 
0.0823 
(0.0027) 
-0.0463 
(0.0016) 
T-Test on
1c and 
*
1c  
23.4863** 
T-Test on
2c and 
*
2c  
-23.8311** 
T-Test on 1 2/c c  and 
* *
1 2c c   
3.6591** 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Procedure 4 reports a very similar result again, with the results of the short memory 
processes changing significantly. However, there are some slight changes in the long 
memory processes as well. We observe fewer changes in direction now. However, 
compared to the changes in the short memory process, they are still very stable. We 
wonder whether a stronger trade link is the reason for the reduced changes in direction. 
12 among 14 transmission periods are identified as contagion (85.7%), which is the 
highest proportion. Higher trade links may represent more transmission channels and a 
higher probability of contagion. 
 
Although the number of contagion effects detected in Table 77 and Table 78 are still the 
same, the counter contagion effects have completely changed. Both common and 
idiosyncratic shocks identified the bank saving action of French bank BNP Paribas as 
contagion, which is quite reasonable because this deal is significant enough to create 
one of the continent’s biggest savings banks. 4 month later, a government personnel 
adjustment concerning the prime minister led to a contagion effect in common shock.  
 
In group 2, Latvia and Lithuania’s parliament approved the European Union’s Lisbon 
Treaty, which of course caused the first contagion effect. Then came the financial crisis, 
and the second contagion effect. As for the third effect, we believe both Latvia’s 
currency saving plan and Lithuania’s presidential election were responsible for this. 
Group 3’s only transmission period is identified as contagion, which in our opinion is 
the result of European’s coordinated plans to shore up the financial sectors. 
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6.6 Conclusion: 
This chapter employed the same framework as that used in the previous one. At the 
same time, we have switched targets here to countries with higher trade links (the top 6 
amongst European countries). We first noticed the involvement of more events with 
indirect links with fundamentals. We therefore feel that stronger trade links might make 
countries more vulnerable to events which imply political changes. Moreover, stronger 
trade links open more transmission channels, and hence more causal relationships are 
identified.  
 
However, all these differences seem trivial when identifying contagion being that we 
continue to obtain results similar to those of the last chapter under each procedure 
deployed. This indicates that, unlike that demonstrated in previous studies, trade doesn’t 
help to explain much about contagion. On the contrary, country characteristics like 
adjustment of government personnel and changes in budget deficits continue to have an 
explanatory power.  
 
Unlike previous research, less fundamental related events have been identified in our 
study. Therefore, our results do not support the idea that macroeconomic fundamentals 
have significant explanatory power in regard to the contagion effects during the 
financial crisis. Adjusting for heteroscedasticity will still cause a decrease in the number 
of transmission periods.  
 
Moreover, although long memory processes are slightly more sensitive, we nevertheless 
conclude that long and short memory features matter and short memory processes are 
still very sensitive to the models used. This feature should be properly accounted for 
when quantifying shocks. Furthermore, the extra sensitivity of long memory processes 
might stem from the additional transmission channels which come with the higher trade 
links. This result is consist with the empirical work suggesting that shocks are generally 
transmitted via long-term linkages between infected countries. Last but not least, 
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although the increase in trade brings about some observable differences in the causal 
relationship, it does not diminish our ability to identify contagion. On the contrary, 
because higher trade links leads to more indirect links with fundamentals, it enhances 
our power to identify pure contagion. 
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Chapter 7 Contagion in Market Returns 
7.1 Introduction 
In the last two chapters, we illustrated that the estimations of sigma are very sensitive to 
the long, short memory and heteroscedasticity features. As a result, these features 
should be properly accounted for when identifying contagion. We will split the shocks 
into two elements: the common shock and the idiosyncratic shock, thus distinguishing 
the pure contagion from the conventional definition of contagion which only focusses 
on the fundamental related transmission. We have also illustrated that, regardless of the 
kinds of trade links enjoyed by countries, the ability of our framework to identify 
contagion will not be diminished.  
 
However, there are still a few issues which must be addressed. First, if our research 
targets are not exclusively European countries and come from another two continents, 
will the switch to the region examined bring any changes? Second, we may be able to 
see the reaction of common shock and idiosyncratic shock separately, but what about 
the overall effect? Third, when contagion is detected, how long will it last?  
 
The importance of region has been highlighted by many empirical studies (see Gregorio 
and Valdés, 2001; Hernandez and Valdes, 2001; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000; Rigobon, 
2002). However, nearly all of the conclusions suggest that the effects of a change in 
region mainly come with the trade linkages because neighbours tend to have higher 
trade volume. Figure 13 presents the trade balance of our nine research targets, from 
which we can see that, unlike the empirical work suggests (Glick and Rose, 1999), trade 
and region are not necessarily directly related. For instance, Canada and Indonesia have 
very similar patterns of trade balance, yet they are located on two different continents. 
The same goes for Canada and Indonesia. Argentina and Chile are neighbours, but they 
have reacted very differently to the European debt crisis.  
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Figure 13: International Trade Balance 
   
  
   
(Source: Data are collected with DataStream in Newcastle University. Argentina from National Institute of Statistics 
and Censuses, Canada from Statistics Canada, Chile from U.S. Census Bureau, Hong Kong from Census and 
Statistics Department, Indonesia from Statistics Indonesia, Japan from Bank of Japan, Malaysia from MATRADE, 
Mexico from INEGI, Philippines from Philippines National Statistics Office.) 
 
As we reviewed in Chapter 3, correlation methods are very convenient when it comes to 
examining overall effects. By employing various kinds of correlation techniques, 
Chiang, Jeon and Li (2007) found a large proportion of contagion amongst Asian 
countries during the Asian financial crisis. Meanwhile, Syllignakis and Kouretas (2011) 
demonstrate a statistically significant increase in the correlation between the US and the 
Germany stock market between 2007 and 2009. In addition, Missio and Watzka (2011) 
have illustrated how contagion spread from Greece to other European countries during 
the European debt crisis. However, no existing research is able to provide a 
comprehensive analysis to examine both the split effects and the overall effects.  
 
In this chapter, we aim to answer the above questions by employing three contagion 
detecting methods in regard to nine economic entities from multiple regions and 
markets, those with different degrees of dependence on foreign trade. The rest of the 
study is organized as follow: section 2 describes the data; section 3 reviews the 
methodology; section 4 tests the overall correlation; section 5 analyses the split effect 
while trying to interpret the relationship between overall and split effects; section 6 
examines the causal relationship and sheds light on how long the contagion effects last; 
section 7 provides a conclusion. 
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7.2Data 
Instead of 1 market (interest rate market) from 1 region (European), we study 9 entities 
and 3 markets: the 9 entities are Argentina, Canada, Chile, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico and Philippines, while the 3 markets are exchange rate market, 
interest rate market and stock market. A paired study is employed. Each area is paired 
with all the other 8 to test for possible contagion. We do not choose countries based on 
low or high degree of dependence. In fact, we use mixed degrees this time. The degrees 
of dependence between some countries are high and some are low. Moreover, based on 
our conclusion in the last chapter, we do not think this will lower the power of our test. 
The degrees of dependence on foreign trade of the selected countries are presented in 
Table 83: 
 
Table 83: Degree of Dependence 
 Argentina Canada Chile Hong Kong Indonesia Japan Malaysia Mexico Philippines 
Argentina 1 0.000622 0.029793 0.002814 0.001319 0.000267 0.003709 0.001802 0.001899 
Canada 0.002488 1 0.009768 0.023723 0.004022 0.003263 0.008764 0.008982 0.005571 
Chile 0.021089 0.001244 1 0.002828 0.000776 0.001591 0.001243 0.003038 0.001236 
Hong 
Kong 
0.001926 0.004583 0.003427 1 0.011239 0.009548 0.062731 0.00196 0.04537 
Indonesia 0.001864 0.001181 0.001968 0.017195 1 0.005823 0.045558 0.000457 0.014638 
Japan 0.004763 0.016064 0.044227 0.24372 0.094534 1 0.209127 0.01006 0.13992 
Malaysia 0.002124 0.001216 0.001385 0.047176 0.020952 0.005966 1 0.001071 0.029819 
Mexico 0.005881 0.006627 0.016941 0.00808 0.001167 0.001641 0.005753 1 0.001665 
Philippines 0.001045 0.000633 0.001047 0.027218 0.005533 0.003246 0.024082 0.000239 1 
(Source: Data are collected with DataStream in Newcastle University. GDP are collected from Oxford Economics. 
Export and Import are collected from IMF - Direction of Trade Statistics.) 
 
The time period examined is identical to that explored in the last chapter, from January 
25, 2006 to December 31, 2009. We also process the data in the same way. Data from 
January 25, 2006 to December 31, 2007 are used to build the forecasting model (if 
needed) while data from January 02, 2008 to December 31, 2009 are the target for 
contagion identification. We first have a look at the data plots: 
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Figure 14: Plots of Data in Level 
 
Exchange Rate Plots 
(Source: Data are collected with DataStream in Newcastle University. Argentina from Thomson Reuters, Canada 
from Bank of Canada, Chile from Central Bank of Chile, Hong Kong from WM/Reuters, Indonesia from Bank 
Indonesia, Japan from Bank of Japan, Malaysia from Central Bank of Malaysia, Mexico from BBV Probursa, 
Philippines from Business World Publishing Corporation.) 
 
Interest Rate Plots 
(Source: Data are collected with DataStream in Newcastle University. Argentina from Central Bank of Argentina, 
Canada from British Bankers' Association, Chile from ABN Tanner Corresdores, Hong Kong from Hong Kong 
Association of Banks, Indonesia from Thomson Reuters, Japan from Thomson Reuters, Malaysia from Maybank 
Group, Mexico from BBV Probursa, Philippines from Thomson Reuters.) 
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Stock Data Plots 
 
(Source: Data are collected with DataStream in Newcastle University. Argentina from Buenos Aires Stock Exchange, 
Canada from S&P/TSX, Chile from Santiago Stock Exchange, Hong Kong from Hang Seng Bank, Indonesia from 
Jakarta Stock Exchange, Japan from Tokyo Stock Exchange, Malaysia from FTSE, Mexico from Mexican Stock 
Exchange, Philippines from Philippine Stock Exchange.) 
 
We can see that among all 3 markets, the exchange rate market is the most stable. The 
interest rate market and stock market are much more volatile. Hong Kong and Malaysia 
are the exceptions when it comes to the exchange rate market, because they are more 
volatile than others. As unstable as the stock market seems, the trends of the data in the 
contagion detection period are very similar, namely a downward trend followed by an 
upward trend. The interest market mainly follows a downward trend in the contagion 
detection period, with the exception of Argentina and Indonesia. They first have an 
upward trend and then return to the original level. 
 
We then describe the data in Table 84. We look at the mean, Standard Deviation, 
Skewness, Kurtosis, normality test, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
 
Table 84: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera ADF 
Exchange Rate 
Argentina 0.0013 0.0148 -0.2116 14.6134 2931.75** -17.57**[1] 
Canada 0.0001 0.0112 -0.4673 8.2007 606.11** -21.67**[1] 
Chile 0.0195 5.3667 0.5007 7.7113 503.62** -20.34**[1] 
Hong Kong -0.0001 0.0022 -1.6924 20.7497 7087.93** -23.55**[1] 
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Indonesia 0.0576 134.0005 2.3687 59.6875 70246.35** -21.24**[1] 
Japan -0.0403 0.9183 -0.3753 4.5668 65.52** -24.05**[1] 
Malaysia 0.0002 0.0145 -0.0764 4.0886 26.23** -22.57**[1] 
Mexico 0.0042 0.1310 0.4635 10.1354 1126.41** -22.33**[1] 
Philippines 0.0095 0.1949 -0.1302 3.5105 7.12* -20.68**[1] 
Interest Rate        
Argentina -0.0038 0.2291 0.3758 18.0808 4949.42** -17.57**[2] 
Canada -0.0077 0.0421 -1.7302 17.4728 4870.11** -21.67**[1] 
Chile -0.0009 0.0105 -5.3756 105.4582 230396** -20.34**[1] 
Hong Kong -0.0061 0.0814 1.6193 36.7541 24960.54** -23.55**[2] 
Indonesia -0.0018 0.0877 -1.2807 36.0522 24507.78** -21.24**[1] 
Japan -0.0008 0.0064 -10.6345 154.1086 505504.1** -24.05**[1] 
Malaysia -0.0029 0.0424 -15.2447 247.5133 1318051** -22.57**[1] 
Mexico -0.0058 0.0572 -5.9245 66.1471 89610.79** -22.33**[4] 
Philippines -0.0026 0.1561 -0.6655 22.7739 8526.61* -20.68**[1] 
Stock         
Argentina -0.1411 10.9319 -0.5428 6.0285 224.68** -22.86**[1] 
Canada -5.3422 233.7901 -0.4335 5.0517 107.69** -21.76**[1] 
Chile 0.0095 0.4059 -0.4037 7.1631 390.22** -21.07**[1] 
Hong Kong -1.3582 60.3125 0.1054 5.7067 160.03** -24.78**[1] 
Indonesia -4.03E-5 0.0045 -0.5986 6.9335 366.99** -20.12**[1] 
Japan -0.0071 0.2009 -0.0515 5.1231 98.08** -27.01**[1] 
Malaysia -0.1189 4.3818 -1.8048 20.2115 6713.63** -21.39**[0] 
Mexico -0.3331 48.2513 -0.1161 6.0618 204.68** -20.51**[0] 
Philippines -0.0417 1.0161 -0.7123 6.1324 257.05* -19.48**[1] 
**denotes significance at 1%. *denotes significance at 5%. The number in [] are the best fitting lag 
terms for the ADF test. 
 
 
The ADF test reach a conclusion that all data are stationary. The Jarque-Bera test 
strongly rejects the hypothesis of normality in all cases, although we assume normality. 
The means are all very close to zero with the exception of Canada and Hong Kong in 
the stock market. The volatility of the exchange rate market and the interest rate market 
are relatively low compared to the stock market, with the exception of Chile and 
Indonesia. 
7.3 A Retrospect of Methodology 
We would like to employ a 3-tier analysis to address two questions: First, can we detect 
any contagion in the overall co-movement, and if we do, what role do common shock 
and idiosyncratic shock play in it? Second, if contagion were identified, how long does 
the effect last? The three tiers are: tier 1: Correlation tests, tier 2: Identification through 
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Heteroscedasticity and tier 3: Causality tests and Impulse response analysis. Tiers 1 and 
2 will help us to answer the first question and tier 3 will help us to answer the second 
question. 
7.3.1 Correlation Test 
We start with the correlation test to establish if we can identify contagion in the overall 
movement in order to address the first half of the first question. We employ Forbes and 
Rigobon’s (2002) method of conditional and unconditional correlations (see Section 3.4 
for details) although we employ a more appropriate method to detect structural breaks. 
Instead of branding the date of an event as a breakpoint, we combine the Bai-Perron test 
and chronology to identify the timing of structural changes. Thus, our results will hold 
practical meaning as well as statistical significance. 
7.3.2 Identification through Heteroscedasticity 
In order to address the second half of the first question, we employ our ‘Identification 
through Heteroscedasticity’ process. As we have illustrated the effect of long and short 
memory and heteroscedasticity in the previous chapters, here we will only use our most 
appropriate procedure, namely the 4th procedure: ARFIMA and Bai-Perron test based 
procedure. By comparing the contagion effects identified in the overall movement and 
the split elements, we can trace the role played by common shock and idiosyncratic 
shock. 
7.3.3 Causality Test and Impulse Response Analysis 
Tier 3 is used not only to answer the second question but also to reveal the statistical 
linkages among the countries. If the co-integration or the causal relationship changes 
between transmission periods, it could serve as a further confirmation of contagion. 
7.4 Correlation Test 
We will answer the first question and test the overall movement using an adjusted 
correlation technique proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) (see chapter 3 for more 
detailed methodology). The dependent variable in their study was stock market returns. 
Interest rate was also considered in order to control for any aggregate shocks and 
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monetary policy coordination. In our study, we add the exchange rate market in addition 
to the stock returns and interest rate. Before the correlation test, we must first detect the 
structural breaks. Unlike Forbes and Rigobon (2002), the structural changes in our study 
are identified by breakpoint test rather than assigning it based on economic information. 
Their conclusion: no contagion, only interdependence, was disproved by many other 
literatures (see Caporale, Serguieva and Wu, 2008; Kleimeier, Lehnert and Verschoor, 
2008). The Bai-Perron test is employed to achieve this purpose. 
7.4.1 Breakpoint Test 
The breakpoints found by Bai-Perron test are summarised in table 85.  
Table 85: Bai-Perron Test Results of Exchange Rate 
 Possible Breakpoint ( 1| )TSupF n n  maxUD  maxWD  
Exchange Rate 
Argentina 173 (2008/09/01) 7.14 
(n=1) 
4.69 5.76 
Canada 214 (2008/10/28) 4.28 
(n=1) 
5.04       5.04 
Chile 214 (2008/10/28) 9.29* 
(n=1) 
6.77       8.04 
Hongkong 218 (2008/11/03) 2.51 
(n=1) 
2.23      3.27 
Indonesia 233 (2008/11/24) 4.59 
(n=1) 
6.95       6.95 
Japan 251 (2008/12/18) 3.12 
(n=1) 
2.47      4.77 
Malaysia 214 (2008/10/28) 8.01 
(n=1) 
5.77      6.85 
Mexico 308 (2009/03/09) 7.12 
(n=1) 
4.87      4.87 
Philippines 232 (2008/11/21) 3.46 
(n=1) 
7.21      7.21 
Interest Rate 
Argentina 82 (2008/04/25) 
225 (2008/11/12) 
8.69* 
(n=1) 
8.09 13.91* 
Canada 198 (2008/10/03) 
276 (2009/01/22) 
12.38* 
(n=1) 
8.34       17.74* 
Chile 229 (2008/11/18) NA NA       NA 
Hongkong 202 (2008/10/10) 5.45 
(n=1) 
2.94      5.11 
Indonesia 218 (2008/11/03) 
372 (2009/06/05) 
12.68* 
(n=1) 
33.98*       33.98* 
Japan 248 (2008/12/15) 3.96 
(n=1) 
10.41*      11.26* 
Malaysia 298 (2009/02/23) NA NA      NA 
Mexico 253 (2008/12/22) 7.19 
(n=1) 
11.69*      11.69* 
Philippines 189 (2008/09/23) 2.01 
(n=1) 
2.62      4.57 
Stock 
Argentina 213 (2008/10/27) 7.55* 
(n=1) 
9.78* 9.78 
Canada 232 (2008/11/21) 4.82 5.47       5.47 
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(n=1) 
Chile 242 (2008/12/05) 4.02 
(n=1) 
7.25       7.25 
Hongkong 213 (2008/10/27) 2.31 
(n=1) 
7.55      7.55 
Indonesia 232 (2008/11/21) 3.47 
(n=1) 
9.98*       9.98* 
Japan 309 (2009/03/10) 5.49 
(n=1) 
5.84      6.31 
Malaysia 215 (2008/10/29) 2.91 
(n=1) 
10.32*      12.12* 
Mexico 308 (2009/03/09) 5.15 
(n=1) 
6.47      6.47 
Philippines 213 (2008/10/27) 1.15 
(n=1) 
9.91*      9.91* 
*: significant at 5% level 
 
 
More breakpoints are found in the interest rate market; only 1 breakpoint is found in 
each economic entity in the exchange rate market and stock market. In the exchange 
rate market, we find no significant breakpoints. Most of the breakpoints found in the 
interest rate market are significant with the exceptions of Chile, Malaysia and 
Philippines. Close to half of the breakpoints in the stock market are significant, 
including Argentina, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines.  
 
Most of the breakpoints found are in October and November 2008, a period which 
corresponds to the 2008 subprime crisis. We also observe some other interesting facts in 
each entity. For instance, Argentina’s lower house of parliament approved the 
government’s controversial plan to nationalise pension funds. Hong Kong’s 
pro-democracy camp won more than a third of seats in legislative elections, retaining a 
key veto over future bills in September 2008. Japan’s Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda 
resigned in September 2008. Following October and November 2008, the next period 
with an abundance of breakpoints is January to March 2009. Many interesting events 
occurred during this time period as well. Argentina declared a state of emergency in 
January 2009. Canada’s parliament passed a budget including a major stimulus package 
in February 2009. Japan’s Economics Minister Kaoru Yosano stated that Japan was 
facing its worst economic crisis since World War II. Mexico’s government unveiled a 
package of emergency measures worth nearly 100 million pounds to protect the 
economy. Just as we observed in the last two chapters, most of the events are related to 
the financial account and the government’s personnel adjustments and elections. 
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7.4.2 Correlation Test Results 
Tables 86 to table 88 summarise the results of the correlation tests. 
 
Table 86: Correlation Results of Exchange Rate 
 Time Periods Conditional T-Statistics Unconditional T-Statistics 
Exchange Rate 
Argentina/Canada Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
-0.0013/ 0.3824 
(0.3707/0.3381) 
0.3824/ 0.0317 
(0.3381/0.3525) 
 
-6.3211* 
 
6.1422* 
-0.0046/ 0.4087 
(0.4132/0.3638) 
0.4087/ 0.0361 
(0.3638/0.3832) 
 
-6.2756* 
 
6.0538* 
Argentina/Chile Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.0117/ 0.3731 
(0.3634/0.2819) 
0.3731/ -0.0391 
(0.2819/0.3994) 
 
-6.8483* 
 
8.2291* 
0.0137/ 0.4009 
(0.4047/0.3043) 
0.4009/ -0.0445 
(0.3043/0.4401) 
 
-6.7305* 
 
8.2019* 
Argentina/Hongkong Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.0874/ -0.1105 
(0.4318/0.2584) 
-0.1105/ 0.0133 
(0.2584/0.4014) 
 
3.8506* 
 
-2.7343* 
0.0988/ -0.1336 
(0.4682/0.2946) 
-0.1336/ 0.0143 
(0.2946/0.4484) 
4.0461* 
 
-2.8821* 
Argentina/Indonesia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.0377/ 0.3335 
(0.3814/0.3866) 
0.3335/ 0.0135 
(0.3866/0.4027) 
 
-5.0626* 
 
5.7458* 
0.0487/0.3487 
(0.4239/0.4317) 
0.3487/ 0.0159 
(0.4317/0.4479) 
-4.6031* 
 
5.3581* 
Argentina/Japan Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
-0.1551/ -0.3274 
(0.3958/0.3508) 
-0.3274/ -0.0112 
(0.3508/0.3684) 
 
3.4191* 
 
6.8962* 
-0.1652/-0.3504 
(0.4343/0.3756) 
-0.3504/ -0.0094 
(0.3756/0.4032) 
3.3952* 
 
-6.9074* 
Argentina/Malaysia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
-0.0712/0.3588 
(0.3731/0.2384) 
0.3588/ 0.0751 
(0.2384/0.3928) 
 
-9.0462* 
 
6.4645* 
-0.0786/0.3927 
(0.4208/0.2415) 
0.3927/0.0811 
(0.2415/0.4188) 
 
-9.3712* 
 
6.9176* 
Argentina/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.0609/0.2084 
(0.4002/0.3629) 
0.2084/ -0.1085 
(0.3629/0.3724) 
 
-3.3419* 
 
7.8339* 
0.0649/0.2222 
(0.4373/0.3916) 
0.2222/-0.1141 
(0.3916/0.4088) 
 
-3.2762* 
 
7.6505* 
Argentina/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
-0.0537/0.2668 
(0.3889/0.3302) 
0.2668/ -0.0741 
(0.3302/0.4351) 
 
-6.0683* 
 
6.7689* 
-0.0565/0.2853 
(0.4263/0.3606) 
0.2853/-0.0759 
(0.3606/0.4678) 
 
-5.9129* 
 
6.6052* 
Canada/Chile Period 1/Period 2 
 
0.0655/-0.0071 
(0.3068/0.3931) 
 
2.3403* 
 
0.0664/ -0.0085 
(0.3409/0.4335)  
2.1888* 
 
Canada/Hongkong Period 1/Period 2 
 
0.0388/0.2181 
(0.4294/0.3884) 
 
-4.8093* 
 
0.0384/ 0.2369 
(0.4754/0.4231)  
-4.8296* 
 
Canada/Indonesia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.1385/ 0.3955 
(0.3675/0.2939) 
0.3955/ 0.1458 
(0.2939/0.4021) 
 
-3.4804* 
 
3.4092* 
0.1462/0.4148 
(0.4057/0.3218) 
0.4148/ 0.1573 
(0.3218/0.4451) 
-3.3195* 
 
3.2090* 
Canada/Japan Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
-0.1475/-0.4359 
(0.4232/0.2338) 
-0.4359/-0.0807 
(0.2338/0.3762) 
 
5.9067* 
 
-7.8545* 
-0.1514/-0.4756 
(0.4506/0.2565) 
-0.4756/-0.0864 
(0.2565/0.4105) 
6.1112* 
 
-7.8544* 
Canada/Malaysia Period 1/Period 2 0.1783/0.2544 -2.0142* 0.1981/0.2723 -1.8248 
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 (0.4504/0.3689) 
 
 (0.4857/0.3954)  
Canada/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.3328/0.4534 
(0.3461/0.3912) 
0.4534/0.3052 
(0.3912/0.3641) 
 
-2.5563* 
 
3.1109* 
0.3533/0.4751 
(0.3716/0.4119) 
0.4751/0.3323 
(0.4119/0.3964) 
-2.4371* 
 
2.8165* 
Canada/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.1011/0.1167 
(0.3915/0.1767) 
0.1167/-0.0268 
(0.1767/0.4086) 
 
-0.3095 
 
2.9191* 
0.1112/0.1372 
(0.4167/0.2029) 
0.1372/-0.0271 
(0.2029/0.4419) 
-0.4546 
 
2.9511* 
Chile/Hongkong Period 1/Period 2 
 
0.0642/0.0731 
(0.4118/0.3967) 
 
-0.2428 
 
0.0624/0.0781 
(0.4453/0.4442)  
-0.3889 
 
Chile/Indonesia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.1081/0.4429 
(0.3895/0.2505) 
0.4429/0.1788 
(0.2505/0.3765) 
 
-5.2713* 
 
4.2879* 
0.1119/0.4735 
(0.4321/0.2542) 
0.4735/0.1972 
(0.2542/0.4143) 
-5.5068* 
 
4.3687* 
Chile/Japan Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
-0.0116/-0.0913 
(0.4124/0.4717) 
-0.0913/-0.0861 
(0.4717/0.4264) 
 
0.9637 
 
-0.0634 
-0.0124/-0.0991 
(0.4461/0.5059) 
-0.0991/-0.0942 
(0.5059/0.4601) 
0.9766 
 
-0.0557 
Chile/Malaysia Period 1/Period 2 
 
0.2412/0.2412 
(0.3301/0.3536) 
 
-0.3898 
 
0.2621/0.2704 
(0.3699/0.3743)  
-0.2462 
 
Chile/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
-0.0096/0.0109 
(0.3741/0.3772) 
0.0109/0.2024 
(0.3772/0.3475) 
 
-0.4402 
 
-4.1951* 
-0.0076/0.0138 
(0.4137/0.4118) 
0.0138/0.2243 
(0.4118/0.3756) 
-0.4194 
 
-4.2351* 
Chile/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.2136/0.4178 
(0.4235/0.1401) 
0.4178/0.1536 
(0.1401/0.4276) 
 
-4.6121* 
 
6.3621* 
0.2215/0.4553 
(0.4454/0.1547) 
0.4553/0.1672 
(0.1547/0.4546) 
-4.8787* 
 
6.3683* 
Hongkong/Indonesia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.0691/0.2581 
(0.3994/0.1555) 
0.2581/0.1086 
(0.1555/0.3567) 
 
-3.7942* 
 
3.2026* 
0.0777/0.2956 
(0.4388/0.1874) 
0.2956/0.1152 
(0.1874/0.3981) 
-3.7221* 
 
3.2601* 
Hongkong/Japan Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.2228/0.0116 
(0.3825/0.2434) 
0.0116/0.0624 
(0.2434/0.4328) 
 
4.1856* 
 
-1.0035 
0.2366/0.0178 
(0.4042/0.2888) 
0.0178/0.0599 
(0.2888/0.4632) 
3.7605* 
 
-0.7215 
Hongkong/Malaysia Period 1/Period 2 
 
0.0957/0.1795 
(0.4343/0.3523) 
 
-2.3162* 
 
0.1067/0.1895 
(0.4674/0.3812)  
-2.1224* 
 
Hongkong/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
-0.0013/-0.0655 
(0.3824/0.4062) 
-0.0655/0.0855 
(0.4062/0.3733) 
 
1.2619 
 
-2.9843* 
-0.0011/-0.0741 
(0.4184/0.4419) 
-0.0741/0.0927 
(0.4419/0.4048) 
1.3155 
 
-3.0371* 
Hongkong/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.0863/-0.3249 
(0.3535/0.3647) 
-0.3249/0.0835 
(0.3647/0.3747) 
 
3.9532* 
 
-3.9439* 
0.0991/-0.3509 
(0.3804/0.3726) 
-0.3509/0.0926 
(0.3726/0.4012) 
4.2213* 
 
-4.1837* 
Indonesia/Japan Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
-0.1567/0.0297 
(0.4154/0.4133) 
0.0297/-0.0562 
(0.4133/0.3745) 
 
-1.7938 
 
0.8371 
-0.1671/0.0434 
(0.4446/0.4652) 
0.0434/-0.0581 
(0.4652/0.4077) 
-1.8061 
 
0.8789 
Indonesia/Malaysia Period 1/Period 2 
 
0.4243/0.7048 
(0.3125/0.0917) 
-9.0324* 
 
0.4588/0.7381 
(0.3207/0.1022) 
-8.3791* 
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Period 2/Period 3 0.7048/0.5583 
(0.0917/0.3328) 
 
4.9377* 0.7381/0.5824 
(0.1022/0.3426) 
4.8663* 
Indonesia/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.0816/0.0315 
(0.3723/0.3958) 
0.0315/-0.0311 
(0.3958/0.3538) 
 
0.9587 
 
1.2049 
0.0915/0.0298 
(0.4105/0.4234) 
0.0298/-0.0346 
(0.4234/0.3954) 
1.0941 
 
1.1461 
Indonesia/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
0.0784/0.1021 
(0.3259/0.3703) 
 
-0.7663 
 
0.0893/0.1083 
(0.3595/0.3983)  
-0.5646 
 
Japan/Malaysia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.0647/-0.3244 
(0.3723/0.3958) 
-0.3244/-0.0686 
(0.3958/0.3538) 
 
4.7197* 
 
-3.1965* 
0.0755/-0.3445 
(0.4978/0.4842) 
-0.3445/-0.0741 
(0.4842/0.4242) 
4.7288* 
 
-3.1502* 
Japan/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
-0.0718/-0.0905 
(0.3729/0.3783) 
-0.0905/-0.0732 
(0.3783/0.3613) 
 
0.3341 
 
-0.3067 
-0.0753/-0.0895 
(0.4136/0.4043) 
-0.0895/-0.0777 
(0.4043/0.4028) 
0.2366 
 
-0.1953 
Japan/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.0624/0.1713 
(0.3736/0.1852) 
0.1713/0.0227 
(0.1852/0.3442) 
 
-2.1675* 
 
3.0679* 
0.0691/0.2011 
(0.4055/0.2223) 
0.2011/0.0276 
(0.2223/0.3738) 
-2.2375* 
 
3.0354* 
Malaysia/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.1132/0.3528 
(0.2845/0.3106) 
0.3528/0.1076 
(0.3106/0.3586) 
 
-6.3407* 
 
6.0464* 
0.1247/0.3822 
(0.3227/0.3269) 
0.3822/0.1188 
(0.3269/0.3983) 
-6.3339* 
 
6.0481* 
Malaysia/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.1571/-0.1101 
(0.3253/0.4223) 
-0.1101/0.0983 
(0.4223/0.3728) 
 
2.5474* 
 
-1.9887 
0.1759/-0.1067 
(0.3527/0.4632) 
-0.1067/0.1089 
(0.4632/0.4018) 
2.4593* 
 
-1.8794 
Mexico/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.0199/0.1446 
(0.3352/0.3381) 
0.1446/0.0464 
(0.3381/0.3509) 
 
-2.7701* 
 
2.1406* 
0.0228/0.1609 
(0.3646/0.3712) 
0.1609/0.0502 
(0.3712/0.3793) 
-2.8042* 
 
2.2083* 
*: significant at 5% level 
 
Among the 65 transmission periods, 48 are identified as contagion by the unconditional 
correlation while 49 are identified as contagion by the conditional correlation. Normally, 
when the conditional correlation of the exchange rate is detected as contagion, the 
unconditional correlation is also detected as contagion. The exception in this case is 
between Canada and Malaysia. When their conditional correlation is significantly 
identified as contagion, the adjusted unconditional correlation is not. During October 
2008, Canada’s conservatives failed to gain an overall majority in the early general 
election and Malaysia’s Prime Minister suffered the worst election result in decades, 
thus exacerbating political tensions. These two events, along with the global financial 
crisis, are sufficient to cause structural changes in both countries. However, when the 
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change in volatility in exchange rate is adjusted, the correlation between these two 
countries seems to be rather stable compared to most of other country combinations. 
Despite this, the results lead us to believe that the fluctuation in market volatility caused 
by political instability can be adjusted. The other stable country combinations are 
Canada/Philippines, Chile/Hong Kong, Chile/Japan, Chile/Malaysia, Chile/Mexico, 
Hong Kong/Japan, Hong Kong/Mexico, Indonesia/Japan, Indonesia/Mexico, 
Indonesia/Philippines, Japan/Mexico and Malaysia/Philippines. Trade does not seem to 
be a good criterion with which to identify contagion in this case. Indeed, we can see 
combinations with various degrees of dependence on each other; for instance, 
Canada/Philippines have a low level of dependence while Hong Kong/Japan have a 
high level of dependence. On the other hand, region does not seem to be a strong 
criterion either. Among the 12 pairs of stable country combinations, 7 of them (58.3%) 
are from different continents. The exceptions include Hong Kong/Japan, 
Indonesia/Japan, Indonesia/Philippines, Chile/Mexico and Malaysia/Philippines. There 
are 28 counter contagion effects in all the country combinations with the exception of 
Chile/Mexico. It is quite clear that the correlations among countries tend to recover after 
shocks. In Chile/Mexico, the absolute value of their correlation maintained its growth 
while there was also a change in the direction of the correlation. During the first 
transmission period, the correlation changed from slightly negative to slightly positive. 
The financial crisis did nothing to affect the magnitude of the correlation but did alter its 
direction. The energy reforms in Mexico due to a drop in oil production lead to a 
stronger relation with Chile according to the significant change in the correlation. 
Among all the 28 counter contagion effects, 7 of them changed direction, thus 
suggesting that there are two ways in which the correlations can recover after shocks. 
The first is to gradually return to their original level, while the other is to reach a new 
equilibrium. It seems that most country combinations follow the first methods in the 
exchange rate market. Another phenomenon we observe is that whenever a counter 
contagion effect occurs, then changes in the correlations are almost always an increase 
in the absolute value followed by a decrease. This suggests that the 2008 crisis 
intensified the exchange rate correlations among countries and that the crisis transfers 
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from one to another through this channel until all of the affected countries either recover 
to their original level or reach a new equilibrium.  
 
Table 87: Correlation Results of Interest Rate 
 Time Periods Conditional T-Statistics Unconditional T-Statistics 
Interest Rate 
Argentina/Canada Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
 
Period 3/Period 4 
 
Period 4/Period 5 
 
0.1471/-0.0884 
(0.3445/0.3392) 
-0.0884/-0.2001 
(0.3392/0.2763) 
-0.2001/0.2059 
(0.2763/0.3845) 
0.2059/ 0.0669 
(0.3845/0.3593) 
 
4.7358* 
 
1.8447 
 
-5.2886* 
 
2.3042* 
0.1549/ -0.0924 
(0.3931/0.3757) 
-0.0924/ 0.0788 
(0.3757/0.4394) 
0.0788/ 0.2271 
(0.4394/0.4203) 
0.2271/ 0.0621 
(0.4203/0.3517) 
 
4.3754* 
 
-2.8077* 
 
-5.0667* 
 
2.5926* 
Argentina/Chile Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.0596/ -0.0364 
(0.1678/0.1346) 
-0.0364/ 0.0098 
(0.1346/0.2505) 
 
4.2836* 
 
-2.3536* 
0.0725/ -0.0405 
(0.2063/0.1474) 
-0.0405/ 0.0064 
(0.1474/0.2458) 
 
4.2141* 
 
-2.4797* 
Argentina/Hongkong Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
 
Period 3/Period 4 
 
 
0.1694/ -0.0715 
(0.4257/0.3973) 
-0.0715/ -0.3299 
(0.3973/0.5139) 
-0.3299/ 0.0447 
(0.5139/0.4081) 
 
3.9389* 
 
2.2377* 
 
-3.3273* 
0.1801/ -0.0724 
(0.4615/0.4394) 
-0.0724/ -0.3524 
(0.4394/0.5235) 
-0.3524/ 0.0392 
(0.5235/0.4034) 
3.7792* 
 
2.3597* 
 
-3.4331* 
Argentina/Indonesia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
 
Period 3/Period 4 
 
 
0.0589/ 0.1691 
(0.3804/0.3243) 
0.1691/ -0.0102 
(0.3243/0.4141) 
-0.0102/ -0.0387 
(0.4141/0.4445) 
 
-2.1789* 
 
3.9321* 
 
0.5147 
0.0561/ 0.1935 
(0.4198/0.3594) 
0.1935/ -0.0162 
(0.3594/0.4366) 
-0.0162/ -0.0282 
(0.4366/0.4301) 
-2.4392* 
 
4.4423* 
 
0.2361 
Argentina/Japan Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
 
Period 3/Period 4 
 
 
0.0595/ 0.1157 
(0.3735/0.4287) 
0.1157/ -0.0296 
(0.4287/0.2741) 
-0.0296/ 0.0668 
(0.2741/0.3256) 
 
-1.0258 
 
2.1565* 
 
-1.5767 
0.0457/ 0.1173 
(0.4374/0.4533) 
0.1173/ -0.0197 
(0.4533/0.3131) 
-0.0197/ 0.0589 
(0.3131/0.3388) 
-1.1571 
 
1.8154 
 
-1.1495 
Argentina/Malaysia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
 
Period 3/Period 4 
 
 
0/ 0 
(0/0) 
0/ 0.0849 
(0/0.2149) 
0.0849/ -0.0152 
(0.2149/0.2901) 
 
NA 
 
-3.3759* 
 
2.9794* 
0/ 0 
(0/0) 
0/ 0.0905 
(0/0.2305) 
0.0905/ -0.0124 
(0.2305/0.2687) 
NA 
 
-3.3575* 
 
3.1659* 
Argentina/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
 
Period 3/Period 4 
 
 
0.0858/ -0.1299 
(0.3581/0.5233) 
-0.1299/ -0.4869 
(0.5233/0.3995) 
-0.4869/ 0.1375 
(0.3995/0.3294) 
 
3.6492* 
 
4.0911* 
 
-7.9259* 
0.1031/ -0.1325 
(0.4031/0.5523) 
-0.1325/ -0.5081 
(0.5523/0.4027) 
-0.5081/ 0.1199 
(0.4027/0.3369) 
3.6519* 
 
4.2203* 
 
-7.9631* 
Argentina/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
 
Period 3/Period 4 
 
 
-0.0213/ 0.1416 
(0.3753/0.3285) 
0.1416/ 0.0996 
(0.3285/0.3508) 
0.0996/ -0.0358 
(0.3508/0.3819) 
 
-3.1094* 
 
0.6301 
 
2.1378* 
-0.0115/ 0.1533 
(0.4317/0.3686) 
0.1533/ 0.0901 
(0.3686/0.3987) 
0.0901/ -0.0343 
(0.3987/0.3826) 
-2.7489* 
 
0.8397 
 
1.7737 
Canada/Chile Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.0069/ 0.0081 
(0.0396/0.0192) 
0.0081/ 0.0993 
-0.2399 
 
-3.2213* 
0.0074/ 0.0101 
(0.0422/0.0259) 
0.0101/ 0.1083 
-0.4933 
 
-3.1728* 
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Period 3/Period 4 
 
 
(0.0192/0.1928) 
0.0993/ 0.0241 
(0.1928/0.2026) 
 
 
2.3827* 
(0.0259/0.2096) 
0.1083/ 0.0208 
(0.2096/0.1982) 
 
2.6396* 
Canada/Hongkong Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.1666/ 0.0469 
(0.4371/0.3858) 
0.0469/ 0.0605 
(0.3858/0.4097) 
 
2.2009* 
 
-0.2573 
0.1672/0.0561 
(0.4738/0.4277) 
0.0561/ 0.0573 
(0.4277/0.4048) 
1.8556 
 
-0.0221 
Canada/Indonesia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
 
Period 3/Period 4 
 
Period 4/Period 5 
 
-0.0361/-0.4448 
(0.4418/0.1954) 
-0.4448/0.0795 
(0.1954/0.5711) 
0.0795/0.1501 
(0.5711/0.4791) 
0.1501/ 0.0031 
(0.4791/0.4467) 
 
7.5816* 
 
-6.0415* 
 
-0.7794 
 
2.2331* 
-0.0448/ -0.4692 
(0.4801/0.2086) 
-0.4692/ 0.0725 
(0.2086/0.5947) 
0.0725/ 0.1534 
(0.5947/0.5058) 
0.1534/ 0.0039 
(0.5058/0.4396) 
 
7.3294* 
 
-5.9557* 
 
-0.8649 
 
2.3612* 
Canada/Japan Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
 
Period 3/Period 4 
 
 
0.0988/ -0.1357 
(0.4059/0.4661) 
-0.1357/ 0.5929 
(0.4661/0.3921) 
0.5929/ 0.1334 
(0.3921/0.3212) 
 
3.2584* 
 
-7.3481* 
 
5.9308* 
0.1064/ -0.1553 
(0.4342/0.4919) 
-0.1553/ 0.6423 
(0.4919/0.3801) 
0.6423/ 0.1309 
(0.3801/0.3335) 
3.4371* 
 
-7.9768* 
 
6.8199* 
Canada/Malaysia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
 
Period 3/Period 4 
 
 
0/ 0.1333 
(0/0.3191) 
0.1333/ 0.1956 
(0.3191/0.3281) 
0.1956/ -0.0082 
(0.3281/0.2749) 
 
-3.6921* 
 
-0.7911 
 
2.7976* 
0/ 0.1389 
(0/0.3296) 
0.1389/ 0.2055 
(0.3296/0.3452) 
0.2055/ -0.0092 
(0.3452/0.2695) 
-3.7219* 
 
-0.8077 
 
2.8331* 
Canada/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
 
Period 3/Period 4 
 
 
0.0065/ -0.1398 
(0.3425/0.3335) 
-0.1398/ 0.0794 
(0.3335/0.3868) 
0.0794/ 0.0696 
(0.3868/0.3041) 
 
2.8582* 
 
-2.3741* 
 
0.1172 
0.0041/ -0.1464 
(0.3757/0.3477) 
-0.1464/ 0.0633 
(0.3477/0.4817) 
0.0633/ 0.0564 
(0.4817/0.3096) 
2.7871* 
 
-1.8926 
 
0.0668 
Canada/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
 
Period 3/Period 4 
 
 
0.1121/ -0.1031 
(0.3804/0.1601) 
-0.1031/ -0.1055 
(0.1601/0.4108) 
-0.1055/ 0.0071 
(0.4108/0.3748) 
 
3.5787* 
 
0.0351 
 
-2.1072* 
0.1223/ -0.1034 
(0.4071/0.1743) 
-0.1034/ -0.1097 
(0.1743/0.4473) 
-0.1097/ 0.0049 
(0.4473/0.3882) 
3.4572* 
 
0.0822 
 
-2.0289* 
Chile/Hongkong Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.3219/0.6102 
(0.2479/0.0737) 
0.6102/-0.1983 
(0.0737/0.4032) 
 
-5.1483* 
 
13.1995* 
0.0529/0.1282 
(0.1468/0.2761) 
0.1282/-0.0455 
(0.2761/0.2172) 
-1.3852 
 
3.1805* 
Chile/Indonesia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
 
Period 3/Period 4 
 
 
-0.0513/ -0.2062 
(0.1761/0.0153) 
-0.2062/ 0.0951 
(0.0153/0.4045) 
0.0951/ 0.1241 
(0.4045/0.0191) 
 
4.7102* 
 
-5.4318* 
 
-0.5221 
-0.0061/ -0.1053 
(0.0854/0.1229) 
-0.1053/ 0.0345 
(0.1229/0.2708) 
0.0345/ 0.0071 
(0.2708/0.0324) 
2.6437* 
 
-3.2209* 
 
1.2071 
Chile/Japan Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
-0.0813/-0.1593 
(0.3481/0.0165) 
-0.1593/0.2041 
(0.0165/0.1988) 
 
1.2993 
 
-12.7986* 
-0.0128/-0.0167 
(0.1504/0.0504) 
-0.0167/0.0541 
(0.0504/0.1484) 
0.2569 
 
-4.8298* 
Chile/Malaysia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0/0 
(0/0) 
0/0 
(0/0) 
 
NA 
 
NA 
0/0 
(0/0) 
0/0 
(0/0) 
NA 
 
NA 
145 
 
Chile/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
-0.1972/0 
(0.4004/0) 
0/0 
(0/0) 
 
-2.9146* 
 
NA 
-0.0305/0 
(0.1716/0) 
0/0 
(0/0) 
-2.6812* 
 
NA 
Chile/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.0552/0.2604 
(0.3616/0.0921) 
0.2604/0.0736 
(0.0921/0.3077) 
 
-2.6375* 
 
3.2777* 
0.0145/0.0367 
(0.1753/0.1059) 
0.0367/0.0184 
(0.1059/0.1659) 
-1.0533 
 
0.9475 
Hongkong/Indonesia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
 
Period 3/Period 4 
 
 
0.0534/ -0.0965 
(0.3752/0.3171) 
-0.0965/ 0.2021 
(0.3171/0.3959) 
0.2021/ -0.0694 
(0.3959/0.3361) 
 
1.8429 
 
-3.5853* 
 
6.3953* 
0.0465/ -0.0846 
(0.4211/0.3438) 
-0.0846/ 0.2316 
(0.3438/0.4331) 
0.2316/ -0.0849 
(0.4331/0.3794) 
1.4422 
 
-3.4102* 
 
6.7237* 
Hongkong/Japan Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.0311/0.1373 
(0.3871/0.5559) 
0.1373/0.0843 
(0.5559/0.3782) 
 
-1.2412 
 
0.6283 
0.0321/0.1461 
(0.4298/0.5706) 
0.1461/0.0915 
(0.5706/0.4263) 
-1.2856 
 
0.6261 
Hongkong/Malaysia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0/-0.0441 
(0/0.1339) 
-0.0441/-0.0028 
(0.1339/0.1202) 
 
3.2404* 
 
-2.5993* 
0/-0.0474 
(0/0.1481) 
-0.0474/-0.0036 
(0.1481/0.1395) 
3.1592* 
 
-2.4718* 
Hongkong/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.0282/0.1312 
(0.3866/0.4199) 
0.1312/0.0203 
(0.4199/0.3478) 
 
-1.6021 
 
1.7881 
0.0372/0.1286 
(0.4294/0.4428) 
0.1286/0.0174 
(0.4428/0.3852) 
-1.3338 
 
1.6885 
Hongkong/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
-0.0252/0.0041 
(0.3431/0.2474) 
0.0041/0.0244 
(0.2474/0.4156) 
 
-0.4013 
 
-0.2814 
-0.0336/0.0022 
(0.3975/0.2658) 
0.0022/0.0309 
(0.2658/0.4577) 
-0.4525 
 
-0.3682 
Indonesia/Japan Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
 
Period 3/Period 4 
 
 
0.0116/ -0.0844 
(0.4659/0.2021) 
-0.0844/ 0.1038 
(0.2021/0.2399) 
0.1038/ 0.1066 
(0.2399/0.3402) 
 
2.0504* 
 
-4.4071* 
 
-0.0775 
0.0071/ -0.0938 
(0.4698/0.2277) 
-0.0938/ 0.1209 
(0.2277/0.2909) 
0.1209/ 0.1188 
(0.2909/0.3781) 
1.9256 
 
-4.3718* 
 
0.0502 
Indonesia/Malaysia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
 
Period 3/Period 4 
 
 
0/ 0.0359 
(0/0.1467) 
0.0359/ -0.0461 
(0.1467/0.3669) 
-0.0461/ -0.0628 
(0.3669/0.1889) 
 
-2.1921* 
 
1.7974 
 
0.3674 
0/ 0.0456 
(0/0.1792) 
0.0456/ -0.0396 
(0.1792/0.3764) 
-0.0396/ -0.0732 
(0.3764/0.2107) 
-2.2781* 
 
1.7729 
 
0.7124 
Indonesia/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
 
Period 3/Period 4 
 
 
0.0681/ 0.0814 
(0.4314/0.3425) 
0.0814/ 0.1781 
(0.3425/0.3763) 
0.1781/ 0.0736 
(0.3763/0.3171) 
 
-0.2052 
 
-1.4351 
 
2.4049* 
0.0711/ 0.0871 
(0.4598/0.3705) 
0.0871/ 0.2005 
(0.3705/0.4092) 
0.2005/ 0.0785 
(0.4092/0.3435) 
-0.2275 
 
-1.5533 
 
2.5858* 
Indonesia/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
 
Period 3/Period 4 
 
 
0.0034/ -0.1993 
(0.4561/0.4222) 
-0.1993/ -0.1481 
(0.4222/0.4089) 
-0.1481/ 0.0492 
(0.4089/0.4186) 
 
2.3806* 
 
-0.6021 
 
-4.1124* 
-0.0018/ -0.3184 
(0.4598/0.3705) 
-0.3184/ -0.1593 
(0.3705/0.4092) 
-0.1593/ 0.0576 
(0.4092/0.3435) 
2.6601* 
 
-1.3351 
 
-4.1185* 
Japan/Malaysia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
-0.0121/-0.0016 
(0.0897/0.2689) 
-0.0016/-0.0414 
-0.2706 
 
0.9654 
-0.0117/0.0118 
(0.0866/0.3034) 
0.0118/-0.0466 
-0.5448 
 
1.2668 
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(0.2689/0.2344) 
 
(0.3034/0.2511) 
Japan/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
0.0829/0.1091 
(0.4971/0.4717) 
 
-0.5976 
 
0.0755/0.1167 
(0.4827/0.4866)  
-0.9577 
Japan/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.1023/0.0871 
(0.4288/0.3926) 
0.0871/-0.0375 
(0.3926/0.3631) 
 
0.2495 
 
2.1321* 
0.1035/0.0886 
(0.4618/0.4296) 
0.0886/-0.0338 
(0.4296/0.4905) 
0.2277 
 
1.9302 
Malaysia/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
-0.6576/0.4948 
(0.3426/0.4884) 
0.4948/-0.0951 
(0.4884/0.2826) 
 
-6.9953* 
 
5.4775* 
-0.0188/0.2553 
(0.3227/0.3269) 
0.2553/-0.0304 
(0.3269/0.3983) 
-4.2483* 
 
4.3915* 
Malaysia/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
0.0073/-0.0952 
(0.3306/0.4081) 
 
1.3028 
 
0.0041/-0.0306 
(0.1949/0.2359)  
1.4136 
Mexico/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
-0.1294/-0.0959 
(04637/0.3819) 
-0.0959/0.1425 
(0.3819/0.3875) 
 
-0.5543 
 
-4.3241* 
-0.1292/-0.0899 
(0.4824/0.4059) 
-0.0899/0.1311 
(0.4059/0.4012) 
-0.6356 
 
-3.9167* 
*: significant at 5% level 
 
Factors related to interest rate are more complicated than those related to exchange rate. 
First of all, there are more detected breakpoints, and hence more transmission periods. 
There are 91 transmission periods in our interest rate case. Second, a smaller proportion 
of transmission periods is identified as contagion (60.4% in conditional correlation and 
51.6% in unconditional correlation). The cases in which conditional correlation and 
unconditional correlation are not consistent with each other include Argentina/Canada, 
Argentina/Japan, Argentina/Philippines, Canada/Hong Kong, Canada/Mexico, 
Chile/Hong Kong, Chile/Philippines, Indonesia/Japan and Japan/Philippines. In the 
above cases, nearly all of the unconditional correlations, with the exception of 
Argentina/Canada, suggest no contagion effect when the two kinds of correlations are 
not consistent with each other. The country involved contains different features, which 
may come from different regions or the same region. They may have a very low degree 
of dependence or a high degree of dependence. This finding again suggests that region 
and trade are not very strong criteria for contagion. The main factor giving rise to 
breakpoints and thus leading to contagion is global crisis. Indeed, considering the fact 
that the correlations are more stable after they are adjusted for heteroscedasticity, we 
can conclude that although the co-movement between countries may seem much more 
volatile during shocks, this may simply be due to proportional changes. The underlying 
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correlations could be quite stable and do not experience significant changes. Although 
there are many more transmission periods in interest rate than exchange rate (65 versus 
91), we do not observe an identical proportion increase in the number of counter 
contagion effects. There are only 33 counter contagion effects. We find only one 
combination which does not exhibit counter contagion effect in exchange rate, while we 
have 8 in interest rate: Canada/Chile, Chile/Japan, Chile/Malaysia, Chile/Mexico, 
Indonesia/Japan, Indonesia/Malaysia, Japan/Philippines and Malaysia/Mexico. It seems 
that the interest rate correlation does not recover as well as the exchange rate. Indeed, 
we find 22 changes in direction across all 33 transmission periods, a significant increase 
compared to the exchange rate (66.7% versus 25%). Among the two ways in which 
correlation recovers, the interest rate correlations tend to reach new equilibriums rather 
than gradually returning to their original level. As for the absolute values, it is very hard 
to find a pattern for the changes compared to the exchange rate. This may be because 
the interbank rates we used are less regulated by the government than exchange rate. 
The demand and supply of the market constantly changes, as do the interbank rates.  
 
Table 88: Correlation Results of Stock 
 Time Periods Conditional T-Statistics Unconditional T-Statistics 
Stock 
Argentina/Canada Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.6637/ 0.7883 
(0.2787/0.1944) 
0.7883/ 0.6917 
(0.1944/0.2345) 
 
-2.4435* 
 
1.9655 
0.6919/ 0.8008 
(0.2753/0.1597) 
0.8008/ 0.7203 
(0.1597/0.2317) 
 
-2.5167* 
 
1.9591 
Argentina/Chile Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.4982/ 0.8408 
(0.3516/0.1929) 
0.8408/ 0.5581 
(0.1929/0.2902) 
 
-7.8016* 
 
6.9996* 
0.5276/ 0.8573 
(0.3577/0.1597) 
0.8573/ 0.5911 
(0.1597/0.2974) 
 
-8.4146* 
 
7.5946* 
Argentina/Hongkong Period 1/Period 2 
 
0.2241/0.3068 
(0.3843/0.3929) 
 
-2.3728* 
 
0.2431/ 0.3231 
(0.4085/0.4182)  
-2.1532* 
 
Argentina/Indonesia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.3045/ 0.5701 
(0.4292/0.2418) 
0.5701/ 0.3027 
(0.2418/0.3747) 
 
-4.1255* 
 
4.3708* 
0.3363/0.5991 
(0.4544/0.2329) 
0.5991/ 0.3237 
(0.2329/0.4007) 
-4.1422* 
 
4.6055* 
Argentina/Japan Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.0422/ 0.1369 
(0.4027/0.4016) 
0.1369/ 0.0214 
(0.4016/0.4027) 
 
-1.8992 
 
2.3257* 
0.0422/0.1474 
(0.4328/0.4297) 
0.1474/ 0.0228 
(0.4297/0.4377) 
-1.9665 
 
2.3321* 
Argentina/Malaysia Period 1/Period 2 
 
0.1771/0.3692 
(0.3784/0.3734) 
 
-5.6706* 
 
0.1992/ 0.3942 
(0.4149/0.3931)  
-5.3203* 
 
Argentina/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
0.5761/0.7046 
(0.2589/0.2838) 
-3.7387* 
 
0.6047/0.7298 
(0.2551/0.2752) 
-3.7309* 
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Period 2/Period 3 0.7046/ 0.6605 
(0.2838/0.2382) 
 
1.3155 0.7298/0.6947 
(0.2752/0.2352) 
 
1.0754 
Argentina/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
0.1423/0.1691 
(0.3754/0.4244) 
 
-0.7507 
 
0.1516/ 0.1788 
(0.4063/0.4562)  
-0.7064 
 
Canada/Chile Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.4589/0.5557 
(0.3781/0.1017) 
0.5557/ 0.6068 
(0.1017/0.2805) 
 
-2.3661* 
 
-1.4064 
0.4848/0.5933 
(0.3954/0.1109) 
0.5933/0.6391 
(0.1109/0.2831) 
 
-2.4672* 
 
-1.1738 
Canada/Hongkong Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.2318/0.4362 
(0.3735/0.2907) 
0.4362/ 0.3948 
(0.2907/0.3565) 
 
-2.7202* 
 
0.5629 
0.2525/0.4657 
(0.3948/0.3052) 
0.4657/0.4213 
(0.3052/0.3759) 
 
-2.6998* 
 
0.5758 
Canada/Indonesia Period 1/Period 2 
 
0.2691/0.2809 
(0.3831/0.3393) 
 
-0.3613 
 
0.2891/ 0.3029 
(0.4201/0.3687)  
-0.3886 
 
Canada/Japan Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.2021/0.0181 
(0.3731/0.3626) 
0.0181/0.0764 
(0.3626/0.3693) 
 
3.8103* 
 
-1.2024 
0.2128/0.0249 
(0.3947/0.3952) 
0.0249/0.0803 
(0.3952/0.4005) 
3.5982* 
 
-1.0498 
Canada/Malaysia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.1934/0.3125 
(0.3874/0.1833) 
0.3125/0.3949 
(0.1833/0.3183) 
 
-2.1877* 
 
-1.6182 
0.2192/0.3495 
(0.4235/0.2111) 
0.3495/0.4274 
(0.2111/0.3362) 
-2.1036* 
 
-1.3448 
Canada/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.5325/0.7077 
(0.3642/0.3518) 
0.7077/0.7757 
(0.3518/0.1683) 
 
-3.7668* 
 
-1.6183 
0.5576/0.7411 
(0.3536/0.3538) 
0.7411/0.8073 
(0.3538/0.1541) 
-3.9056* 
 
-1.5799 
Canada/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.1615/0.3113 
(0.3311/0.3308) 
0.3113/0.2058 
(0.3308/0.3522) 
 
-1.7945 
 
1.2734 
0.1771/0.3553 
(0.3635/0.3562) 
0.3553/0.2206 
(0.3562/0.3763) 
-1.9796 
 
1.5103 
Chile/Hongkong Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.2208/0.2796 
(0.4077/0.2587) 
0.2796/0.3177 
(0.2587/0.3718) 
 
-1.0404 
 
-0.7086 
0.2364/0.3001 
(0.4348/0.2896) 
0.3001/0.3371 
(0.2896/0.3971) 
-1.0172 
 
-0.6207 
Chile/Indonesia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.2125/0.4327 
(0.4258/0.2311) 
0.4327/0.2676 
(0.2311/0.3787) 
 
-2.6812* 
 
2.0555 
0.2266/0.4722 
(0.4603/0.2439) 
0.4722/0.2868 
(0.2439/0.4085) 
-2.8266* 
 
2.1833 
Chile/Japan Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.0553/-0.0129 
(0.4069/0.3478) 
-0.0129/-0.0292 
(0.3478/0.4419) 
 
1.3562 
 
0.3092 
0.0599/-0.0109 
(0.4394/0.3536) 
-0.0109/-0.0336 
(0.3536/0.4733) 
1.2782 
 
0.3942 
Chile/Malaysia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.2236/0.4389 
(0.4195/0.1958) 
0.4389/0.3318 
(0.1958/0.3661) 
 
-4.4699* 
 
2.4204* 
0.2449/0.4732 
(0.4533/0.2056) 
0.4732/0.3557 
(0.2056/0.3833) 
-4.4657* 
 
2.5229* 
Chile/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.5815/0.5119 
(0.2953/0.2654) 
0.5119/0.6145 
(0.2654/0.2678) 
 
1.8239 
 
-2.7208* 
0.6082/0.5415 
(0.3008/0.2844) 
0.5415/0.6501 
(0.2844/0.2711) 
1.6524 
 
-2.7202* 
Chile/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.1452/0.3823 
(0.4235/0.1401) 
0.3823/0.1391 
(0.1401/0.4276) 
-5.3847* 
 
5.5957* 
0.1578/0.4262 
(0.4007/0.1995) 
0.4262/0.1501 
(0.1995/0.4483) 
-5.7192* 
 
5.9609* 
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Hongkong/Indonesia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.4622/0.5501 
(0.3994/0.1555) 
0.5501/0.5868 
(0.1555/0.3567) 
 
-2.3214* 
 
-1.1863 
0.4903/0.5907 
(0.4007/0.1104) 
0.5907/0.6212 
(0.1104/0.2518) 
-2.6287* 
 
-1.0201 
Hongkong/Japan Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.5433/0.4717 
(0.3825/0.2434) 
0.4717/0.4503 
(0.2434/0.4328) 
 
1.6899 
 
0.5134 
0.5703/0.4962 
(0.2971/0.3789) 
0.4962/0.4796 
(0.3789/0.2893) 
1.6823 
 
0.3801 
Hongkong/Malaysia Period 1/Period 2 
 
0.4694/0.6065 
(0.3462/0.2686) 
 
-4.7944* 
 
0.5026/0.6411 
(0.3647/0.2719)  
-4.6501* 
 
Hongkong/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.1689/0.3459 
(0.3695/0.3775) 
0.3459/0.4324 
(0.3775/0.3255) 
 
-3.7068* 
 
-1.9268 
0.1789/0.3769 
(0.4253/0.4011) 
0.3769/0.4608 
(0.4011/0.3435) 
-3.8892* 
 
-1.7632 
Hongkong/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
0.4365/0.4831 
(0.3006/0.3561) 
 
-1.5944* 
 
0.4735/0.5049 
(0.3198/0.3785)  
-1.0132* 
 
Indonesia/Japan Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.4064/0.3983 
(0.4154/0.4133) 
0.3983/0.2906 
(0.4133/0.3745) 
 
0.1883 
 
2.7769* 
0.4252/0.4302 
(0.4336/0.2998) 
0.4302/0.3131 
(0.2998/0.3311) 
-0.1111 
 
2.8403* 
Indonesia/Malaysia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.4459/0.8056 
(0.4084/0.1247) 
0.8056/0.5681 
(0.1247/0.3037) 
 
-8.5392* 
 
6.6093* 
0.4702/0.8403 
(0.4292/0.1025) 
0.8403/0.5992 
(0.1025/0.3115) 
-9.4247* 
 
7.6499* 
Indonesia/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.2527/0.2626 
(0.4077/0.3471) 
0.2626/0.3232 
(0.3471/0.3344) 
 
-0.2053 
 
-1.3112 
0.2694/0.2824 
(0.4293/0.3747) 
0.2824/0.3505 
(0.3747/0.3556) 
-0.2501 
 
-1.3713 
Indonesia/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.3541/0.8784 
(0.3723/0.3958) 
0.8784/0.4481 
(0.3958/0.3538) 
 
-8.8638* 
 
7.5436* 
0.3761/0.9113 
(0.3925/0.1764) 
0.9113/0.4691 
(0.1764/0.3697) 
-10.7546* 
 
9.4205* 
Japan/Malaysia Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.3675/0.3109 
(0.3723/0.3958) 
0.3109/0.3041 
(0.3958/0.3538) 
 
1.3544 
 
0.1702 
0.4008/0.3402 
(0.4978/0.4842) 
0.3402/0.3326 
(0.4842/0.4242) 
1.3573 
 
0.1762 
Japan/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
-0.0444/0.0397 
(0.3676/0.3376) 
 
-2.6821* 
 
-0.0461/0.0437 
(0.4028/0.3701)  
-2.6092* 
 
Japan/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.3889/0.3953 
(0.3562/0.4181) 
0.3953/0.3331 
(0.4181/0.3384) 
 
-0.1305 
 
1.2776 
0.4201/0.4163 
(0.3776/0.4508) 
0.4163/0.3557 
(0.4508/0.3549) 
0.0703 
 
1.1584 
Malaysia/Mexico Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.1497/0.3645 
(0.4066/0.3471) 
0.3645/0.4456 
(0.3471/0.3661) 
 
-4.6832* 
 
-1.8386 
0.1567/0.3881 
(0.4348/0.3702) 
0.3881/0.4741 
(0.3702/0.3837) 
-4.7231* 
 
-1.8381 
Malaysia/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
0.4616/0.4896 
(0.3582/0.3324) 
 
-0.8911 
 
0.4931/0.5148 
(0.3746/0.3467)  
-0.6612 
 
Mexico/Philippines Period 1/Period 2 
 
Period 2/Period 3 
0.1452/0.3192 
(0.3398/0.2891) 
0.3192/0.1608 
(0.2891/0.4511) 
 
-4.5702* 
 
3.6833* 
0.1611/0.3506 
(0.3727/0.3096) 
0.3506/0.1722 
(0.3096/0.4762) 
-4.6052* 
 
3.9046* 
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*: significant at 5% level 
 
The stock market is more stable than the exchange rate and interest rate market. Among 
all the 64 transmission periods, both conditional and unconditional correlation identified 
33 contagions. In this case, the conditional and unconditional correlations are 
completely consistent with each other. Adjusting for heteroscedasticity only slightly 
changed the magnitude but not the significance of the t-statistics. Although region does 
not play an important role in the identification of contagion, we notice that the effect of 
trade begins to emerge. Only 1 of the top 4 combinations with the highest degree of 
dependence experience contagion: Indonesia/Japan in Period 2/Period 3. The other 3 
combinations, Hong Kong/Japan, Japan/Malaysia and Japan/Philippines are all quite 
stable. Shockingly, the global financial crisis was strong enough to create a structural 
change in Indonesia, although the trade links among these countries coordinated their 
movements and contagion did not occur. Among these four combinations, 
Indonesia/Japan has the lowest degree of dependence. Thus, after Japan’s Economics 
Minister stated that Japan was facing its worst economic crisis since World War II in 
February 2009, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Philippines remained unaffected while 
Indonesia suffered a contagion. While Indonesia does have a strong trade link with 
Japan, it is not strong enough to endure such a fluctuation. We observe 16 counter 
contagion effects, a lot less than the 28 counter contagion effects we find in exchange 
rate, even when our stock case and exchange rate case have almost the same number of 
transmission periods (64 versus 65). Only 1 of the 16 counter contagion effects 
experienced a change in direction: Chile/Japan. Their correlation changes from a weak 
positive one to an even weaker negative one after the shock in December 2008. Judging 
from the timeline of these two countries, the global financial crisis seems to be the only 
reason for this change. It seems that the stock market correlations tend to gradually 
return to their original level after shocks, instead of shaping into new equilibriums. 
Most of the counter contagion effect experienced an increase in the magnitude of the 
correlation, followed by a decrease to their original level, although there are 3 
exceptions: Canada/Japan, Chile/Japan, and Chile/Mexico. However, the reason why 
Japan is amongst these exceptions may stem from the reduction in foreign trade with 
Chile and Canada during the crisis. The cause of the declining correlation between Chile 
and Mexico may be the energy reforms carried out in Mexico at the end of 2008. 
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Compared to the study by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), the big difference is that we 
detected a massive amount of contagion effects using the same conditional and 
unconditional correlation methods. This result shows the importance of the proper 
breakpoint test, which has proven to have a significant impact on the identification of 
contagion. Better than assigning a known date as the structural change, a suitable 
breakpoint test is much more appropriate. Indeed, we do not reach the conclusion that 
the unconditional correlation is substantially smaller than the conditional correlation in 
each sample either. We observe that the absolute values follow no pattern when it comes 
to this matter. We do notice that the number of contagion effects detected by the 
unconditional correlation is usually slightly lower than the conditional correlation. In 
our case, the exchange rate market and interest rate market both find less contagion 
effects in the unconditional correlation while they are equal to each other in the stock 
market. The stock market has the lowest proportion of contagion compared to the other 
markets. It seems that although contagion is transferred through the stock market, 
interest rate and exchange rate markets are much more important transmission channels. 
The counter contagion effects were most stable and predictable in the exchange rate 
market, followed by the stock market. The correlation, both conditional and 
unconditional, normally increases first before declining to its original level. The interest 
rate market was the most volatile, while there was no pattern in terms of how the 
correlation changes. However, because of the interbank rate we used, the interest rate 
cases reflect the demand and supply of the market better. Moreover, we can see that they 
continued to change constantly. Since the interbank rate data is the least regulated 
among all 3 markets, we can see that government regulations tend to make the change in 
market return more stable and predictable. 
7.5 Identification through Heteroscedasticity 
We must now examine the split elements and attempt to answer the second question by 
establishing the degree to which each split elements contribute to the overall 
movements. 
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7.5.1 Quantifying the Shock 
Table 89 summarises the specifications of the forecasting models. 
 
Table 89: Forecasting Models Specifications 
 
1p  2p  3p  1q  2q  3q  d  
Exchange Rate 
Argentina 0.6147 
(0.0035) 
-0.9986 
(0.0032) 
 -0.6069 
(0.0080) 
0.9825 
(0.0235) 
 -0.0057 
(0.0025) 
Canada  0.8936 
(0.0802) 
  -0.8388 
(0.0969) 
  
Chile  -0.1232 
(0.0445) 
    0.0608 
(0.0364) 
Hong Kong   -0.5997 
(0.2919) 
  0.6601 
(0.2741) 
 
Indonesia  -0.0880 
(0.0448) 
     
Japan   -0.7202 
(0.1937) 
  0.7921 
(0.1769) 
 
Malaysia  -0.1423 
(0.0408) 
     
Mexico   0.0926 
(0.0444) 
   -0.0450 
(0.0369) 
Philippines 0.6813 
(0.1143) 
  -0.8370 
(0.0659) 
  0.2563 
(0.1140) 
Interest Rate 
Argentina   -0.1295 
(0.0258) 
    
Canada -0.6349 
(0.1997) 
  0.7175 
(0.1731) 
  0.2035 
(0.0421) 
Chile  0.6657 
(0.1206) 
  -0.7668 
(0.1047) 
 -0.0979 
(0.0335) 
Hong Kong   -0.5352 
(0.1715) 
  0.3989 
(0.1852) 
0.0867 
(0.0365) 
Indonesia  -0.0964 
(0.0485) 
    0.0834 
(0.0280) 
Japan      0.2148 
(0.0320) 
 
Malaysia   0.0786 
(0.0237) 
    
Mexico  0.9504 
(0.0129) 
  -0.9861 
(0.0053) 
  
Philippines 0.6274 
(0.1236) 
  -0.3366 
(0.0958) 
  -0.1989 
(0.1116) 
Stock 
Argentina       -0.0015 
(0.0360) 
Canada   -0.0706 
(0.0374) 
    
Chile   -0.1155 
(0.0441) 
   0.1141 
(0.0365) 
Hong Kong  -0.1721 
(0.0482) 
    0.0612 
(0.0369) 
Indonesia  0.5973 
(0.2614) 
  -0.6903 
(0.2380) 
 0.0636 
(0.0338) 
Japan 0.4309 
(0.0578) 
0.4418 
(0.0801) 
-0.8548 
(0.0818) 
-0.3986 
(0.0485) 
-0.4610 
(0.0655) 
0.9325 
(0.0797) 
-0.1068 
(0.0515) 
Malaysia -0.2821 
(0.1130) 
  0.4828 
(0.1053) 
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Mexico -0.4462 
(0.1856) 
  0.5718 
(0.1705) 
   
Philippines 0.5288 
(0.3469) 
  -0.4742 
(0.3666) 
   
The statistics inside the ( ) are Std.Error and all coefficients are significant at 5% level. 
 
We can see that there are only 8 long memory processes in the above table. Chile and 
Philippines in the exchange rate market, Canada, Hong Kong and Indonesia in the 
interest rate market, and Chile, Hong Kong and Indonesia in the stock market. The other 
19 are all short memory processes, and as such are very sensitive to the models we use. 
We observe no correlation between long/short memory feature and region. Both 
American and Asian countries experience both of the features. Since we are using our 
most appropriate procedure, the estimation will not be affected. Moreover, because most 
of the data are short memory processes, we do not expect the shock to have a persistent 
effect. We then examine the forecast plots. 
 
Figure 15: Forecasting Plots 
Exchange Rate Forecast 
 
Interest Rate Forecast 
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Stock Forecast 
 
 
After taking a quick glance at the plots, we see that the forecast results are just as bad as 
usual for all countries. This is not affected by the different trade links and regions. We 
then proceed to the formal tests to see if they confirm our observations. 
 
Table 90: ME, MAE, MSE, MPE and MAPE for Forecasting Models 
 ME
 
MAE
 
MSE
 
MPE
 
MAPE
 
Exchange Rate 
Argentina 0.0011 0.0094 0.0002 -0.8482 0.8680 
Canada 0.0001 0.0076 0.0001 -0.9627 0.9627 
Chile 0.0297 3.6333 28.7429 -0.9545 0.9545 
Hong Kong -0.0001 0.0011 5.01E-06 -0.8633 0.8633 
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Indonesia 0.0602 56.6628 18.0020 -0.9087 0.9087 
Japan -0.0404 0.6700 0.8436 -0.9389 0.9392 
Malaysia 0.0002 0.0106 0.0002 -0.9220 0.9220 
Mexico 0.0041 0.0819 0.0171 -0.9594 0.9594 
Philippines 0.0233 0.1510 0.0385 -1.1483 1.1791 
Interest Rate 
Argentina -0.0037 0.1125 0.0524 -0.5343 0.5343 
Canada -0.0075 0.0198 0.0018 -0.6358 0.6361 
Chile -0.0008 0.0016 0.0001 -0.0304 0.0304 
Hong Kong -0.0055 0.0360 0.0066 -0.8633 0.8633 
Indonesia -0.0006 0.0413 0.0076 -0.7854 0.8753 
Japan -0.0011 0.0019 4.2E-05 -0.6079 0.6079 
Malaysia -0.0028 0.0035 0.0018 -0.0383 0.0383 
Mexico -0.0053 0.0147 0.0033 -0.1688 0.1688 
Philippines -0.0030 0.0899 0.0243 -0.7743 0.7743 
Stock 
Argentina -0.1407 7.6926 119.2974 -0.9904 0.9904 
Canada -5.3224 172.2697 545.8089 -0.9919 0.9919 
Chile 0.0069 0.2878 0.1667 -0.9643 0.9766 
Hong Kong -1.6450 44.0069 3641.325 -0.8633 0.8633 
Indonesia -7.1E-05 0.0031 2.03E-05 -0.8180 0.8180 
Japan -0.0075 0.15007 0.0402 -0.9771 0.9771 
Malaysia -0.1187 2.9600 19.1773 -0.9559 0.9559 
Mexico -0.3275 34.8888 2324.409 -0.9908 0.9908 
Philippines -0.0417 0.7220 1.0323 -0.9366 0.9366 
 
The conclusion at which we arrive is identical to that mentioned in the last two chapters. 
The formal tests of accuracy again confirmed what we observed. The MPE and MAPE 
tests suggest very high percentage errors. With this said however, there are certain 
exceptions in the interest rate market, for instance, Chile. This is because the data itself 
is mostly constant. Again, we see from the forecast results that it doesn’t matter what 
kind of trade links countries have. When shock occurs, it can bring the same changes to 
all kinds of countries.  
 
The results of the Bai-Perron breakpoint test were presented in the last section, and thus 
we now proceed to the identification of contagion. 
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7.5.2 The Identification of Contagion 
Tables 91 to 96 provide the result of ‘Identification through Heteroscedasticity’. We will 
first examine what is happening in the split details and attempt to establish how each 
element affects the overall movement.  
Table 91: Identification of Exchange Rate (idiosyncratic shock) 
Argentina Canada 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
-0.9332 
(0.6383) 
* *
1 2   
2.3076 
(0.3903) 
T-stat 
42.1079* 
1 2/   
2.3076 
(0.3903) 
* *
1 2   
2.23E-5 
(512.7169) 
T-stat 
-0.1982 
Argentina Chile 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
0.0058 
(0.0003) 
* *
1 2   
0.0032 
(0.0003) 
T-stat 
16.5027* 
1 2/   
0.0032 
(0.0003) 
* *
1 2   
54.8699 
(35.7371) 
T-stat 
2.3748* 
Argentina Hong Kong 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
-3.05E-4 
(52.0672) 
* *
1 2   
-2.98E-4 
(0.0739) 
T-stat 
-0.0253 
1 2/   
-2.98E-4 
(0.0739) 
* *
1 2   
239.6229 
(11.0954) 
T-stat 
-54.0472* 
Argentina Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
-1.1879 
(0.3998) 
* *
1 2   
5.2601 
(0.5258) 
T-stat 
-43.5415* 
1 2/   
5.2601 
(0.5258) 
* *
1 2   
2.91e-5 
(19.9351) 
T-stat 
-0.7399 
Argentina Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
0.0967 
(0.0501) 
* *
1 2   
0.0942 
(0.0102) 
T-stat 
1.9952* 
1 2/   
0.0942 
(0.0102) 
* *
1 2   
1921.4159 
(72.1946) 
T-stat 
-10.4446* 
Argentina Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
0.6397 
(0.4511) 
* *
1 2   
2.0209 
(0.3571) 
T-stat 
14.7706* 
1 2/   
2.0209 
(0.3571) 
* *
1 2   
1.12e-5 
(118.1782) 
T-stat 
1.1238 
Argentina Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
0.4567 
(25.1111) 
* *
1 2   
0.1266 
(0.0138) 
T-stat 
-0.9741 
1 2/   
0.1266 
(0.0138) 
* *
1 2   
1.14E4 
(864.2754) 
T-stat 
-12.9388* 
Argentina Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
0.1463 
(0.0912) 
* *
1 2   
0.1209 
(0.0414) 
T-stat 
12.7901* 
1 2/   
0.1209 
(0.0414) 
* *
1 2   
-7136 
(307.2706) 
T-stat 
11.8418* 
Canada Chile 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
0.0017 
(0.0095) 
* *
1 2   
0.0033 
(0.0102) 
T-stat 
-1.0632 
1 2/   
 
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Canada Hong Kong 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
9.95E-6 
(0.0003) 
* *
1 2   
134.7279 
(3.8564) 
T-stat 
-62.2579* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Canada Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
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2.1396 
(0.6949) 
11.9129 
(0.9742) 
-29.2923* 11.9129 
(0.9742) 
5.88E-5 
(118.7632) 
-0.3183 
Canada Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
0.0709 
(0.4013) 
* *
1 2   
0.0852 
(0.3924) 
T-stat 
0.1837 
1 2/   
0.0852 
(0.3924) 
* *
1 2   
-6628.7278 
(39.8193) 
T-stat 
166.5272* 
Canada Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
32.4991 
(3.6532) 
* *
1 2   
9.3977 
(2.7020) 
T-stat 
5.0839* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Canada Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
0.6903 
(0.0920) 
* *
1 2   
0.2156 
(0.0719) 
T-stat 
4.0629* 
1 2/   
0.2156 
(0.0719) 
* *
1 2   
10719 
(55.9374) 
T-stat 
-191.624* 
Canada Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
6.6509 
(1.0413) 
* *
1 2   
2.0614 
(0.5292) 
T-stat 
3.9288* 
1 2/   
2.0614 
(0.5292) 
* *
1 2   
2.9341 
(5.2752) 
T-stat 
-0.1646 
Chile Hong Kong 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
-0.0925 
(0.0012) 
* *
1 2   
24066 
(75.6703) 
T-stat 
-318.0449* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Chile Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
1525.25 
(3.8257) 
* *
1 2   
-1495.98 
(2058.85) 
T-stat 
1.4674 
1 2/   
-1495.98 
(2058.85) 
* *
1 2   
423.3669 
(367.6969) 
T-stat 
0.1481 
Chile Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
5.7482 
(0.2101) 
* *
1 2   
14.4823 
(0.1072) 
T-stat 
-37.0241* 
1 2/   
14.4823 
(0.1072) 
* *
1 2   
1076.5 
(946.372) 
T-stat 
-1.1179 
Chile Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
233.396 
(2.1920) 
* *
1 2   
155.230 
(1.3003) 
T-stat 
30.6687* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Chile Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
28.7414 
(0.1778) 
* *
1 2   
29.6263 
(0.1274) 
T-stat 
-4.0442* 
1 2/   
29.6263 
(0.1274) 
* *
1 2   
4.9870 
(3.8011) 
T-stat 
6.3679* 
Chile Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
15.3938 
(0.1142) 
* *
1 2   
23.5230 
(0.0758) 
T-stat 
-59.2728* 
1 2/   
23.5230 
(0.0758) 
* *
1 2   
-60.2676 
(209.3011) 
T-stat 
0.4019 
Hong Kong Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
0.4478 
(0.2173) 
* *
1 2   
0.1326 
(0.0256) 
T-stat 
1.4404 
1 2/   
0.1326 
(0.0256) 
* *
1 2   
15.1909 
(10.0084) 
T-stat 
-1.5045 
Hong Kong Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
0.0625 
(0.0084) 
* *
1 2   
2.3469 
(1.6335) 
T-stat 
-1.3983 
1 2/   
2.3469 
(1.6335) 
* *
1 2   
0.2037 
(0.0384) 
T-stat 
3.2577* 
Hong Kong Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
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1 2/   
31.3225 
(3.6458) 
* *
1 2   
8.0265 
(2.4372) 
T-stat 
5.3121* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Hong Kong Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
13.8849 
(2.3720) 
* *
1 2   
4.5653 
(1.3556) 
T-stat 
3.4112* 
1 2/   
4.5653 
(1.3556) 
* *
1 2   
29.6562 
(22.3997) 
T-stat 
-1.1181 
Hong Kong Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
4.0286 
(0.6928) 
* *
1 2   
1.3010 
(0.3505) 
T-stat 
3.5127* 
1 2/   
1.3010 
(0.3505) 
* *
1 2   
1.8196 
(1.6211) 
T-stat 
-0.3127 
Indonesia Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
76.0006 
(1.1214) 
* *
1 2   
279.3618 
(4.1355) 
T-stat 
-47.4601* 
1 2/   
279.3618 
(4.1355) 
* *
1 2   
-24734 
(53982) 
T-stat 
0.4615 
Indonesia Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
-22417 
(5699.87) 
* *
1 2   
19257.22 
(30202) 
T-stat 
-1.3559 
1 2/   
19257.22 
(30202) 
* *
1 2   
-3548 
(5736) 
T-stat 
0.5000 
Indonesia Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
-197.0625 
(22.0482) 
* *
1 2   
777.611 
(225.79) 
T-stat 
-2.5589* 
1 2/   
777.611 
(225.79) 
* *
1 2   
41283 
(17707) 
T-stat 
-2.2873* 
Indonesia Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
488.1732 
(25.6557) 
* *
1 2   
629.8565 
(67.4689) 
T-stat 
-1.9628 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Japan Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
17.7534 
(0.3872) 
* *
1 2   
23.8307 
(0.4444) 
T-stat 
-10.3091* 
1 2/   
23.8307 
(0.4444) 
* *
1 2   
57466 
(30416) 
T-stat 
-1.8885 
Japan Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
1.4362 
(0.0528) 
* *
1 2   
-2567.26 
(651.772) 
T-stat 
3.9410* 
1 2/   
-2567.26 
(651.772) 
* *
1 2   
-160.178 
(96.9598) 
T-stat 
1.6457 
Japan Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
5.8331 
(0.3849) 
* *
1 2   
4.2348 
(0.2146) 
T-stat 
3.6264* 
1 2/   
4.2348 
(0.2146) 
* *
1 2   
1.8984 
(0.0578) 
T-stat 
10.5109* 
Malaysia Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
0.3384 
(0.0401) 
* *
1 2   
0.1661 
(0.0350) 
T-stat 
3.2316* 
1 2/   
0.1661 
(0.0350) 
* *
1 2   
-16483 
(28.2433) 
T-stat 
583.626* 
Malaysia Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
1.0215 
(0.1463) 
* *
1 2   
-0.6666 
(1.1560) 
T-stat 
1.4488 
1 2/   
-0.6666 
(1.1560) 
* *
1 2   
-4594.41 
(199.372) 
T-stat 
23.0406* 
Mexico Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/   
10.6744 
(1.5407) 
* *
1 2   
10.2380 
(1.4643) 
T-stat 
0.2053 
1 2/   
10.2380 
(1.4643) 
* *
1 2   
1.3274 
(0.0011) 
T-stat 
6.0851* 
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*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean 
but convergent values, standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
Table 92: Identification of Exchange Rate (Common Shock) 
Argentina Canada 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-4.1290 
(0.0003) 
* *
1 2c c   
4.1289 
(0.0004) 
T-stat 
-2.7950* 
1 2/c c   
4.1289 
(0.0004) 
* *
1 2c c   
-878.6307 
(8.0695) 
T-stat 
-0.7978 
Argentina Chile 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-0.0079 
(0.0007) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.0013 
(0.0003) 
T-stat 
-15.2050* 
1 2/c c   
0.0013 
(0.0003) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.1673 
(80.1427) 
T-stat 
6.1567 
Argentina Hong Kong 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-0.0079 
(0.0950) 
* *
1 2c c   
-1.16E-4 
(0.1962) 
T-stat 
10.3277* 
1 2/c c   
-1.16E-4 
(0.1962) 
* *
1 2c c   
1.58E-5 
(0.0023) 
T-stat 
-10.6125* 
Argentina Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-11.5567 
(0.0003) 
* *
1 2c c   
-11.5589 
(0.0004) 
T-stat 
7.2351 
1 2/c c   
-11.5589 
(0.0004) 
* *
1 2c c   
3.19e-6 
(0.0123) 
T-stat 
-3.2005* 
Argentina Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-0.0457 
(0.0035) 
* *
1 2c c   
-0.0458 
(0.0753) 
T-stat 
1.2484 
1 2/c c   
-0.0458 
(0.0753) 
* *
1 2c c   
1.8396 
(70.3571) 
T-stat 
-0.1913 
Argentina Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
5.9521 
(0.0003) 
* *
1 2c c   
5.9661 
(0.0171) 
T-stat 
0.6214 
1 2/c c   
5.9661 
(0.0171) 
* *
1 2c c   
125.5639 
(7.5198) 
T-stat 
-1.4725 
Argentina Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-0.0259 
(0.0023) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.0293 
(0.0012) 
T-stat 
-3.9133* 
1 2/c c   
0.0293 
(0.0012) 
* *
1 2c c   
8.2885 
(133.319) 
T-stat 
-0.6792 
Argentina Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-0.0412 
(0.0045) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.0410 
(0.0078) 
T-stat 
-3.8090* 
1 2/c c   
0.0410 
(0.0078) 
* *
1 2c c   
1.1674E-5 
(0.0105) 
T-stat 
-50.9887* 
Canada Chile 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
9.63E-4 
(0.0106) 
* *
1 2c c   
-0.0254 
(0.0290) 
T-stat 
0.3648 
1 2/c c   
 
* *
1 2c c   T-stat 
Canada Hong Kong 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-6.67E-5 
(0.0003) 
* *
1 2c c   
-627.1259 
(12.9453) 
T-stat 
-2.2128* 
1 2/c c   
* *
1 2c c   T-stat 
Canada Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-0.7998 
(0.0071) 
* *
1 2c c   
-10.2111 
(0.0260) 
T-stat 
-18.3488* 
1 2/c c   
-10.2111 
(0.0260) 
* *
1 2c c   
-1.01E-5 
(0.0040) 
T-stat 
5.2048* 
Canada Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-0.0591 
* *
1 2c c   
-0.0596 
T-stat 
2.4835* 
1 2/c c   
-0.0596 
* *
1 2c c   
0.0416 
T-stat 
15.2304* 
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(0.1365) (0.1089) (0.1089) (0.0035) 
Canada Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-0.1172 
(0.3505) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.1998 
(0.0517) 
T-stat 
-0.8948 
1 2/c c   
* *
1 2c c   T-stat 
Canada Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
0.0496 
(0.0015) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.0597 
(0.0012) 
T-stat 
-5.1770* 
1 2/c c   
0.0597 
(0.0012) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.0367 
(0.0022) 
T-stat 
9.0795* 
Canada Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
0.1022 
(0.0297) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.1027 
(0.0297) 
T-stat 
-0.0132 
1 2/c c   
0.1027 
(0.0297) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.9707 
(0.0020) 
T-stat 
-29.1107* 
Chile Hong Kong 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-0.0184 
(0.0007) 
* *
1 2c c   
-3.8189 
(3.8072) 
T-stat 
0.9982 
1 2/c c   
* *
1 2c c   T-stat 
Chile Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-184.6397 
(58.1117) 
* *
1 2c c   
-6822.06 
(4.3768) 
T-stat 
113.89* 
1 2/c c   
-6822.06 
(4.3768) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.0071 
(0.0087) 
T-stat 
-51.3113* 
Chile Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
53.4707 
(82.3499) 
* *
1 2c c   
-16.6232 
(42.6761) 
T-stat 
0.7557 
1 2/c c   
-16.6232 
(42.6761) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.2936 
(0.0207) 
T-stat 
-13.4504* 
Chile Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
697.728 
(14.6435) 
* *
1 2c c   
79.4394 
(1.1312) 
T-stat 
42.0972* 
1 2/c c   
* *
1 2c c   T-stat 
Chile Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-19.1911 
(41.5046) 
* *
1 2c c   
872.3983 
(325.747) 
T-stat 
-2.7151* 
1 2/c c   
872.3983 
(325.747) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.0015 
(0.0013) 
T-stat 
1.6664 
Chile Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
138.5716 
(65.1870) 
* *
1 2c c   
34.1970 
(18.4706) 
T-stat 
1.5405 
1 2/c c   
34.1970 
(18.4706) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.0016 
(0.0019) 
T-stat 
3.9868* 
Hong Kong Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
0.0511 
(0.0240) 
* *
1 2c c   
-0.0263 
(0.0167) 
T-stat 
2.6424* 
1 2/c c   
-0.0263 
(0.0167) 
* *
1 2c c   
15.4140 
(3.2973) 
T-stat 
-4.6826* 
Hong Kong Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
0.0378 
(0.0068) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.0233 
(0.0066) 
T-stat 
1.5314 
1 2/c c   
0.0233 
(0.0066) 
* *
1 2c c   
9712.62 
(7296.56) 
T-stat 
-1.3311 
Hong Kong Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
0.0125 
(0.0004) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.0029 
(0.0003) 
T-stat 
17.1204* 
1 2/c c   
* *
1 2c c   T-stat 
Hong Kong Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
161 
 
1 2/c c   
0.0716 
(0.0223) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.0723 
(0.0223) 
T-stat 
-0.0215 
1 2/c c   
0.0723 
(0.0223) 
* *
1 2c c   
304843 
(304843) 
T-stat 
-26.7169* 
Hong Kong Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
0.0609 
(0.0182) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.0581 
(0.0183) 
T-stat 
0.1087 
1 2/c c   
0.0581 
(0.0183) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.9994 
(0.000027) 
T-stat 
-51.3384* 
Indonesia Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-113.559 
(2.1520) 
* *
1 2c c   
839.257 
(30.7931) 
T-stat 
-30.8672* 
1 2/c c   
839.257 
(30.7931) 
* *
1 2c c   
-0.0222 
(0.0149) 
T-stat 
7.1425* 
Indonesia Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-17009 
(17135) 
* *
1 2c c   
37455 
(52.6731) 
T-stat 
-3.1785* 
1 2/c c   
37455 
(52.6731) 
* *
1 2c c   
-0.0293 
(0.0174) 
T-stat 
11.5132* 
Indonesia Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-1558.7 
(3482.57) 
* *
1 2c c   
-3590.33 
(272.828) 
T-stat 
0.5815 
1 2/c c   
-3590.33 
(272.828) 
* *
1 2c c   
-0.0283 
(0.0246) 
T-stat 
-13.1595* 
Indonesia Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-5.5710 
(55.7838) 
* *
1 2c c   
257.554 
(13.3030) 
T-stat 
-4.5882* 
1 2/c c   
* *
1 2c c   T-stat 
Japan Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-211.6482 
(147.0709) 
* *
1 2c c   
-876.8302 
(341.3118) 
T-stat 
1.7898 
1 2/c c   
-876.8302 
(341.3118) 
* *
1 2c c   
-0.0062 
(0.0060) 
T-stat 
-2.5689* 
Japan Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
-38.5017 
(0.7701) 
* *
1 2c c   
-54.4616 
(1.1246) 
T-stat 
11.7088* 
1 2/c c   
-54.4616 
(1.1246) 
* *
1 2c c   
-89.5798 
(1.8177) 
T-stat 
14.0006* 
Japan Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
0.7213 
(0.0752) 
* *
1 2c c   
1.4393 
(0.0766) 
T-stat 
-6.6823* 
1 2/c c   
1.4393 
(0.0766) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.0891 
(0.0299) 
T-stat 
16.4040* 
Malaysia Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
0.0244 
(0.0006) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.0302 
(0.0006) 
T-stat 
-6.2922* 
1 2/c c   
0.0302 
(0.0006) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.0234 
(0.0013) 
T-stat 
4.5412* 
Malaysia Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
0.0164 
(0.0026) 
* *
1 2c c   
-0.0042 
(0.0041) 
T-stat 
4.2571* 
1 2/c c   
-0.0042 
(0.0041) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.5373 
(0.0137) 
T-stat 
-37.6852* 
Mexico Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/c c   
10.0940 
(0.5131) 
* *
1 2c c   
7.8502 
(0.3895) 
T-stat 
3.4824* 
1 2/c c   
7.8502 
(0.3895) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.0169 
(0.0034) 
T-stat 
20.1071* 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean 
but convergent values, standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Indeed, 39 transmission periods (60%) of the idiosyncratic shocks are identified as 
contagion and 44 transmission periods (63.1%) of the common shocks are identified as 
contagion. We found 18 counter contagion effects in idiosyncratic shocks, and 7 of them 
finally changed in direction. Common shock had 16 counter contagion effects, while 
only 4 of them finally changed in direction. Referring back to the exchange rate 
correlation results, we found exactly the same proportion of change in direction with the 
common shock. In this regard, the effects of the common shock overpower the 
idiosyncratic shock as they represent the overall effect in a better way. As for the way in 
which the ratios change in those counter contagion effects, there was hardly any pattern 
in terms of how they change in idiosyncratic shocks. However, most of the ratios 
increased first before declining in the common shock, just like the overall effect. The 
effect of the common shock prevails again. It’s also worth noticing that if we look at the 
common shock and idiosyncratic shock separately, they both have fewer contagion 
effects compare to that of the overall correlation. In most cases, such as Argentina and 
Canada, Canada and Chile, the corresponding contagion effects in both common shock 
and idiosyncratic shock are not significant, however, they become significant if we put 
them together. This result further illustrate that the correlation methods are biased due to 
the lack of details and the techniques only focus on common shock are also biased 
because they ignore the importance of idiosyncratic shock. 
 
Table 93: Identification of Interest Rate (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
Argentina Canada 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
-2.1859 
(1.5777) 
* *
1 2   
2.3336 
(0.2902) 
T-stat 
-2.82* 
1 2/   
2.3336 
(0.2902) 
* *
1 2   
1.6716 
(0.0911) 
T-stat 
-8.86* 
1 2/   
1.6716 
(0.0911) 
* *
1 2   
1.8337 
(0.1425) 
T-stat 
-0.95 
1 2/   
1.8337 
(0.1425) 
* *
1 2   
-0.0334 
(0.3427) 
T-stat 
5.45* 
Argentina Chile 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
1.9614 
(0.1858) 
* *
1 2   
10.8067 
(1.0110) 
T-stat 
-8.60* 
1 2/   
10.8067 
(1.0110) 
* *
1 2   
-1.2579 
(0.5565) 
T-stat 
10.45* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Argentina Hong Kong 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
1470.5 
(86.926) 
* *
1 2   
-29.886 
(1.1077) 
T-stat 
17.25* 
1 2/   
-29.886 
(1.1077) 
* *
1 2   
20.091 
(19.187) 
T-stat 
-0.64 
1 2/   
20.091 
(19.187) 
* *
1 2   
12.001 
(11.237) 
T-stat 
0.36 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Argentina Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
106.27 
(5.1612) 
* *
1 2   
-5314.1 
(739.43) 
T-stat 
7.33* 
1 2/   
-5314.1 
(739.43) 
* *
1 2   
-0.5658 
(2.9143) 
T-stat 
8.49* 
1 2/   
-0.5658 
(2.9143) 
* *
1 2   
-4243 
(1038.4) 
T-stat 
4.08* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Argentina Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
2.6863 
(0.2431) 
* *
1 2   
14.328 
(1.2569) 
T-stat 
-9.09* 
1 2/   
14.328 
(1.2569) 
* *
1 2   
15.549 
(1.9827) 
T-stat 
-6.93* 
1 2/   
15.549 
(1.9827) 
* *
1 2   
0.0478 
(0.1647) 
T-stat 
7.79* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
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Argentina Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
4.47E5 
(87686) 
* *
1 2   
6.75E5 
(1.32E5) 
T-stat 
-1.43 
1 2/   
6.75E5 
(1.32E5) 
* *
1 2   
1.5221 
(0.0036) 
T-stat 
5.11* 
1 2/   
1.5221 
(0.0036) 
* *
1 2   
6675.1 
(888.32) 
T-stat 
-7.51* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Argentina Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
25.120 
(0.4412) 
* *
1 2   
0.2938 
(14.752) 
T-stat 
-1.56 
1 2/   
0.2938 
(14.752) 
* *
1 2   
4.3594 
(0.4051) 
T-stat 
2.32* 
1 2/   
4.3594 
(0.4051) 
* *
1 2   
0.6461 
(0.3086) 
T-stat 
7.29* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Argentina Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
17.076 
(1.2893) 
* *
1 2   
8.3415 
(0.4941) 
T-stat 
6.32* 
1 2/   
8.3415 
(0.4941) 
* *
1 2   
1.0111 
(0.0011) 
T-stat 
4.92* 
1 2/   
1.0111 
(0.0011) 
* *
1 2   
0.0509 
(0.1565) 
T-stat 
6.13* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Canada Chile 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
0.4865 
(0.0004) 
* *
1 2   
-1.14E5 
(33057) 
T-stat 
3.46* 
1 2/   
-1.14E5 
(33057) 
* *
1 2   
-188.63 
(183.58) 
T-stat 
-0.17 
1 2/   
-188.63 
(183.58) 
* *
1 2   
-4859.1 
(1219.4) 
T-stat 
3.98* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Canada Hong Kong 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
84.903 
(23.838) 
* *
1 2   
1.5651 
(0.0298) 
T-stat 
3.49* 
1 2/   
1.5651 
(0.0298) 
* *
1 2   
-2186.7 
(483.24) 
T-stat 
4.53* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Canada Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
4.2309 
(0.1132) 
* *
1 2   
4.5297 
(0.1144) 
T-stat 
-1.85 
1 2/   
4.5297 
(0.1144) 
* *
1 2   
0.3159 
(0.0027) 
T-stat 
36.81* 
1 2/   
0.3159 
(0.0027) 
* *
1 2   
-369.34 
(204.51) 
T-stat 
1.80 
1 2/   
-369.34 
(204.51) 
* *
1 2   
308.02 
(334.31) 
T-stat 
-1.36 
Canada Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
-17.083 
(0.1907) 
* *
1 2   
20.023 
(0.2308) 
T-stat 
-123* 
1 2/   
20.023 
(0.2308) 
* *
1 2   
32.486 
(16.348) 
T-stat 
-0.69 
1 2/   
32.486 
(16.348) 
* *
1 2   
-1821.6 
(445.67) 
T-stat 
4.08* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Canada Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
5.2613 
(0.0725) 
* *
1 2   
0.7274 
(0.0321) 
T-stat 
57.15* 
1 2/   
0.7274 
(0.0321) 
* *
1 2   
0.7305 
(0.0004) 
T-stat 
-0.09 
1 2/   
0.7305 
(0.0004) 
* *
1 2   
-436.95 
(99.187) 
T-stat 
4.41* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Canada Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
7.1674 
(0.0816) 
* *
1 2   
1.8941 
(0.0418) 
T-stat 
57.49* 
1 2/   
1.8941 
(0.0418) 
* *
1 2   
1.7482 
(4.7948) 
T-stat 
0.03 
1 2/   
1.7482 
(4.7948) 
* *
1 2   
13673 
(3347.3) 
T-stat 
-4.07* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Canada Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
0.7341 
(0.0218) 
* *
1 2   
0.3057 
(0.0305) 
T-stat 
11.41* 
1 2/   
0.3057 
(0.0305) 
* *
1 2   
0.6946 
(0.0313) 
T-stat 
3.41* 
1 2/   
0.6946 
(0.0313) 
* *
1 2   
0.5858 
(0.0539) 
T-stat 
1.74 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Chile Hong Kong 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
4.9377 
(0.8238) 
* *
1 2   
2.8040 
(1.1826) 
T-stat 
1.4803 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   
2769.5 
(571.05) 
T-stat 
-4.84* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Chile Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
13.841 
(2.3759) 
* *
1 2   
13.572 
(2.4322) 
T-stat 
0.07 
1 2/   
13.572 
(2.4322) 
* *
1 2   
2.0659 
(0.1641) 
T-stat 
6.63* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Chile Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
3.12* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
-1.04 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
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1922.2 
(610.70) 
11.763 
(3.3472) 
11.763 
(3.3472) 
47.543 
(34.083) 
Chile Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
6.8844 
(0.1622) 
* *
1 2   
0.4240 
(0.0469) 
T-stat 
38.2* 
1 2/   
0.4240 
(0.0469) 
* *
1 2   
-4651.5 
(439.31) 
T-stat 
10.59* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Chile Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
7.9257 
(0.4117) 
* *
1 2   
1.2014 
(0.2071) 
T-stat 
14.5* 
1 2/   
1.2014 
(0.2071) 
* *
1 2   
0.1960 
(0.0004) 
T-stat 
4.85* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Chile Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
1.6509 
(0.2686) 
* *
1 2   
2.3487 
(1.1405) 
T-stat 
-0.59 
1 2/   
2.3487 
(1.1405) 
* *
1 2   
10022 
(1985.5) 
T-stat 
-5.04* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Hong Kong Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
48.429 
(2.1943) 
* *
1 2   
31.010 
(1.3991) 
T-stat 
6.69* 
1 2/   
31.010 
(1.3991) 
* *
1 2   
52.125 
(45.456) 
T-stat 
-1.49 
1 2/   
52.125 
(45.456) 
* *
1 2   
-4525.0 
(1152.0) 
T-stat 
3.93* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Hong Kong Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
-52.821 
(2.0536) 
* *
1 2   
-1.4943 
(0.1621) 
T-stat 
-24.9* 
1 2/   
-1.4943 
(0.1621) 
* *
1 2   
365.23 
(409.21) 
T-stat 
-0.88 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Hong Kong Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
4.0927 
(0.0607) 
* *
1 2   
1.0843 
(0.0273) 
T-stat 
45.16* 
1 2/   
1.0843 
(0.0273) 
* *
1 2   
-24.298 
(207.77) 
T-stat 
0.12 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Hong Kong Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
32.724 
(11.850) 
* *
1 2   
6.7342 
(0.7616) 
T-stat 
2.18* 
1 2/   
6.7342 
(0.7616) 
* *
1 2   
33.567 
(184.59) 
T-stat 
-0.11 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Hong Kong Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
3.7057 
(0.0721) 
* *
1 2   
3.5901 
(0.0671) 
T-stat 
1.17 
1 2/   
3.5901 
(0.0671) 
* *
1 2   
597.74 
(856.45) 
T-stat 
-0.68 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Indonesia Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
9.3031 
(0.8733) 
* *
1 2   
15.736 
(2.9645) 
T-stat 
-2.08* 
1 2/   
15.736 
(2.9645) 
* *
1 2   
-1.25E5 
(37713) 
T-stat 
3.31* 
1 2/   
-1.25E5 
(37713) 
* *
1 2   
35.846 
(28.633) 
T-stat 
-3.32* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Indonesia Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
465.96 
(17.381) 
* *
1 2   
66.674 
(2.1278) 
T-stat 
22.8* 
1 2/   
66.674 
(2.1278) 
* *
1 2   
1.0914 
(0.0004) 
T-stat 
21.1* 
1 2/   
1.0914 
(0.0004) 
* *
1 2   
0.7419 
(0.0252) 
T-stat 
-3.86* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Indonesia Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
1583.1 
(594.01) 
* *
1 2   
2.0986 
(0.1731) 
T-stat 
2.66* 
1 2/   
2.0986 
(0.1731) 
* *
1 2   
-10989 
(2319.0) 
T-stat 
4.74* 
1 2/   
-10989 
(2319.0) 
* *
1 2   
-500.56 
(239.69) 
T-stat 
-4.49* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Indonesia Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
803.88 
(180.78) 
* *
1 2   
1.2898 
(0.0857) 
T-stat 
4.43* 
1 2/   
1.2898 
(0.0857) 
* *
1 2   
32911 
(160.01) 
T-stat 
-205.6* 
1 2/   
32911 
(160.01) 
* *
1 2   
-3012.8 
(36.541) 
T-stat 
164.8* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Japan Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
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1 2/   
1.2489 
(3.1275) 
* *
1 2   
0.0091 
(0.0426) 
T-stat 
0.39 
1 2/   
0.0091 
(0.0426) 
* *
1 2   
-2319.0 
(328.82) 
T-stat 
7.05* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Japan Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
117.38 
(19.493) 
* *
1 2   
25.431 
(8.008) 
T-stat 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Japan Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
6.7285 
(1.0941) 
* *
1 2   
2.2097 
(0.5882) 
T-stat 
3.63* 
1 2/   
2.2097 
(0.5882) 
* *
1 2   
2.4905 
(2.7321) 
T-stat 
-0.10* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Malaysia Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
11.761 
(1.1986) 
* *
1 2   
3.5063 
(6.4847) 
T-stat 
1.25 
1 2/   
3.5063 
(6.4847) 
* *
1 2   
-218.92 
(177.15) 
T-stat 
1.43 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Malaysia Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
2.3873 
(0.0241) 
* *
1 2   
0.6971 
(0.0102) 
T-stat 
64.36* 
1 2/   
0.6971 
(0.0102) 
* *
1 2   
2724.2 
(711.28) 
T-stat 
-3.82* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
Mexico Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/   
2663.5 
(386.08) 
* *
1 2   
8.7475 
(1.2816) 
T-stat 
6.87* 
1 2/   
8.7475 
(1.2816) 
* *
1 2   
8375.1 
(1652.3) 
T-stat 
-5.05* 
1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 1 2/   
* *
1 2   T-stat 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
Table 94: Identification of Interest Rate (Common Shock) 
Argentina Canada 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/c c   
340.48 
(104.14) 
* *
1 2c c   
-146.15 
(19.334) 
T-stat 
4.59* 
1 2/c c   
-146.15 
(19.334) 
* *
1 2c c   
24.729 
(3.8927) 
T-stat 
-8.81* 
1 2/c c   
24.729 
(3.8927) 
* *
1 2c c   
-227.12 
(61.998) 
T-stat 
4.05* 
1 2/c c   
-227.12 
(61.998) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.3984 
(0.0691) 
T-stat 
-4.24* 
Argentina Chile 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/c c   
3.01E4 
(1052.5) 
* *
1 2c c   
-230.51 
(7.2029) 
T-stat 
28.87* 
1 2/c c   
-230.51 
(7.2029) 
* *
1 2c c   
0.1309 
(0.0304) 
T-stat 
-32.1* 
1 2/c c   
* *
1 2c c   T-stat 1 2/c c   
* *
1 2c c   T-stat 
Argentina Hong Kong 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/c c   
24.212 
(0.5928) 
* *
1 2c c   
-27.454 
(0.8748) 
T-stat 
48.89* 
1 2/c c   
-27.454 
(0.8748) 
* *
1 2c c   
-5.8189 
(0.2234) 
T-stat 
26.49* 
1 2/c c   
-5.8189 
(0.2234) 
* *
1 2c c   
1.7903 
(0.0547) 
T-stat 
-33.1* 
1 2/c c    T-stat 
Argentina Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
18.516 
(0.4626) 
 
97.383 
(1.9721) 
T-stat 
-38.9* 
 
97.383 
(1.9721) 
 
0.0081 
(0.0021) 
T-stat 
24.39* 
 
0.0081 
(0.0021) 
 
0.2578 
(0.2068) 
T-stat 
-0.96 
  T-stat 
Argentina Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
-2568.5 
(2333.7) 
 
-263.81 
(7.8213) 
T-stat 
-0.98 
 
-263.81 
(7.8213) 
 
254.68 
(25.391) 
T-stat 
-16.2* 
 
254.68 
(25.391) 
 
0.2260 
(0.0511) 
T-stat 
10.02* 
  T-stat 
Argentina Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
0.4829 
(0.0667) 
 
8.4012 
(3.0102) 
T-stat 
-2.84* 
 
8.4012 
(3.0102) 
 
0.0296 
(0.0067) 
T-stat 
2.84* 
 
0.0296 
(0.0067) 
 
0.6324 
(0.0277) 
T-stat 
-18.6* 
  T-stat 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
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Argentina Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
-17.742 
(0.1855) 
 
-17.742 
(0.1855) 
T-stat 
89.53* 
 
-17.742 
(0.1855) 
 
-4.3570 
(0.8840) 
T-stat 
5.18* 
 
-4.3570 
(0.8840) 
 
0.2384 
(0.0585) 
T-stat 
-5.18* 
  T-stat 
Argentina Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
23.069 
(0.6964) 
 
51.116 
(1.4201) 
T-stat 
-17.7* 
 
51.116 
(1.4201) 
 
4.4731 
(0.5356) 
T-stat 
-7.71* 
 
4.4731 
(0.5356) 
 
0.3151 
(0.0746) 
T-stat 
7.68* 
  T-stat 
Canada Chile 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
10252 
(1537.3) 
 
-3.13E5 
(242.82) 
T-stat 
207.7* 
 
-3.13E5 
(242.82) 
 
0.0384 
(0.0081) 
T-stat 
-61.7* 
 
0.0384 
(0.0081) 
 
-0.7688 
(0.7920) 
T-stat 
1.08 
  T-stat 
Canada Hong Kong 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
0.0085 
(0.0003) 
 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
T-stat 
19.83* 
 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0384 
(0.0087) 
T-stat 
-1.06 
  T-stat   T-stat 
Canada Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
-0.0139 
(0.2283) 
 
-0.8151 
(0.0504) 
T-stat 
3.42* 
 
-0.8151 
(0.0504) 
 
0.0017 
(0.0004) 
T-stat 
-16.2* 
 
0.0017 
(0.0004) 
 
1.0360 
(0.0070) 
T-stat 
-69.2* 
 
1.0360 
(0.0070) 
 
0.1023 
(0.0175) 
T-stat 
51.19* 
Canada Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
0.0030 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0047 
(0.0003) 
T-stat 
-3.45* 
 
0.0047 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0022 
(0.0004) 
T-stat 
4.25* 
  
9.8062 
(2.3913) 
T-stat 
-4.04* 
  T-stat 
Canada Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
0.0707 
(0.0917) 
 
-0.0128 
(0.0006) 
T-stat 
0.91 
 
-0.0128 
(0.0006) 
 
0.0019 
(0.0004) 
T-stat 
-19.1* 
 
0.0019 
(0.0004) 
 
0.6988 
(0.0236) 
T-stat 
-24.5* 
  T-stat 
Canada Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
0.0029 
(0.0003) 
 
-0.0047 
(0.0004) 
T-stat 
13.38* 
 
-0.0047 
(0.0004) 
 
0.0023 
(0.0004) 
T-stat 
-10.3* 
 
0.0023 
(0.0004) 
 
1.3324 
(0.0741) 
T-stat 
-15.5* 
  T-stat 
Canada Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
-0.1137 
(0.1395) 
 
-0.0108 
(0.0180) 
T-stat 
-0.73 
 
-0.0108 
(0.0180) 
 
-1.6090 
(0.6189) 
T-stat 
2.91* 
 
-1.6090 
(0.6189) 
 
0.4355 
(0.0670) 
T-stat 
-3.28* 
  T-stat 
Chile Hong Kong 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
0.0286 
(0.0075) 
 
0.0242 
(0.0076) 
T-stat 
0.4082 
  
0.3877 
(0.1848) 
T-stat 
-1.91 
  T-stat   T-stat 
Chile Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
0.0347 
(0.0111) 
 
0.0357 
(0.0111) 
T-stat 
-0.06 
 
0.0357 
(0.0111) 
 
55.926 
(9.8252) 
T-stat 
-5.67* 
  T-stat   T-stat 
Chile Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
-26073 
(3940.3) 
 
3254.4 
(1081.8) 
T-stat 
-7.17* 
 
3254.4 
(1081.8) 
 
0.1428 
(0.0222) 
T-stat 
3.01* 
  T-stat   T-stat 
Chile Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
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1 2c c  1 2/c c 
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1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
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1 2c c 
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1 2c c  1 2/c c 
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1 2c c  1 2/c c 
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1 2c c  1 2/c c 
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1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
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1 2c c  1 2/c c 
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1 2c c  1 2/c c 
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1 2c c  1 2/c c 
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1 2c c 
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1 2c c  1 2/c c 
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0.0011 
(0.0003) 
 
-0.0005 
(0.0004) 
T-stat 
3.19* 
 
-0.0005 
(0.0004) 
 
0.3328 
(0.0142) 
T-stat 
-18.9* 
  T-stat   T-stat 
Chile Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
-0.0008 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0126 
(0.0004) 
T-stat 
-23.7* 
 
0.0126 
(0.0004) 
 
0.0037 
(0.0006) 
T-stat 
11.50* 
  T-stat   T-stat 
Chile Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
0.0236 
(0.0066) 
 
0.0211 
(0.0066) 
T-stat 
0.27 
 
0.0211 
(0.0066) 
 
1.2087 
(0.0202) 
T-stat 
-49.9* 
  T-stat   T-stat 
Hong Kong Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
-31.564 
(10.337) 
 
57.308 
(72.866) 
T-stat 
-1.21 
 
57.308 
(72.866) 
 
0.0065 
(0.0016) 
T-stat 
1.06 
 
0.0065 
(0.0016) 
 
0.1568 
(0.2429) 
T-stat 
-0.42 
  T-stat 
Hong Kong Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
95.469 
(5.3112) 
 
53.772 
(17.288) 
T-stat 
2.30* 
 
53.772 
(17.288) 
 
0.0341 
(0.0073) 
T-stat 
4.01* 
  T-stat   T-stat 
Hong Kong Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
0.0027 
(0.0064) 
 
-0.0077 
(0.0005) 
T-stat 
1.61 
 
-0.0077 
(0.0005) 
 
0.0017 
(0.0004) 
T-stat 
-14.4* 
  T-stat   T-stat 
Hong Kong Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
230.62 
(7.3467) 
 
18.141 
(0.7179) 
T-stat 
28.78* 
 
18.141 
(0.7179) 
 
0.0289 
(0.0067) 
T-stat 
13.23* 
  T-stat   T-stat 
Hong Kong Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
-0.0034 
(0.0057) 
 
-0.0134 
(0.0054) 
T-stat 
1.26 
 
-0.0134 
(0.0054) 
 
0.0231 
(0.0055) 
T-stat 
0.21 
  T-stat   T-stat 
Indonesia Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
2804.5 
(128.02) 
 
23.281 
(20.446) 
T-stat 
21.45* 
 
23.281 
(20.446) 
 
-33.817 
(0.8268) 
T-stat 
2.29* 
 
-33.817 
(0.8268) 
 
0.0732 
(0.0153) 
T-stat 
-40.9* 
  T-stat 
Indonesia Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
-2196.7 
(43.183) 
 
-16.402 
(0.3388) 
T-stat 
-50.4* 
 
-16.402 
(0.3388) 
 
0.0040 
(0.0008) 
T-stat 
-30.5* 
 
0.0040 
(0.0008) 
 
700.45 
(181.01) 
T-stat 
-23.3* 
  T-stat 
Indonesia Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
0.0061 
(0.0010) 
 
0.0157 
(0.0010) 
T-stat 
-6.64* 
 
0.0157 
(0.0010) 
 
0.0502 
(0.0132) 
T-stat 
0.03 
 
0.0502 
(0.0132) 
 
0.9934 
(0.0022) 
T-stat 
-69.9* 
  T-stat 
Indonesia Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
-0.0469 
(0.0009) 
 
-0.0473 
(0.0009) 
T-stat 
0.30 
 
-0.0473 
(0.0009) 
 
0.0277 
(0.0015) 
T-stat 
-40.8* 
 
0.0277 
(0.0015) 
 
0.0595 
(0.0039) 
T-stat 
-5.02* 
  T-stat 
Japan Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
-0.0051 
 
-0.0022 
T-stat 
-6.38* 
 
-0.0022 
 
0.8157 
T-stat 
-84.4* 
  T-stat   T-stat 
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* *
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* *
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* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
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* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
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1 2/c c 
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1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
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(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0089) 
Japan Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
0.0934 
(0.0274) 
 
0.0936 
(0.0274) 
T-stat   T-stat   T-stat   T-stat 
Japan Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
0.0886 
(0.0268) 
 
0.0894 
(0.0268) 
T-stat 
-0.02 
 
0.0894 
(0.0268) 
 
1.0054 
(0.0004) 
T-stat 
-34.1* 
  T-stat   T-stat 
Malaysia Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
-0.1287 
(0.0323) 
 
0.3757 
(0.0172) 
T-stat 
-13.7* 
 
0.3757 
(0.0172) 
 
0.0301 
(0.0071) 
T-stat 
0.17 
  T-stat   T-stat 
Malaysia Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
0.0007 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0076 
(0.0003) 
T-stat 
-13.7* 
 
0.0076 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0690 
(0.0106) 
T-stat 
-2.99* 
  T-stat   T-stat 
Mexico Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 Period 3/Period 4 Period 4/Period 5 
 
7.9195 
(0.4249) 
 
5.4368 
(0.2930) 
T-stat 
4.81* 
 
5.4368 
(0.2930) 
 
2.0706 
(0.1807) 
T-stat 
12.08* 
  T-stat   T-stat 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean but convergent values, 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
There are 66 transmission periods (72.5%) of the idiosyncratic shocks identified as 
contagion and 70 transmission periods (76.9%) of the common shocks identified as 
contagion. We found 39 counter contagion effects in idiosyncratic shocks, while 15 of 
them finally changed in direction. Common shock had 34 counter contagion effects, 
with 14 of these finally changing direction. Common shock is again closer to the overall 
effect, which has 33 counter contagions. However, the number of changes in direction 
for both shocks is very different from the overall effect (22). This result again confirmed 
that both shock must be combined together to analyse the behaviour of the overall 
effects. We do not observe much similar pattern in interest rate as we did with exchange 
rate. Neither shock can represent the overall effect alone. They both play an important 
role in the combined result. As for the way in which the ratios change in those counter 
contagion effects, there was hardly any pattern in terms of how they change in both 
shocks, just as was the case with the overall effect of interest rate market. Recall that we 
detected the most significant breakpoints for interest rate and no significant breakpoints 
for exchange rate. Both market identified large proportion of contagion, yet exchange 
rate market’s common shock clearly has more similar pattern with the overall 
correlation. Therefore we conclude that significant structural changes have more effects 
on common shock. 
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* *
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* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
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* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
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1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
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Table 95: Identification of Stock (Idiosyncratic Shock) 
Argentina Canada 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
277.8551 
(225.1721) 
 
0.1176 
(0.0448) 
T-stat 
1.2334 
 
0.1176 
(0.0448) 
 
-179.0615 
(30.1558) 
T-stat 
5.9788* 
Argentina Chile 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
5.5392 
(0.3244) 
 
-30.8283 
(1.3309) 
T-stat 
26.5464* 
 
-30.8283 
(1.3309) 
 
74.9204 
(7430.30) 
T-stat 
-0.0086 
Argentina Hong Kong 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
-0.2144 
(0.0030) 
 
9889.4 
(227.26) 
T-stat 
-43.5157* 
  T-stat 
Argentina Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
-6622.2241 
(2084.9493) 
 
2128.9356 
(6.7821) 
T-stat 
-4.1972* 
 
2128.9356 
(6.7821) 
 
-4048.5118 
(5054.9687) 
T-stat 
1.2221 
Argentina Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
29.5564 
(0.0204) 
 
67.6240 
(3.4026) 
T-stat 
-11.1874* 
 
67.6240 
(3.4026) 
 
40.7575 
(4.6176) 
T-stat 
-8.9354* 
Argentina Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
11.5262 
(10.3651) 
 
-155.7981 
(63.1119) 
T-stat 
2.6161* 
  T-stat 
Argentina Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.4035 
(0.2361) 
 
0.0574 
(0.1501) 
T-stat 
1.2366 
 
0.0574 
(0.1501) 
 
-768.0446 
(188.3499) 
T-stat 
4.0735* 
Argentina Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
9.0676 
(0.0093) 
 
-10.1725 
(4.7701) 
T-stat 
4.0334* 
  T-stat 
Canada Chile 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
7556.3607 
(2263.9418) 
 
-14518.3627 
(6527.9153) 
T-stat 
3.1949* 
  T-stat 
Canada Hong Kong 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
-4.6558 
(0.7161) 
 
171.6911 
(96.1397) 
T-stat 
-1.8342 
 
171.6911 
(96.1397) 
 
-18.9469 
(16.1641) 
T-stat 
1.9554 
Canada Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
3.3353 
(0.0787) 
 
524.4557 
(99.5861) 
T-stat 
-5.2328* 
  T-stat 
Canada Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
258.5141 
(13.3957) 
 
224.7814 
(13.1312) 
T-stat 
1.7982 
 
224.7814 
(13.1312) 
 
132249.7564 
(52290.6301) 
T-stat 
-2.5248* 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
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1 2/ 
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* *
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* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
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Canada Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
-9132089.2195 
(311441.9897) 
 
260231.3272 
(35946.7002) 
T-stat 
-29.9586* 
 
260231.3272 
(35946.7002) 
 
-467.0282 
(34.2205) 
T-stat 
7.2523* 
Canada Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
1.9858 
(0.7608) 
 
-896.1948 
(64.5023) 
T-stat 
13.9238* 
 
-896.1948 
(64.5023) 
 
1129.7514 
(14511.1233) 
T-stat 
-0.0838 
Canada Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
129.4729 
(0.8381) 
 
223.0070 
(42.4738) 
T-stat 
-2.2017* 
 
223.0070 
(42.4738) 
 
4898.6616 
(21347.3979) 
T-stat 
-0.2165 
Chile Hong Kong 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
255.4468 
(955.0266) 
 
0.1390 
(0.5453) 
T-stat 
0.2673 
 
0.1390 
(0.5453) 
 
1362.8471 
(256.9860) 
T-stat 
-5.3131* 
Chile Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
-34.0332 
(14.3173) 
 
5702.9946 
(1454.3926) 
T-stat 
-3.9444* 
 
5702.9946 
(1454.3926) 
 
32.4447 
(4.4152) 
T-stat 
-7.3240* 
Chile Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
10.6389 
(0.1427) 
 
11.2649 
(0.1700) 
T-stat 
-2.8195* 
 
11.2649 
(0.1700) 
 
-324.6052 
(337.2960) 
T-stat 
1.0581 
Chile Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.2975 
(0.0144) 
 
4045.3267 
(457.3215) 
T-stat 
-8.8450* 
 
4045.3267 
(457.3215) 
 
0.0791 
(0.0623) 
T-stat 
8.8455* 
Chile Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.0109 
(0.0022) 
 
-1123.0621 
(1093.1345) 
T-stat 
1.0273 
 
-1123.0621 
(1093.1345) 
 
-0.8588 
(0.8498) 
T-stat 
-1.6601 
Chile Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
-1.0489 
(0.0324) 
 
0.9216 
(0.0409) 
T-stat 
-37.7050* 
 
0.9216 
(0.0409) 
 
-104.4717 
(328.5673) 
T-stat 
0.3207 
Hong Kong Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
-13145.2625 
(5364.0093) 
 
-24053.1597 
(2978.7309) 
T-stat 
1.7778 
 
-24053.1597 
(2978.7309) 
 
-288.6628 
(323.3265) 
T-stat 
-7.9314* 
Hong Kong Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
-84.3027 
(7.5293) 
 
41.0255 
(2.7205) 
T-stat 
-15.6546* 
 
41.0255 
(2.7205) 
 
405.8773 
(532.7674) 
T-stat 
-0.6848 
Hong Kong Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
-19.4682 
(0.1129) 
 
896.2542 
(297.5576) 
T-stat 
-3.0774* 
  T-stat 
Hong Kong Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
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0.3643 
(0.1747) 
 
-853.6771 
(92.7931) 
T-stat 
9.2036* 
 
-853.6771 
(92.7931) 
 
70.5851 
(55.6104) 
T-stat 
-0.8218 
Hong Kong Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
-2938981.1710 
(29354.8641) 
 
102.2826 
(81.4064) 
T-stat 
-100.1221* 
  T-stat 
Indonesia Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.1498 
(0.0225) 
 
955.9914 
(883.3116) 
T-stat 
-1.0821 
 
955.9914 
(883.3116) 
 
0.1562 
(0.0005) 
T-stat 
1.0821 
Indonesia Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.3667 
(0.1084) 
 
0.0926 
(0.0051) 
T-stat 
2.5237* 
 
0.0926 
(0.0051) 
 
0.5316 
(0.4075) 
T-stat 
-0.4833 
Indonesia Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.0036 
(0.0021) 
 
0.0124 
(0.0022) 
T-stat 
-2.9045* 
 
0.0124 
(0.0022) 
 
-0.0329 
(0.0218) 
T-stat 
2.1084* 
Indonesia Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.0852 
(0.0145) 
 
0.0568 
(0.0095) 
T-stat 
1.6302 
 
0.0568 
(0.0095) 
 
4516.0689 
(3503.7302) 
T-stat 
-1.2889 
Japan Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
-0.0409 
(0.0004) 
 
-4740.1973 
(7.4786) 
T-stat 
633.8263* 
 
-4740.1973 
(7.4786) 
 
0.0018 
(0.0003) 
T-stat 
-633.8321* 
Japan Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
-0.0027 
(0.0006) 
 
3560.5800 
(8.0043) 
T-stat 
-444.8297* 
  T-stat 
Japan Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.5724 
(0.0242) 
 
-12875.6541 
(1896.3071) 
T-stat 
6.7901* 
 
-12875.6541 
(1896.3071) 
 
0.5441 
(0.0852) 
T-stat 
-6.7901* 
Malaysia Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.1285 
(0.0222) 
 
0.1031 
(0.0290) 
T-stat 
0.6937 
 
0.1031 
(0.0290) 
 
6039.3517 
(11.4286) 
T-stat 
-528.4273* 
Malaysia Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
-4.8826 
(0.1142) 
 
47.2087 
(45.0044) 
T-stat 
-1.1574 
  T-stat 
Mexico Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
17.1069 
(0.1786) 
 
5.9038 
(0.3115) 
T-stat 
31.1936* 
 
5.9038 
(0.3115) 
 
365.4191 
(265.5621) 
T-stat 
-1.3259 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean 
but convergent values, standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
1 2/ 
* *
1 2  1 2/ 
* *
1 2 
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Table 96: Identification of Stock (Common Shock) 
Argentina Canada 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.0454 
(0.0044) 
 
-0.0072 
(0.0200) 
T-stat 
2.5702* 
 
-0.0072 
(0.0200) 
 
0.5086 
(0.0284) 
T-stat 
-2.8949* 
Argentina Chile 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
150.6200 
(119.1074) 
 
31.2364 
(3.5516) 
T-stat 
1.0018 
 
31.2364 
(3.5516) 
 
41.6138 
(0.5007) 
T-stat 
-28.2121* 
Argentina Hong Kong 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.0997 
(0.0047) 
 
0.8421 
(0.0614) 
T-stat 
-12.0416* 
  T-stat 
Argentina Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
1226.8772 
(26.4377) 
 
155.2068 
(0.4391) 
T-stat 
40.5301* 
 
155.2068 
(0.4391) 
 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
T-stat 
353.4517* 
Argentina Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
222.9250 
(0.1956) 
 
55.8151 
(0.2251) 
T-stat 
560.3289* 
 
55.8151 
(0.2251) 
 
-402.8994 
(66.5752) 
T-stat 
6.0719* 
Argentina Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
4.5582 
(0.0568) 
 
-1.0786 
(0.1466) 
T-stat 
35.8427* 
  T-stat 
Argentina Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.1136 
(0.0096) 
 
0.0717 
(0.0355) 
T-stat 
1.1396 
 
0.0717 
(0.0355) 
 
0.3882 
(0.0104) 
T-stat 
-1.3936 
Argentina Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
20.0339 
(0.0302) 
 
0.5026 
(0.7315) 
T-stat 
26.6771* 
  T-stat 
Canada Chile 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
110.7649 
(25.5654) 
 
1226.8846 
(1.2367) 
T-stat 
-43.6063* 
  T-stat 
Canada Hong Kong 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
3.2241 
(1.2172) 
 
4.4537 
(1.0890) 
T-stat 
-0.7529 
 
4.4537 
(1.0890) 
 
-0.0039 
(0.0042) 
T-stat 
4.0931* 
Canada Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
7.1166 
(0.1079) 
 
-3.4134 
(0.8059) 
T-stat 
12.9501* 
  T-stat 
Canada Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
979.1849 
(15.7283) 
 
129.9216 
(6.9203) 
T-stat 
49.4232* 
 
129.9216 
(6.9203) 
 
-0.0054 
(0.0081) 
T-stat 
18.7745* 
Canada Malaysia 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
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Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
1.8518 
(0.7933) 
 
19.4892 
(3.0198) 
T-stat 
-5.6487* 
 
19.4892 
(3.0198) 
 
-0.0040 
(0.0026) 
T-stat 
6.4550* 
Canada Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
4.0182 
(0.4118) 
 
38.9217 
(2.9006) 
T-stat 
-11.9134* 
 
38.9217 
(2.9006) 
 
7.5470 
(0.1985) 
T-stat 
-17.4205* 
Canada Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
137.7458 
(7.5722) 
 
284.0081 
(1.1023) 
T-stat 
-19.1141* 
 
284.0081 
(1.1023) 
 
-0.0055 
(0.0042) 
T-stat 
116.9870* 
Chile Hong Kong 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.2982 
(0.3929) 
 
2.4911 
(2.6454) 
T-stat 
-0.8199 
 
2.4911 
(2.6454) 
 
0.7277 
(0.0281) 
T-stat 
0.9819 
Chile Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
613.2111 
(146.3553) 
 
12.0066 
(4.5414) 
T-stat 
4.1058* 
 
12.0066 
(4.5414) 
 
223.7125 
(20.4658) 
T-stat 
1.5584 
Chile Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.0062 
(0.0011) 
 
-0.0032 
(0.0009) 
T-stat 
6.1833* 
 
-0.0032 
(0.0009) 
 
17.4758 
(3.8039) 
T-stat 
-4.5883* 
Chile Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.0634 
(0.0156) 
 
0.2328 
(0.0190) 
T-stat 
-6.8655* 
 
0.2328 
(0.0190) 
 
0.0820 
(0.0142) 
T-stat 
6.3322* 
Chile Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.0124 
(0.0004) 
 
31.2094 
(2.6238) 
T-stat 
-11.8897* 
 
31.2094 
(2.6238) 
 
0.0493 
(0.0098) 
T-stat 
-4.3232* 
Chile Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.0811 
(0.0293) 
 
0.0231 
(0.0045) 
T-stat 
1.9531 
 
0.0231 
(0.0045) 
 
1.0222 
(0.0003) 
T-stat 
-219.2265* 
Hong Kong Indonesia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
159.1362 
(0.6277) 
 
14394.2644 
(11.8305) 
T-stat 
-1201.5629* 
 
14394.2644 
(11.8305) 
 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
T-stat 
1216.7047* 
Hong Kong Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
204.9191 
(7.4467) 
 
94.7338 
(2.3424) 
T-stat 
14.1145* 
 
94.7338 
(2.3424) 
 
-0.0044 
(0.0083) 
T-stat 
40.4430* 
Hong Kong Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
13.3506 
(0.0946) 
 
1.9560 
(0.3111) 
T-stat 
35.0374* 
  T-stat 
Hong Kong Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
  T-stat 
-1.5016 
  T-stat 
-15.4411* 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
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1.1404 
(0.5147) 
1.9784 
(0.2154) 
1.9784 
(0.2154) 
2.4437 
(0.1325) 
Hong Kong Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
52.2616 
(0.2527) 
 
0.0958 
(0.0056) 
T-stat 
206.3633* 
  T-stat 
Indonesia Japan 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.0167 
(0.0004) 
 
0.0197 
(0.0004) 
T-stat 
-4.8537* 
 
0.0197 
(0.0004) 
 
0.0039 
(0.0007) 
T-stat 
19.2745* 
Indonesia Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
-0.0112 
(0.0049) 
 
0.0076 
(0.0065) 
T-stat 
-2.2917* 
 
0.0076 
(0.0065) 
 
0.1029 
(0.0167) 
T-stat 
-0.1223 
Indonesia Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.0065 
(0.0020) 
 
0.0086 
(0.0023) 
T-stat 
-0.6791 
 
0.0086 
(0.0023) 
 
0.0180 
(0.0032) 
T-stat 
-2.2728* 
Indonesia Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.0332 
(0.0057) 
 
0.0241 
(0.0056) 
T-stat 
1.1259 
 
0.0241 
(0.0056) 
 
0.7724 
(0.0172) 
T-stat 
-41.1672* 
Japan Malaysia 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.0384 
(0.0003) 
 
15.8742 
(1.8171) 
T-stat 
-8.7145* 
 
15.8742 
(1.8171) 
 
0.0021 
(0.0004) 
T-stat 
8.7346* 
Japan Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.0017 
(0.0004) 
 
-446.3305 
(161.7572) 
T-stat 
2.7592* 
  T-stat 
Japan Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.0876 
(0.0305) 
 
-0.0082 
(0.0583) 
T-stat 
1.4571 
 
-0.0082 
(0.0583) 
 
0.0406 
(0.0089) 
T-stat 
-0.8286 
Malaysia Mexico 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
0.0228 
(0.0011) 
 
0.0262 
(0.0021) 
T-stat 
-1.3940 
 
0.0262 
(0.0021) 
 
0.0009 
(0.0002) 
T-stat 
11.6742* 
Malaysia Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
3.9375 
(0.0251) 
 
0.4734 
(0.0453) 
T-stat 
66.7633* 
  T-stat 
Mexico Philippines 
Period 1/Period 2 Period 2/Period 3 
 
333.7004 
(293.1267) 
 
112.6477 
(36.4544) 
T-stat 
0.7483 
 
112.6477 
(36.4544) 
 
219.5209 
(6.3319) 
T-stat 
-10.6372* 
*denotes significance at 5%, **denotes significance at 1%, the value reported in the table are not mean 
but convergent values, standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c  1 2/c c 
* *
1 2c c 
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In total, 39 transmission periods (60.9%) of the idiosyncratic shocks are identified as 
contagion and 44 transmission periods (68.8%) of the common shocks are identified as 
contagion. We found 22 counter contagion effects in idiosyncratic shocks, with 7 of 
them finally changing in direction. Common shock had 22 counter contagion effects, 
with 6 of them finally changing in direction. Both of the shocks have more than enough 
contagion effects to match the number of the overall effect. Again, their effect must be 
combined to reflect the entire movement. The same holds for the change in direction. 
The overall effects have only 1 change in direction in all the counter contagion effects 
while both shocks have many more than this. Compare to the results of the exchange 
rate market, where the effects of the split shocks accumulate, their effects in stock 
market tend to offset against each other and their number reduced across the whole 
movement. 
7.6 Causality Test and Impulse Response Analysis 
We will now examine the statistical linkage between the countries. Many empirical 
work used granger causality test to identify contagion. The idea is to test for chances in 
the causal relationships between adjoining regimes. If statistically significant changes 
were detected, they are interpreted as contagion. For example, by using daily exchange 
rate, Gray (2009) found significant contagion among the EU-8 countries. Gómez-Puig 
and Sosvilla-Rivero (2014) also showed that the causal relationships increases as the 
sovereign debt crisis reveals itself in the euro zone. We will answer the third question in 
an attempt to establish the duration of the contagion effects. Tables 97 to 102 summarise 
the result of the co-integration test and the granger causality test (please see the 
Appendix 5 for figures related to the impulse response analysis).  
 
Table 97: Co-Integration Test of Exchange Rate 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Argentina/Canada 140.0466**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
39.2835**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
209.0907**[6] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Argentina/Chile 130.0764**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 63.4993**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 208.5479**[7] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Argentina/Hongkong 148.9087**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
55.7697**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
225.4183**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Argentina/Indonesia 140.9844**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
46.2026**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
183.1506**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Argentina/Japan 150.6864**[1] 90.1005**[1]  255.0334**[2] 
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{I(0)/I(0)} {I(0)/I(0)} {I(0)/I(0)} 
Argentina/Malaysia 164.2532**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
46.9793**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
205.9827**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Argentina/Mexico 125.8343**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
138.6982**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
194.7523**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Argentina/Philippines 134.4451**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
67.5816**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
220.1541**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Canada/Chile 156.5203**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
278.9570**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Canada/Hongkong 175.6907**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
320.7493**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Canada/Indonesia 75.8827**[7] 
{I(0)/I(1)} 
42.4747**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
343.6075**[5] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Canada/Japan 170.7021**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
41.7166**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
248.3971**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Canada/Malaysia 182.0709**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
282.1387**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Canada/Mexico 167.3198**[6] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
104.5103**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
177.7468**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Canada/Philippines 158.2902**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
13.1066*[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
261.5137**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Chile/Hongkong 180.7352**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
279.2957**[4] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Chile/Indonesia 93.9644**[8] 
{I(0)/I(1)} 
42.4714**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
302.7068**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Chile/Japan 177.7029**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
46.7417**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
236.7184**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Chile/Malaysia 191.6041**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
232.5014**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Chile/Mexico 196.5399**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
100.3627**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
174.1124**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Chile/Philippines 169.0359**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
17.7182*[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
197.1615**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Hongkong/Indonesia 152.9140**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
8.3162[1] 
{I(0)/I(1)} 
223.7636**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Hongkong/Japan 209.1921**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
47.7845**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
284.2963**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Hongkong/Malaysia 208.6380**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
292.1417**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Hongkong/Mexico 185.9402**[5] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
115.9367**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
170.1024**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Hongkong/Philippines 189.2871**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
14.7469[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
258.3258**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Indonesia/Japan 165.2991**[7] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
31.3241**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
237.3968**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
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Indonesia/Malaysia 208.6380**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
13.7214[8] 
{I(1)/I(0)} 
281.3893**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Indonesia/Mexico 215.8915**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
74.7368**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
184.7288**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Indonesia/Philippines 202.8513**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
258.3258**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Japan/Malaysia 206.5733**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
30.1782**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
247.5257**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Japan/Mexico 245.4628**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
62.3711**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
204.0074**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Japan/Philippines 206.6517**[4] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
21.5941**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
264.0239**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Malaysia/Mexico 199.8879**[5] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
82.5156**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
171.4536**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Malaysia/Philippines 181.9270**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
18.7672*[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
213.2274**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Mexico/Philippines 224.3423**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
69.7367**[4] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
164.0337**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
The statistics in this table are trace statistics. ** indicates significant at 1% level. The 
number in [] and {} are the number of the best fitting lag terms and the integration level 
respectively. 
 
Table 98: Granger Causality Test of Exchange Rate 
 AR CA CH HK IN JA MA ME PH 
Period 1 
AR  4.2614* 1.4093 0.0672  0.1959 0.3677 0.6263 0.0451 0.0132 
CA 0.0858  2.8259 1.1912 2.1814 0.0516 0.0078 8.6233* 1.4551 
CH 3.4862 64.3156*  1.6755 7.5718* 14.5362* 16.7982* 83.4860* 0.1455 
HK 2.7705 3.2744 0.0037  0.0855 0.3497 1.2008 0.0942 1.0348 
IN 1.1598 4.6034* 0.2234 0.5674  8.1173* 1.2008 0.0955 1.0384 
JA 0.0724 1.2766 1.0051 8.6697* 4.7925*  0.5245 18.7026* 1.1953 
MA 0.2937 16.5384 0.0031 1.4484 1.4484 0.0862  21.0107* 1.5834 
ME 0.0013 0.1221 0.0574 1.9628 1.7297 0.7551 0.0148  0.2780 
PH 1.7079 14.2516* 3.1539 0.0123 0.0369 31.9654* 44.8464* 21.6111*  
Period 2 
AR  4.0404 0.1746 0.2617 0.0372 0.0003 1.3812 11.0567* 0.9066 
CA 0.1853  3.9438* 1.6125 4.6597* 0.1156 0.3133 0.4347 0.1498 
CH 10.1621* 34.9300*  3.1504 0.3561 3.7172 3.3154 5.7997* 0.1010 
HK 0.6141 0.2293 0.3507  1.3587 0.8754 1.2146 1.2153 0.2791 
IN 2.7295 11.1985* 0.3360 2.7988  1.1685 0.0004 2.2679 0.1190 
JA 6.9334* 2.4835 0.2473 0.5301 9.1193*  0.0963 19.8764* 0.0034 
MA 0.2961 41.6237* 0.0556 1.4586 4.8040* 0.0431  5.7134* 0.0354 
ME 0.3417 1.9013 5.8493* 7.0776* 5.9476* 0.0175 0.0317  0.2196 
PH 4.4585* 1.9188 3.4670 0.1048 2.8034 2.9135 18.6241* 5.6764*  
Period 3 
AR  0.0942 2.2821 2.3247 0.6841 0.2549 1.6043 11.0567* 8.9147* 
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CA 0.2437    7.7068* 0.1094  1.3281 1.2761 
CH 1.8982    0.0395 0.0610  18.1158* 0.0001 
HK 1.0875    0.0725 0.9606  4.3854* 0.1190 
IN 3.2435* 15.0397* 1.0163 0.9392  0.2493 1.3823 3.1619  
JA 0.0016 4.4913* 0.1710 0.6787 0.5372  1.0101 3.3424 0.6393 
MA 0.7569    0.8998 0.0557  24.6951* 0.9206 
ME 0.3417 0.9011 0.0088 0.1041 0.2514 0.3761 0.8515  0.1953 
PH 0.0125 37.6833* 4.1921* 2.8034  4.2030* 145.304* 1.3063  
* indicates significant at 5% level. 
 
The results of the co-integration test reveal that only 3 sub-periods are not statistically 
co-integrated: Period 2 of Hong Kong/Indonesia, Hong Kong/Philippines, and 
Indonesia/Malaysia. The time period is November 2008, during the global crisis. The 
statistical relationship in terms of the above combinations was discontinued for less than 
a month due to the fluctuation of the economy. The results of the granger causality test 
suggest that although the countries seem to be statistically connected, the underlying 
relationship could be very different. During the first transmission period, the casual 
relationship of 20 of the combinations changed, that is, 55.6%. During the second 
transmission period, 15 of the combinations’ causal relationships changed, equating to 
41.6%. The 14% drop suggests that the countries’ economies begin to recover from the 
shock and stabilise following this. We expect to see similar results in the interest rate 
and the stock markets. However, we found that some of the results from the granger 
causality test are not consistent with the correlation test, e.g. Canada/Philippines and 
Chile/Mexico. The correlation is a criterion with which to measure the strength of the 
relationship between two data sets, although it does not suggest a causal relationship. 
Indeed, while these two areas can have a strong correlation, there is no statistically 
significant causal relationship. We do not view this inconsistency as a problem, but 
instead take the view that combining the results of these tests together helps to more 
effectively explain contagion. Significant changes in both correlation and causality are 
taken as contagion. As for the impulse response figures in Appendix 5, we can see that 
most of the impacts die out within 5 days, with the exception of 4 combinations: 
Argentina and Indonesia in the 2nd period, Canada and Indonesia in the 1st period, 
Canada and Philippines in the 2nd period, and Chile and Indonesia in the 1st period. For 
Argentina/Indonesia, and Canada/Philippines, their impact on each other is quite 
volatile. Given a positive shock in one country, the other will suffer from a turbulence 
lasting 10 to 15 days. While in the case of Canada/Indonesia and Chile/Indonesia, the 
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effects are quite stable. A positive shock in Indonesia will give rise to a positive effect in 
Chile and a negative effect in Canada lasting for 30 to 40 days. 
 
Table 99: Co-Integration Test of Interest Rate 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
Argentina/Canada 58.3689**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
61.7911**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
13.1402[4] 
{I(1)/I(0)} 
41.6324**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
234.0141**[7] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Argentina/Chile 59.9159**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 83.3098**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
207.0432**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
    
Argentina/Hongkong 82.8492**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
92.4937**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
12.0386[1] 
{I(1)/I(0)} 
178.3860**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Argentina/Indonesia 99.7837**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
58.7638**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
119.8383**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
133.6921**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Argentina/Japan 45.7203**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
100.1082**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
26.9253**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
76.6926**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Argentina/Malaysia 55.3251**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
890.6796**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
164.2532**[5] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
46.9793**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Argentina/Mexico 64.8578**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
93.8324**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
33.3350**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
42.1204**[7] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Argentina/Philippines 71.4014**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
67.5585**[5] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
23.2660**[4] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
208.9621**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Canada/Chile 132.4342**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
45.0871**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
170.4536**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
203.3133**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Canada/Hongkong 160.2221**[6] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
60.2147**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
141.4111**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
  
Canada/Indonesia 167.9259**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
22.5461**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
58.7514**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
77.2112**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
104.9445**[4] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Canada/Japan 99.9051**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
35.1501**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
19.2473*[7] 
{I(1)/I(0)} 
131.7375**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Canada/Malaysia 7.2475[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
886.8967**[7] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
224.4375**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
85.4352**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Canada/Mexico 169.5683**[5] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
42.4761**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
15.8900*[1] 
{I(1)/I(0)} 
183.2078**[5] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Canada/Philippines 131.4670**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
60.2102**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
167.2223**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
78.3755**[5] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Chile/Hongkong 176.1460**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
190.6605**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
187.6405**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
  
Chile/Indonesia 201.3414**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
132.8004**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
132.7912**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
158.9366**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Chile/Japan 172.6561**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
20.8603**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
117.0241**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
  
Chile/Malaysia 55.2468**[6] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
636.5282**[4] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
191.6041**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
  
Chile/Mexico 196.5399**[1] 45.0121**[6] 221.5525**[6]   
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{I(0)/I(0)} {I(0)/I(0)} {I(0)/I(0)} 
Chile/Philippines 150.9323**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
224.1824**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
115.8235**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
  
Hongkong/Indonesia 215.8677**[7] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
10.6636[1] 
{I(1)/I(0)} 
121.4353**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
119.5632**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Hongkong/Japan 85.4242**[7] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
34.4240**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
97.0311**[5] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
  
Hongkong/Malaysia 59.6822**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
876.1720**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
162.3233**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
  
Hongkong/Mexico 178.7995**[5] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
39.1277**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
195.0950**[6] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
  
Hongkong/Philippines 148.9356**[4] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
27.2417**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
212.6720**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
  
Indonesia/Japan 113.7174**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
67.2175**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
104.1904**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
53.5257**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Indonesia/Malaysia 69.0191**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
365.5976**[7] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
147.8165**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
13.7214[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Indonesia/Mexico 200.1105**[5] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
38.3744**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
117.2997**[5] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
136.0915**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Indonesia/Philippines 188.5820**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
20.8616**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
143.0839**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
127.2036**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Japan/Malaysia 188.1869**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
27.8287**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
851.8021**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
  
Japan/Mexico 203.2295**[6] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
255.3611**[5] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
   
Japan/Philippines 114.8301**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
49.1635**[5] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
115.5563**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
  
Malaysia/Mexico 205.7516**[5] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
31.0157**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
901.0259**[6] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
  
Malaysia/Philippines 82.4884**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
880.2931**[7] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
   
Mexico/Philippines 156.0841**[5] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
54.3924**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
214.1199**[5] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
  
The statistics in this table are trace statistics. ** indicates significant at 1% level. The number in [] and {} are 
the number of the best fitting lag terms and the integration level respectively. 
 
Table 100: Granger Causality Test of Interest Rate 
 AR CA CH HK IN JA MA ME PH 
Period 1 
AR  0.0197 4.2585* 1.9804  1.6165 0.0031 1.0649 0.1112 0.0702 
CA 0.0056  0.0722 33.1267* 0.0960* 3.8499 0.0102 2.2451 5.9975* 
CH 12.1749* 3.0509  1.8948 0.6668 0.0157 0.1065 0.0008 8.5126* 
HK 0.2752 1.3447 0.2682  2.6778 4.0025* 0.5628 0.1381 0.1506 
IN 0.4408 5.3025* 1.8722 0.5126  1.2111 0.2117 0.0406 0.1505 
JA 4.7420* 3.5919 0.0195 3.1157* 2.4892  30.7316* 1.8431 1.1953 
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MA 0.0230 1.3060 2.4028 0.5734 0.2110 1.1535  0.0046 0.1402 
ME 0.1562 0.6790 0.0005 0.1943 0.3141 49.1882* 0.0042  0.0016 
PH 0.9209 0.0001 1.3949 0.3071 0.5332 0.0103 0.0301 0.7164  
Period 2 
AR  0.3717 0.1977 0.0041 0.4980 8.9692* 0.1448 0.0266 0.2638 
CA 1.3208  0.0282 3.6344 0.7397 0.1026 0.9893 0.1907 1.5663 
CH 0.1489 0.0023  0.1006 0.6760 0.0072 39.4898* 82.6375* 0.5031 
HK 0.5857 0.5061 0.0347  6.6160* 0.1856 3.8961* 0.3854 2.4791 
IN 0.1046 0.0443 0.1602 0.0082  0.8388 0.8223 2.2641 0.6543 
JA 22.9379* 0.3000 0.0265 2.9870 1.4861  0.0752 1.7610 0.0034 
MA 1.7242 22.8389* 0.0551 0.6898 0.4195 0.0838  0.0682 0.8671 
ME 3.3598 0.2824 0.1645 1.2269 4.4504* 2.9850* 0.0007  0.6131 
PH 0.4155 0.9308 4.2528* 5.6039* 1.2454 0.7207 0.0020 0.3911  
Period 3 
AR  1.3559 0.8644 0.0796 2.1392 0.7534 0.5678 0.1385 1.8399 
CA 0.2362  0.8587 0.0116 0.8666 0.2500 1.1299 3.0207 0.5715 
CH 19.0690* 0.8648  0.0161 0.0861 0.0333 2.8453 0.5802 1.3566 
HK 0.2284 0.4407 0.4011  0.0725 1.6668 0.6933 0.5936 12.9265* 
IN 0.3285 1.6782 0.0348 0.9392  0.2493 1.0170 1.3776 0.2927 
JA 1.0164 0.0437 0.0129 72.3084* 0.5372  0.2840  0.9595 
MA 1.8273 0.7235 0.0721 0.8354 0.0846 0.1294  0.7423  
ME 0.3965 0.8422 9.4042* 0.2107 1.9840  4.8222*  2.8341 
PH 0.1061 1.1704 0.4735 19.2231* 0.9959 1.7475  0.2457  
Period 4 
AR  0.2771  1.8174 0.6395 0.0386 1.6043 1.2918 1.7745 
CA 0.0036  2.3048  0.5984 0.2191 3.4403 0.0700 1.2761 
CH  1.6603   2.1425     
HK 0.8535    2.3524     
IN 0.6087 2.4137 0.4011 1.7306  2.0304 1.3823 0.2282 0.0808 
JA 8.1894* 0.9852   0.6137     
MA 0.7569 0.0066   0.8998     
ME 1.2291 0.1611   0.0081     
PH 0.0052 37.6833*   0.7542     
Period 5 
AR  2.8596        
CA 1.0383    1.1365     
CH          
HK          
IN  0.2291        
JA          
MA          
ME          
PH          
* indicates significant at 5% level. 
 
182 
 
An additional number of time periods were not co-integrated due to the increase in the 
number of breakpoints: Canada/Malaysia in Period 1, Hong Kong/Indonesia in Period 2, 
Argentina/Canada and Argentina/Hong Kong in Period 3, and Indonesia/Malaysia in 
Period 4. As for the causality test, we found that the relationships of 19 combinations 
changed, (14 in the second period and 2 in the third period). This agrees with what we 
anticipated in terms of exchange rate. The interest rate market exhibited similar 
behaviour. Indeed, the number of changes in causal relationship decreased regularly 
with the passage of time due to the fact that the countries are gradually recovering from 
the crisis while both the economy and the casual relationship are stabilising. The results 
of impulse response analysis are quite similar to those of the exchange rate market. 
Most of the impacts fade away in less than 5 days, with the exception of 4 combinations: 
Argentina/Mexico in period 4, Hong Kong/Japan in period 3, Hong Kong/Philippines in 
period 2, and Japan/Mexico in period 2. The effect lasts from 10 to 20 days across all of 
these 4 combinations. Hong Kong has a negative reaction and Mexico has a positive 
reaction to a positive shock in Japan while the responses of all other combinations to 
each other are very volatile.  
 
Table 101: Co-Integration Test of Stock 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Argentina/Canada 180.7061**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
26.6029**[2] 
{I(1)/I(0)} 
307.3600**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Argentina/Chile 153.1458**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 33.7459**[8] 
{I(1)/I(0)} 
 243.9566**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Argentina/Hongkong 185.1066**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
319.2193**[5] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Argentina/Indonesia 16.2343*[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
267.1058**[8] 
{I(1)/I(0)} 
183.1506**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Argentina/Japan 187.9559**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
112.0539**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 209.9756**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Argentina/Malaysia 192.7965**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
279.7391**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Argentina/Mexico 172.5813**[4] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
83.7016**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
179.8376**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Argentina/Philippines 153.9304**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
283.4737**[5] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Canada/Chile 184.5262**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
16.4981*[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
240.3194**[4] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Canada/Hongkong 186.2131**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
37.0500**[7] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
319.2676**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
183 
 
Canada/Indonesia 191.6332**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
291.7384**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Canada/Japan 243.8776**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
100.0945**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
214.1870**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Canada/Malaysia 203.7142**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
28.7830**[7] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
300.3893**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Canada/Mexico 196.3756**[4] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
82.3990**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
185.1490**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Canada/Philippines 158.4511**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
27.2907**[7] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
273.6232**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Chile/Hongkong 166.8783**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
37.6684**[4] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
260.6226**[4] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Chile/Indonesia 160.1245**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
36.4866**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
241.3526**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Chile/Japan 232.0590**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
71.0268**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
220.4077**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Chile/Malaysia 178.5974**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
36.8727**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
240.3057**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Chile/Mexico 194.3241**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
55.3229**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
179.7993**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Chile/Philippines 149.8900**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
35.2104**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
236.4205**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Hongkong/Indonesia 155.1626**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
34.2678**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
258.1889**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Hongkong/Japan 228.3733**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
113.1412**[4] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
201.3333**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Hongkong/Malaysia 210.6165**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
264.2220**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Hongkong/Mexico 186.0583**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
125.0175**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
231.7350**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Hongkong/Philippines 171.0564**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
291.5815**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Indonesia/Japan 222.3252**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
83.4177**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
188.6119**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Indonesia/Malaysia 197.9368**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
16.6331*[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
253.3888**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Indonesia/Mexico 170.4331**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
94.2743**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
176.3232**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Indonesia/Philippines 160.9010**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
23.7806**[8] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
258.6348**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Japan/Malaysia 222.9677**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
97.8163**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
195.3620**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Japan/Mexico 326.6384**[4] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
205.5193**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Japan/Philippines 184.3861**[1] 121.8940**[6] 197.2869**[1] 
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{I(0)/I(0)} {I(0)/I(0)} {I(0)/I(0)} 
Malaysia/Mexico 188.6729**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
80.0073**[3] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
180.2953**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
Malaysia/Philippines 180.3467**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
262.7015**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
 
Mexico/Philippines 161.3993**[1] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
110.1434**[7] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
164.6006**[2] 
{I(0)/I(0)} 
The statistics in this table are trace statistics. ** indicates significant at 1% level. 
The number in [] and {} are the number of the best fitting lag terms and the 
integration level respectively. 
 
Table 102: Granger Causality Test of Stock 
 AR CA CH HK IN JA MA ME PH 
Period 1 
AR  0.1690 1.4044 2.2897 3.1271 0.8991 0.1491 0.0451 0.0132 
CA 0.2678  1.2847 0.7179 0.2104 0.9672 1.4543 8.0102* 0.0302 
CH 0.1383 2.1774  0.8578 1.0972 14.5362* 2.0081 6.1170* 0.7835 
HK 31.8625* 39.3414* 22.4567*  0.1030 1.0589 0.1234 61.5955* 1.1804 
IN 25.1662* 26.7660* 17.5414* 0.0289  1.4517 0.2622 43.1467* 2.1286 
JA 69.4733* 95.6375* 92.3416* 11.5272* 9.0061*  2.9652 157.931* 3.1577 
MA 22.0396* 21.3638* 18.2217* 2.9701 4.8631* 0.1557  30.7888* 0.8218 
ME 4.7485* 1.5057 3.5246 3.3774 0.8137 3.0744 10.0318*  3.1945 
PH 31.2070* 29.4202* 35.3370* 2.2472 5.5576* 0.5780 0.4259 95.2648*  
Period 2 
AR  0.6890 2.3375 9.7245* 0.0014 14.0141* 1.3812 3.3337 6.4931* 
CA 0.0005  0.1527 0.0495 0.8335 0.8056 1.3690 0.0221 0.7032 
CH 5.5E-06 1.1934  0.3339 0.0611 0.0020 3.3289 0.4894 2.0E-06 
HK 50.6814* 7.2961* 5.7990*  2.1765 5.5965* 0.5100 31.6319* 0.5261 
IN 1.5765 28.8865* 1.9425 5.7678*  0.7476 1.3111 15.4298* 0.0086 
JA 22.9432* 19.2831* 13.6062* 1.8360 1.6077  0.7275 51.9141* 0.1231 
MA 43.5858* 6.6452* 5.5255* 0.3607 7.0351* 2.5027  15.0592* 0.7633 
ME 3.3001 0.2042 1.0349 1.0656 2.7558 0.0028 10.2591*  0.0061 
PH 79.8337* 15.4820* 8.2544* 5.8021* 0.0011 3.2583 4.7563* 66.9712*  
Period 3 
AR  8.9021* 4.9949*  2.7871 2.2884  5.7754*  
CA 0.0436  1.1626 1.0118  0.9095 0.9432 2.8528 0.0016 
CH 0.2509 0.4187  0.1281 0.3064 0.0080 0.1943 0.6652 0.0128 
HK  43.4836* 31.3864*  2.2907 4.2020*  55.4538*  
IN 27.5036*  10.1826* 0.5021  3.9881* 1.1736 14.2562* 0.5878 
JA 29.7197* 56.9207* 42.6368* 7.4287* 9.1872*  11.0877*  1.2472 
MA  36.7263* 23.5160*  2.5670 1.2095  21.3310*  
ME 1.7730 0.7922 0.1860 0.0795 0.5601  0.0269  1.3559 
PH  107.988* 45.9077*  9.0218* 1.3653  38.1280*  
* indicates significant at 5% level. 
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Stock market again exhibited the most stable behaviour. All of the time periods are 
statistically co-integrated. The casual relationships of 16 combinations changed in the 
first transmission period while 14 changed in the second. This result indicates that 
although contagion occurred, the countries are still statistically related. However, this 
results also imply that it is hard for market participants to make investment decisions 
due to the variety of market linkages. As for the impulse response analysis, only the 
impacts of 2 combinations lasted longer than 5 days: Canada/Malaysia in period 2, and 
Indonesia/Hong Kong in period 2. Their impacts on each other are very volatile and last 
for 15 to 25 days. 
 
To sum up, while we still observe some contagion effects with this methodology, there 
are not as many as with the correlation methodology. We did not detect many changes in 
the co-integration relationships. Indeed, they seem to be always co-integrated, with the 
exception of some rare samples. With this said, the granger causality test reveals that 
there is something else going on. The underlying relationship is much more complicated 
than the co-integration test suggests. While the data may still be co-integrated, the 
causal relationship may change more than once. 
7.7 Conclusion 
We have identified and analysed contagion using 3 different methods. The results we 
have obtained do not support the importance of the relationship between trade links and 
region, as was the case with many of the previous studies. Although it has been argued 
that geographic proximity tends to increase the probability of contagion (Forbes and 
Rigobon, 2002), our results do not support that conclusion.  
 
The neighbourhood effect (Gregorio and Valdés, 2001) is trivial to our study. Indeed, its 
role in our study are quite weak, with the exception of the correlation tests in the stock 
market. In this case, we found that countries with a high degree of dependence on 
foreign trade are less likely to experience contagion. This result is not consistent with 
our conclusion in Chapter 6 where we argued that higher trade linkages bring more 
transmission channels. However, it seems that not only can trade bring more 
possibilities of aggressive contagion effect, it can also dilute negative transmission.  
The two-sided nature of trade linkages in regard to contagion are worthy of great 
attention. This further illustrate the complications of foreign trade policy. A 
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country-specific evaluation of trade policy is strongly recommended. During the process, 
we also found that excessive volatility can be adjusted, and that the change during 
transmission periods might not be as significant once the volatility has been adjusted. 
By analysing the overall and the split shocks separately, we are able to see how the 
common shock and idiosyncratic shock affect the overall movement.  
 
In this empirical study, we found that common shock prevails in determining the 
contagion in exchange rate, while the effect of both shocks must be considered in order 
to understand the overall movement in interest rate and stock markets. Moreover, the 
impulse response analysis suggests that the contagion effects do not normally last longer 
than 5 days, although they will occasionally last longer than 10 days. This result does 
not support the suggestion that long-run policy adjustment is more helpful in dealing 
with financial contagion (Gravelle, Kichian and Morley, 2006). Since contagion appears 
to transfer within a very short time interval, immediate or short-run adjustment might 
turn out to be much more useful to overcome the negative fluctuation caused by 
contagion. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
This thesis has introduced a number of new features with a view to filling the existing 
gaps in the literature. In doing so, we have also studied financial contagion under a 
more comprehensive definition.  
 
In general, the word ‘contagion’ suggests that the changes in one market somehow 
affect the structure of another market. In order to gain a more precise understanding, we 
reviewed the definitions of contagion used in empirical work. To our knowledge there 
are five definitions. Indeed, in undertaking this review we find that studies under these 
definitions tend to include an increasing number of features. The studies of contagion 
have become more and more comprehensive, while we can also identify the gaps still to 
be filled in the definitional context.  
 
While previous studies have examined the effects of the macroeconomic fundamentals 
from many angles, the shock component is completely ignored as that which cannot be 
directly explained by fundamentals. This is the main definitional gap that we are trying 
to fill. Moreover, in our study, this gap is filled by what we define as ‘pure contagion’ 
which, in turn, is identified by using our revised version of the ‘Identification through 
Heteroscedasticity’ procedure.  
 
It was our intention to benefit from the advantages offered by previous techniques, 
should they fit our purpose. Moreover, we have sought to take inspiration from their 
disadvantages and to bring in new features so as to make possible improvements. With 
this in mind, we have also reviewed certain representative methods used in previous 
studies in order to outline the reasons behind the use of our methodology.  
 
Following the review, we conclude that there are two advantages we would like to use. 
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The first relates to using the ability of the ‘Identification through Heteroscedasticity’ 
procedure to split shocks into common shock and idiosyncratic shock in order to 
address our ‘pure contagion’. Secondly, we felt that the capacity of the Correlation 
Method to capture overall effects would be extremely useful.  
 
Meanwhile, we have also noticed certain gaps which need filling. In the first place, we 
bring in the long and short memory feature to measure the effects of autocorrelation, 
thus answering the question of whether or not long persistence autocorrelation affects 
contagion in the same way as short persistence autocorrelation. In the second place, 
while the literature adjusted for heteroscedasticity by direct calculation, we were curious 
as to whether this could be achieved in another way.  
 
We hence designed a methodology to address the above issues. The pure contagion 
feature was addressed by splitting the shock into common shock and idiosyncratic 
shock using the ‘Identification through Heteroscedasticity’ procedure. The long and 
short memory feature was addressed by employing the ARFIMA model to obtain the 
residuals for the testing procedure. However, we would like to see how the results look 
when this feature is not properly addressed, and thus we will also check the results of 
the ARMA model. In addition to this, the heteroscedasticity feature was addressed by 
using the Bai-Perron breakpoint test, which has a better performance under 
heteroscedasticity.  
 
Nonetheless, we would like to compare the results with those of the Andrews-Ploberger 
test, which also requires homoscedasticity, so that we can check the effect of the 
adjustment. Finally, we cannot use the original Markov-Switching regime to solve our 
system, entailing that we must use a new algorithm; namely, the nonlinear iterative 
method. 
 
The interbank rate from seven European countries has served as our first dependent 
variable. By estimating exogenously the breakpoints before the contagion test and 
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introducing the long memory and short memory feature, we may improve the power of 
the tests compared to Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006). In order to fulfil our 
intention of highlighting the effect of pure contagion, each of the pairs of research 
targets has low degree of dependence on foreign trade in relation to each other. The 
results from the four testing procedures suggest a massive proportion of cross border 
contagion effects in both interdependence and pure contagion, which is consistent with 
previous studies (see Gallegati, 2012; Peng and Ng, 2012).  
 
As for our findings in regard to the pure contagion, they not only confirmed our 
hypothesis but also helped to fill the blank in existing empirical work, that which 
concludes that the contagion effects in the price movements are excessively related to 
fundamentals (Kodres and Pritsker, 2002). On the contrary, our results suggests that 
pure contagion is the reason for the excess co-movement in the fundamentals. Therefore, 
the observation from previous studies is biased due to the fact that pure contagion is not 
properly considered.  
 
In addition to this, we also found that interdependence and pure contagion usually move 
in the same direction. Excessive variance was repeatedly found during the crisis period 
(Chiang, Jeon and Li, 2007). Our results confirm this conclusion. However, it also leads 
to greater hedging risk as it damages the benefit of international diversification. This 
concern is also shared by other studies.  
 
Baur (2012) finds that due to the limited effectiveness of portfolio diversification, both 
countries and markets are very vulnerable during a financial crisis. Therefore, pure 
contagion brings more uncertainty to diversification strategies. The effect of news on 
contagion has been widely studied in empirical work. Important related news - for 
instance, the rescue plan for Greece - has a significant effect on asset prices (Mink and 
De Haan, 2013). In addition, the effects of negative and positive news on the correlation 
between markets are not very different (Yiu, Ho and Choi, 2010).  
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Moreover, our results suggest that the government’s macroeconomic regulations, as well 
as personnel adjustments and elections, can result in breakpoints for the period chosen. 
This suggests that we should consider as confidential information by the government 
not only news related directly to fundamentals, but also the news that imply possible 
changes in fundamental. Last but not least, unlike with previous literature, we have also 
observed counter-contagion effects. Inci, Li and McCarthy (2011) may have observed 
no reverse contagion effects, but we observed that the counter-contagion period usually 
offsets the previous contagion effect and it sometimes bent back so hard that it changed 
the direction of contagion. As a result, being that the market tend to be self-revision, we 
conclude that long-run regulation is unnecessary when the sole purpose of the 
government is to deal with financial crisis. However, short-run adjustments may be 
needed just in case the turbulence grows out of control. 
 
We will then widen our study by including trade links in our analysis. Here we will 
choose three pairs of European countries that have the highest degree of dependence on 
foreign trade among all combinations as research targets. We would assume that the 
stronger trade links might make the countries more vulnerable to events which imply 
political changes. The results of our breakpoint tests and the chronology support this 
assumption, which is consist with previous studies (Gravelle, Kichian and Morley, 2006; 
Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). Moreover, as indicated by our causality tests, the 
dissemination of contagion is easier, being that more causal relationships are detected 
indicating that more trade related channels may become available.  
 
This conclusion shows that governments should pay more attention to the evaluation of 
their foreign trade policy, and should take this evaluation into consideration when 
building their financial immunity system. However, all of these differences seem trivial 
when identifying contagion. On the one hand, the effects of the econometric features (i.e. 
the long and short memory, heteroscedasticity) are not affected by the change in trade 
links. On the other hand, the extra sensitivity in long memory processes suggest an 
increased number of fundamental related transmission channels resulting from the 
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higher degree of trade links. This result further supports the theory that the transmission 
of contagion does depend on the completeness of the financial and political structure 
(Allen and Gale, 1998). Unlike the conclusions of previous empirical work (Syllignakis 
and Kouretas, 2011), we conclude that the explanatory power of trade linkage is much 
less significant and limited within the boundary of fundamental interdependence. In 
addition, the decrease in the number of the fundamental related events suggests that the 
higher trade link does not diminish our ability to identify contagion, especially pure 
contagion. 
 
After examining the split shocks and the new features, we assessed the region, the 
overall effects, and the roles of the split shocks and the duration of the identified 
contagion effects. Surprisingly, the role of region, having been emphasised by many 
empirical studies (Glick and Rose, 1999; Gregorio and Valdés, 2001; Hernandez and 
Valdes, 2001; Rigobon, 2002) is trivial in our study. The results do not support the 
neighbourhood effect. Contrary to the conclusions of previous research (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 2000), we argue that crisis tends to be global, not regional. However, countries 
in different regions do react differently to crisis as Naoui, Liouane and Brahim (2010) 
have illustrated. Therefore, government should bear in mind that the economic 
experience of other countries may not be very helpful in view of the difference between 
country characteristics.  
 
Trade links appear to have a different function. Instead of bringing more possibilities 
into contagion, trade link dilute them. It appears that instead of worrying about their 
neighbours, countries should pay more attention to their global trade partners. We also 
found that our overall shock has many contagion effects, so disagreeing with Forbes and 
Rigobon’s (2002) conclusion that there is ‘no contagion, only interdependence’. By 
combining the results of the overall shocks and the split shocks together, we are then 
able to fill a blank in contagion literature and examine how the split effects affect the 
overall movement. In our case, we found that the role of common shock is slightly more 
important than that of the idiosyncratic shock, especially in regard to the exchange rate.  
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Last but not least, the impulse response analysis suggests that the contagion effects do 
not normally last long and die out in a short period of time. This result is not in line with 
Gravelle, Kichian and Morley’s (2006) work. Like Degryse, Elahi and Penas (2010), we 
believe that the transmission of contagion is too fast for long-run policies to come into 
play, entailing that short-run or immediate adjustments will be much more effective. 
 
It would be appreciated if future studies can fill the following gaps: 
1. Our method is based on the study by Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006) and we 
were unable to change one of their assumptions. That is, the initial correlation between 
the common shocks of two countries is 1 and the idiosyncratic shock is independent of 
the common shock. We must admit that the initial correlation could very well be any 
value other than 1, while it is possible that the idiosyncratic shock has a certain linkage 
with common shock. The power of our method would be improved if there was any way 
to identify these initial correlations. 
 
2. Although we can see that the roles of common shock and idiosyncratic shock vary 
depending on different research targets, we are unable to ascertain the reason behind 
these differences. Therefore, the question seems to be: is there any other feature which 
we must consider, or is this simply a random result? Indeed, it would be even more 
helpful if countries understood their vulnerability to shocks once this question has been 
answered.
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Appendix 1 Financial Crisis Since 1927 
 Time Period Countries Affected Summary 
Great Depression Started in 1929 and 
lasted until the late 
1930s or early 1940s 
Almost every country Started with the fall in stock prices that began around September 4, 1929 and became 
worldwide news with the stock market crash of October 29, 1929 (Black Tuesday). 
Unemployment rose, adverse impact on price, massive bank failures and stock market crash. 
Oil Crisis Oct 1973-Mar 1974 East Asia, West Europe, 
Latin America, Australia, 
U.S. 
Followed by the 1973-1974 stock market crash, caused certain economy shifting from 
oil-intensive industries to more fuel efficient industries. The Western nations’ central banks 
decided to sharply cut interest rates to encourage growth. The U.S. power was under attack 
even in Latin America after the oil embargo. 
Stock Market Crash Jan 1973-Dec 1974 U.S., Europe, East Asia Dow Jones Industrial Average lost over 45% of its value, FT 30 lost 73% of its value, and 
Hong Kong Hang Seng Index fell from 1800 to 300. 
Latin American Debt 
Crisis 
Early 1980s Latin America Mexico’s Finance Minister declared that Mexico would no longer be able to service its debt. In 
the wake of Mexico’s default, Most commercial banks reduced significantly or halted new 
lending to Latin America. As much of Latin America’s loans were short-term, the crisis ensued 
when their refinancing was refused. 
Saving and Loan Crisis 1986-1995 U.S. More than 1600 banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation were closed or 
received financial assistance. The federal government ultimately appropriated 105 billion 
dollars to resolve the crisis. 
Japanese Banking Crisis 1990-2003 Japan Stock market reduced 60% from Oct 1989 to Aug 1992, the central bank lowered the interest 
rate form 6% to 0.5% in ten years, massive bank failure, and overall recession. 
Mexico Crisis Dec 1994-Mar 1995 Started in Mexico, global 
currency crisis 
Sudden devaluation of peso, inflict heavy losses on stock markets. 
Asian Crisis Jun 1997-1999 Asia Start with the devaluation of Thai Baht, Currency declines spread rapidly throughout South 
Asia, in turn causing stock market declines, reduced import revenues and even government 
upheaval. 
Russian Financial Crisis Oct 1997-1999 Started in Russia, It was triggered by the Asia financial crisis, real income reduced dramatically, significant rise 
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triggered global crisis. in price level, especially import goods, great loss in commercial banks. The crisis spread to the 
U.S., Europe, Latin America, triggered global effect. 
Subprime Crisis 2007-2010 Started in the U.S., 
triggered global crisis 
It’s a situation created due to subprime lending. Investment funds were forced to close, 
resulting lack of liquidity in nearly all major financial markets. 
European Sovereign 
Debt Crisis 
2010-present Europe In May 2010, the Greek government deficit was estimated to be 13.6%, which is one of the 
highest in the world relative to GDP. Accumulated government debt is forecast, according to 
some estimates, to hit 120% of GDP in 2010. On 27 April 2010, the Greek debt rating was 
decreased to the first levels of 'junk' status by Standard & Poor's amidst fears of default by the 
Greek government. The crisis spread beyond Greece, reduced confidence in other European 
economies 
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Appendix 2 Degree of Dependence on Foreign Trade 
 Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Czech 
Republic 
Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland 
Belgium  0.034033 0.007215 0.031242 0.015222 0.019131 0.043488 0.041593 0.009907 0.029189 0.003812 
Bulgaria 0.002868  0.002916 0.003113 0.000589 0.00056 0.00064 0.001361 0.009239 0.005184 4.48E-05 
Croatia 0.000851 0.004233  0.003505 0.000626 0.000434 0.000422 0.00128 0.000504 0.006609 0.000113 
Czech 
Republic 
0.01161 0.01359 0.010468  0.004819 0.004149 0.003737 0.019786 0.001685 0.039915 0.000649 
Denmark 0.010287 0.001938 0.003518 0.0087  0.019528 0.003365 0.010906 0.00314 0.007854 0.012345 
Finland 0.01002 0.003444 0.0019 0.005936 0.015136  0.002137 0.005715 0.002175 0.007378 0.002003 
France 0.244429 0.043949 0.020158 0.056958 0.027998 0.022945  0.05987 0.019223 0.05526 0.003664 
Germany 0.305877 0.118495 0.079122 0.394954 0.119013 0.080361 0.07851  0.039717 0.32717 0.024121 
Greece 0.006297 0.070402 0.002672 0.002967 0.002946 0.002614 0.002164 0.003427  0.003525 0.000379 
Hungary 0.007992 0.016165 0.015172 0.029929 0.003252 0.003901 0.00272 0.012268 0.00153  0.000372 
Iceland 0.000394 5.23E-05 9.69E-05 0.000183 0.001937 0.000399 7.28E-05 0.000344 6.63E-05 0.000133  
Italy 0.072029 0.098065 0.106122 0.054643 0.021808 0.019192 0.038469 0.040835 0.033573 0.069081 0.004536 
Latvia 0.000643 0.000609 0.000144 0.001282 0.002052 0.003199 0.0002 0.000672 7.6E-05 0.00107 0.002449 
Lithuania 0.001717 0.001192 0.000367 0.00253 0.003025 0.002526 0.000534 0.001199 0.000113 0.001867 0.005718 
Netherlands 0.250135 0.018411 0.009362 0.051156 0.035302 0.035453 0.025073 0.054663 0.013657 0.046653 0.026397 
Norway 0.013145 0.000968 0.001668 0.005212 0.034236 0.016078 0.004008 0.009201 0.000888 0.001966 0.012934 
Poland 0.017714 0.016085 0.008361 0.068759 0.013368 0.011093 0.005623 0.020883 0.002146 0.045166 0.002157 
Romania 0.003583 0.048205 0.004235 0.008703 0.000991 0.000837 0.002148 0.004336 0.004778 0.039718 0.0002 
Sweden 0.029044 0.009198 0.006077 0.015732 0.080634 0.07284 0.00579 0.012385 0.003154 0.017193 0.008145 
Switzerland 0.01864 0.030668 0.008012 0.016255 0.006242 0.006085 0.01248 0.02566 0.004053 0.01324 0.003343 
Ukraine 0.002017 0.007486 0.001847 0.009214 0.001286 0.002239 0.000557 0.00215 0.001526 0.017 0.000742 
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 Italy Latvia Lithuania Netherlands Norway Poland Romania Sweden Switzerland Ukraine 
Belgium 0.015513 0.013598 0.023366 0.147642 0.015972 0.020195 0.013041 0.029478 0.017824 0.008551 
Bulgaria 0.001738 0.001071 0.001385 0.000943 0.000101 0.00157 0.013989 0.000724 0.01034 0.00062 
Croatia 0.002735 0.00037 0.000615 0.000667 0.000247 0.001175 0.00187 0.000736 0.000933 0.000927 
Czech 
Republic 
0.004332 0.009827 0.012809 0.011479 0.002276 0.029103 0.011075 0.005952 0.005635 0.013909 
Denmark 0.003174 0.029932 0.028914 0.014067 0.028418 0.010315 0.002293 0.05542 0.004048 0.003673 
Finland 0.002162 0.035986 0.01861 0.010958 0.010384 0.006598 0.001447 0.038735 0.003042 0.004797 
France 0.046581 0.024619 0.041621 0.08311 0.028226 0.035978 0.043626 0.033088 0.067049 0.013167 
Germany 0.064906 0.107001 0.123489 0.235991 0.083103 0.173689 0.112228 0.092493 0.179813 0.065396 
Greece 0.004626 0.001052 0.001483 0.005137 0.000696 0.00156 0.01136 0.002039 0.002505 0.004202 
Hungary 0.004107 0.00603 0.007113 0.007673 0.000675 0.014275 0.037256 0.004809 0.003507 0.019018 
Iceland 0.000101 0.001962 0.002685 0.001534 0.001606 0.00025 7.64E-05 0.000863 0.000338 9.74E-05 
Italy  0.024596 0.03257 0.048288 0.012772 0.041972 0.108242 0.022206 0.069254 0.041828 
Latvia 0.000245  0.070523 0.000705 0.000719 0.002396 0.000142 0.002268 0.002387 0.000413 
Lithuania 0.000505 0.106474  0.001851 0.001146 0.0064 0.000355 0.002804 0.000695 0.006279 
Netherlands 0.017659 0.024848 0.041581  0.039444 0.02973 0.018994 0.037219 0.021619 0.014892 
Norway 0.002203 0.012279 0.013026 0.019318  0.006606 0.003242 0.039769 0.00293 0.002847 
Poland 0.008 0.04319 0.076134 0.015636 0.007077  0.014976 0.015736 0.004216 0.044095 
Romania 0.006114 0.000884 0.001449 0.003228 0.001131 0.005036  0.001412 0.001478 0.010621 
Sweden 0.004708 0.048103 0.037902 0.021629 0.048105 0.017721 0.004937  0.006309 0.004801 
Switzerland 0.015648 0.011979 0.011017 0.013319 0.003735 0.005121 0.005439 0.006707  0.003654 
Ukraine 0.002156 0.009199 0.021018 0.002187 0.000825 0.012355 0.009204 0.001153 0.000872  
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Appendix 3 Chronology 
 
Germany Greece Latvia 
2005  May - Parliament ratifies EU constitution. 2005  May - Parliament ratifies EU 
constitution. 
2005  May - Parliament ratifies EU 
constitution. 
2006  July - Parliament approves far-reaching changes to the way in which Germany is 
governed; the reforms are intended to speed up decision-making.  
November - Unemployment falls below 4 million for the first time in four years.  
2006September - Greece, Russia and 
Bulgaria back a long-awaited deal to 
build an oil pipeline which will 
carry Russian oil to Europe via 
Alexandropoulis in Greece. 
2006  October - Parties in coalition 
government led by Aigars Kalvitis 
together win parliamentary majority 
in general election. 
2007 2007  August - Wildfires sweep through 
tinder-dry forests across the 
mainland and islands, killing dozens 
of people. 
2007  December - Prime Minister Kalvitis 
resigns, bowing to pressure over 
attempts to sack the country's 
anti-corruption chief. His coalition 
is returned to power in a 
parliamentary vote, with Ivars 
Godmanis as new prime minister. 
2008October - Germany agrees a $68bn plan to save one of the country's largest banks, 
Hypo Real Estate, from collapse. 
November - Germany is declared to be officially in recession. 
2008 2008   May - Latvian parliament approves 
European Union's Lisbon Treaty. 
Financial crisis. 
December - International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) approves 
1.68bn euro rescue package to 
help Latvia ride out severe 
economic slump. 
2009February - Parliament approves $63bn stimulus package aimed at shoring up 
recession-hit economy.  
2009October - Opposition Pasok socialist 
party wins snap election called by 
2009  June - The Central Bank spends 
almost a billion euros in 2009 to 
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August - Figures are released showing that economy grew by 0.3% in last quarter, 
bringing country out of recession. 
October - The parties reach agreement on major tax cut proposals. Official data 
shows the German economy shrank by 5% in 2009, hit by a slump in exports and 
investment. 
PM Karamanlis. support the lat currency, prevent 
devaluation and avoid a domino 
effect elsewhere in Eastern Europe. 
August - Government, trade unions 
and employers agree deep public 
spending cuts aimed at saving the 
country from bankruptcy and 
getting the IMF to release a further 
tranche of rescue loans. 
October - Government agrees to 
slash budget deficit in 2010 in 
order to meet targets imposed by 
EU in exchange for 7.5bn rescue 
loans. 
2010May - Germany's parliament votes to approve a 22.4bn euro German contribution to 
bail out debt-ridden Greece, prompting widespread public anger.  
September - Cabinet approves controversial plan to extend lifespan of Germany's 
nuclear reactors, reversing 2001 decision to phase out nuclear energy by 2021. 
2010  January~March - Government 
announces two more rounds of 
tough austerity measures, and faces 
mass protests and strikes. 
April~May - Fears of a possible 
default on Greece's debts prompt 
eurozone countries to approve a 
$145bn (110bn euros; £91bn) 
rescue package for the country. 
October - Government announces 
new, tougher, austerity measures in 
2011 draft budget. Measures 
include new taxes and higher rate 
of VAT. 
2010January - Unemployment soars to 
20%, giving Latvia the highest 
jobless rate in the EU. 
March - Largest coalition party 
leaves government following 
repeated disagreements over 
austerity measures, depriving PM 
Valdis Dombrovskis of his 
majority. 
2011  January - Provisional figures show the economy grew by 3.6% in 2010, its fastest 2011  February - International lenders say 2011 
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pace since reunification in 1990. Economists attributed the rate to a recovery in 
exports. 
austerity measures so far 
implemented do not go far enough, 
and that Greece must speed up 
reforms to get its finances back on 
track. 
Iceland Bulgaria Romania Lithuania 
2005 2005 2005  May - Parliament ratifies EU 
constitution. 
2005 
2006June - Prime Minister Halldor 
Asgrimsson resigns and amid 
concerns about the economy. 
2006 2006  September - European Commission 
confirms that Romania - and 
Bulgaria - will join the EU at the 
start of 2007, although under strict 
conditions. 
2006 
2007 2007 2007 2007 
2008  April - The government warns that 
it may intervene in the country's 
currency and stock markets to fight 
hedge funds that it says are 
attacking Iceland's financial system. 
October - The government takes 
over control of all three of 
Iceland's major banks in an effort 
to stabilise the financial system, 
which has been hit hard by the 
global financial crisis. 
 
2008  September - European Commission 
permanently strips Bulgaria of half 
of the aid frozen in July over what it 
says is the government's failure to 
tackle corruption and organised 
crime. 
2008 2008  October - The conservative 
Homeland Union party becomes 
largest party after parliamentary 
elections, pushing Prime Minister 
Gediminas Kirkilas's Social 
Democrats into second place. 
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2009  July - Iceland formally applies for 
EU membership after parliament 
votes in favour of accession. 
2009 2009 2009  April - National statistics office 
publishes figures showing that 
Lithuania's GDP plunged 12.6% in 
the first quarter of 2009, compared 
to the same period last year. 
2010  February - Unemployment soars to 
over 15,000 (over 9% of work force) 
- up from just over 1,500 (1% of 
work force) at the beginning of 
2008, before the financial crisis took 
hold. 
 
2010June - EU expresses concern over 
reliability of Bulgarian national 
statistics and says these may have to 
be subjected to EU scrutiny. 
July - Former PM Sergei Stanishev 
is accused of failing to return files 
containing state secrets relating to 
security and organised crime after 
losing the 2009 election, and is 
charged with mishandling 
classified documents. 
September - EU calls on Bulgaria 
to take urgent action to tackle 
crime and corruption. 
2010  February - Romanian Defence 
Council agrees to host missile 
interceptors as part of new US 
defence shield, subject to 
parliamentary approval. 
2010 
2011 February - Parliament approves new 
deal to settle UK banking dispute 
with UK and Netherlands. 
2011 2011 2011 
Find more at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/country_profiles/default.stm 
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Appendix 4 Bai-Perron Breakpoint Test Results 
Latvia and Germany’s Risk premium 
Specifications 
tz =ar(1)    q =1     p =0     h =202   m =5      =0.15 
Tests 
(1)TSupF    
(2)TSupF     
(3)TSupF     
(4)TSupF     
(5)TSupF    
(2 |1)TSupF  
31.85 *      25.38*      17.00*       22.48 *      18.22*       35.36* 
(3 | 2)TSupF  
(4 | 3)TSupF  
(5 | 4)TSupF  
maxUD  maxWD  
2.19          2.19       2.19        31.85*   39.97* 
Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure:     2 
LWZ:            1 
BIC:          1 
Breakpoint found 
642, 844 (2009/10/12, 2010/07/21) 
Note 
m : maximum number of breakpoint; h : minimum length of distance; *: significant at 5% level 
 
Greece and Germany’s Risk premium 
Specifications 
tz =ar(1)    q =1     p =0     h =202    m =5      =0.15 
Tests 
(1)TSupF     
(2)TSupF     
(3)TSupF     
(4)TSupF    
(5)TSupF      
(2 |1)TSupF  
36.49 *      209.4*      135.7*       160.9 *      128.8*        62.62* 
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(3 | 2)TSupF  
(4 | 3)TSupF  
(5 | 4)TSupF  
maxUD   maxWD  
  5.42       0.65       0.00        209.4*     282.7* 
Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure:     2 
LWZ:            2 
BIC:          2 
Breakpoint found 
658, 1022 (2009/11/03, 2011/03/28) 
Note 
m : maximum number of breakpoint; h : minimum length of distance; *: significant at 5% level 
 
Iceland and Germany’s Risk premium 
Specifications 
tz =ar(9)    q =1     p =0     h =200   m =5      =0.15 
Tests 
(1)TSupF   
(2)TSupF   
(3)TSupF   
(4)TSupF   
(5)TSupF   
(2 |1)TSupF  
10.08 *      4.96      4.92       5.97      4.32       1.09 
(3 | 2)TSupF   
(4 | 3)TSupF   
(5 | 4)TSupF   
maxUD   maxWD  
 4.66        1.54         0.00         10.08*     10.26* 
Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure:     1 
LWZ:            1 
BIC:          1 
Breakpoint found 
385 (2008/10/16) 
Note 
203 
 
m : maximum number of breakpoint; h : minimum length of distance; *: significant at 5% level 
 
Bulgaria and Germany’s Risk premium 
Specifications 
tz =ar(1)    q =1    p =0   h =202   m =5      =0.15 
Tests 
(1)TSupF   
(2)TSupF   
(3)TSupF   
(4)TSupF   
(5)TSupF   
(2 |1)TSupF  
30.34*     25.82*     18.91*    16.86*     14.23*      9.51* 
(3 | 2)TSupF   
(4 | 3)TSupF   
(5 | 4)TSupF   
maxUD   maxWD  
 3.50        1.64         0.38         30.34*     31.23* 
Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure:     2 
LWZ:            1 
BIC:          2 
Breakpoint found 
430, 1119 (2008/12/18, 2011/8/10) 
Note 
m : maximum number of breakpoint; h : minimum length of distance; *: significant at 5% level 
 
Romania and Germany’s Risk premium 
Specifications 
tz =ar(1)    q =1     p =0     h =202   m =5      =0.15 
Tests 
(1)TSupF    
(2)TSupF     
(3)TSupF    
(4)TSupF    
(5)TSupF   
(2 |1)TSupF  
53.16*      75.29*       67.92*      57.52*      3.39       109.8* 
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(3 | 2)TSupF   
(4 | 3)TSupF   
(5 | 4)TSupF   
maxUD   maxWD  
  0.74         0.00        0.00        75.29*     98.90* 
Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure:     2 
LWZ:            2 
BIC:          2 
Breakpoint found 
390, 592 (2008/10/23, 2009/08/03) 
Note 
m : maximum number of breakpoint; h : minimum length of distance; *: significant at 5% level 
 
Lithuania and Germany’s Risk premium 
Specifications 
tz =ar(1)    q =1 p =0     h =202  m =5      =0.15 
Tests 
(1)TSupF   
(2)TSupF   
(3)TSupF   
(4)TSupF   
(5)TSupF   
(2 |1)TSupF  
2.56      3.06       5.26      11.43*      9.04*       8.46 
(3 | 2)TSupF  
(4 | 3)TSupF  
(5 | 4)TSupF  
maxUD  maxWD  
  8.81      39.73       2.05        11.43*   19.84* 
Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure:     0 
LWZ:            1 
BIC:          2 
Breakpoint found 
402 (2008/11/10) 
Note 
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m : maximum number of breakpoint; h : minimum length of distance; *: significant at 5% level 
 
Netherlands and Germany’s Risk premium 
Specifications 
tz =ar(1)    q =1     p =0     h = 78    m =5      =0.15 
Tests 
(1)TSupF     
(2)TSupF     
(3)TSupF     
(4)TSupF     
(5)TSupF     
(2 |1)TSupF  
1.59         1.76         1.76         1.42         1.06          1.78  
(3 | 2)TSupF     
(4 | 3)TSupF     
(5 | 4)TSupF     
maxUD     maxWD  
1.96            0.58           0.00          1.76       2.53 
Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure:     0 
LWZ:            0 
BIC:          0 
Breakpoint found 
0 
Note 
m : maximum number of breakpoint; h : minimum length of distance; *: significant at 5% level 
 
Belgium and Germany’s Risk premium 
Specifications 
tz =ar(1)    q =1     p =0     h = 78     m =5      =0.15 
Tests 
(1)TSupF     
(2)TSupF     
(3)TSupF     
(4)TSupF     
(5)TSupF     
(2 |1)TSupF  
20.36*       61.01*       47.72*      37.81*       38.79 *       105.19 * 
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(3 | 2)TSupF     
(4 | 3)TSupF     
(5 | 4)TSupF     
maxUD     maxWD  
22.89*          4.94           4.94         61.01*      85.12* 
Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure:     3 
LWZ:            2 
BIC:          2 
Breakpoint found 
202, 280, 360 (2008/10/08, 2009/01/26, 2009/05/18) 
Note 
m : maximum number of breakpoint; h : minimum length of distance; *: significant at 5% level 
 
Latvia and Germany’s Risk premium 
Specifications 
tz =ar(9)    q =1     p =0     h = 78     m =5      =0.15 
Tests 
(1)TSupF     
(2)TSupF     
(3)TSupF     
(4)TSupF     
(5)TSupF     
(2 |1)TSupF  
22.94*      14.41*       10.22*       12.39*       7.71*        17.44* 
(3 | 2)TSupF     
(4 | 3)TSupF     
(5 | 4)TSupF     
maxUD     maxWD  
20.02*          12.66*          0.00        22.94*      22.94* 
Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure:     3 
LWZ:            0 
BIC:          2 
Breakpoint found 
113, 191, 388 (2008/06/05, 2008/09/23, 2009/06/25) 
Note 
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m : maximum number of breakpoint; h : minimum length of distance; *: significant at 5% level 
 
Lithuania and Germany’s Risk premium 
Specifications 
tz =ar(1)    q =1    p =0     h = 78      m =5      =0.15 
Tests 
(1)TSupF     
(2)TSupF     
(3)TSupF     
(4)TSupF     
(5)TSupF     
(2 |1)TSupF  
25.92*       11.63*       12.38*      11.92*        9.54*       14.42* 
(3 | 2)TSupF     
(4 | 3)TSupF     
(5 | 4)TSupF     
maxUD     maxWD  
8.02           7.66            0.00         25.92*     25.92* 
Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure:     2 
LWZ:            0 
BIC:          2 
Breakpoint found 
190, 398 (2008/09/22, 2009/07/09) 
Note 
m : maximum number of breakpoint; h : minimum length of distance; *: significant at 5% level 
 
Denmark and Germany’s Risk premium 
Specifications 
tz =ar(1)    q =1     p =0     h = 78      m =5      =0.15 
Tests 
(1)TSupF     
(2)TSupF     
(3)TSupF     
(4)TSupF     
(5)TSupF     
(2 |1)TSupF  
13.76*       8.41*        5.71         4.59        3.63          8.17 
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(3 | 2)TSupF     
(4 | 3)TSupF     
(5 | 4)TSupF     
maxUD     maxWD  
6.26            1.52          0.00         13.76*      13.76* 
Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure:     1 
LWZ:            0 
BIC:          0 
Breakpoint found 
242 (2008/12/03) 
Note 
m : maximum number of breakpoint; h : minimum length of distance; *: significant at 5% level 
Sweden and Germany’s Risk premium 
Specifications 
tz =ar(1)    q =1    p =0     h = 78      m =5      =0.15 
Tests 
(1)TSupF     
(2)TSupF     
(3)TSupF     
(4)TSupF     
(5)TSupF     
(2 |1)TSupF  
0.89         0.44       10.78*        8.08         6.45         0.67 
(3 | 2)TSupF     
(4 | 3)TSupF     
(5 | 4)TSupF     
maxUD     maxWD  
5.05           0.51          0.00          10.78*     15.52* 
Number of breaks selected 
Sequential Procedure:     0 
LWZ:            0 
BIC:          0 
Breakpoint found 
238 (2008/11/27) 
Note 
m : maximum number of breakpoint; h : minimum length of distance; *: significant at 5% level 
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Appendix 5 Impulse Response 
Exchange rate 
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